(2013) "Mediating Objects. Scientific and Public Functions of Models in Nineteenth-Century Biology" History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences (original) (raw)
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Mediating objects: scientific and public functions of models in nineteenth-century biology
History and philosophy of the life sciences, 2013
The aim of this article is to examine the scientific and public functions of two- and three-dimensional models in the context of three episodes from nineteenth-century biology. I argue that these models incorporate both data and theory by presenting theoretical assumptions in the light of concrete data or organizing data through theoretical assumptions. Despite their diverse roles in scientific practice, they all can be characterized as mediators between data and theory. Furthermore, I argue that these different mediating functions often reflect their different audiences that included specialized scientists, students, and the general public. In this sense, models in nineteenth-century biology can be understood as mediators between theory, data, and their diverse audiences.
Models in philosophy of biology: a pragmatic approach
The term model in philosophy of biology points at a number of non-coincident concepts. Such a multiplicity - I argue - can hinder debates, especially those in which multiple, heterogeneous elements are eligible as models. I argue that the goal of defining shared and uniform criteria for the identification of models in biology seems not achievable, and thus suggest a pragmatic approach: I propose the choice of model concept to be shared, contextual and functional to the single discussion in philosophy of biology; I also recommend as much clarity as possible about the local intended meaning of the term model. The model notion was brought “in centre stage” in philosophy of biology in the 1980s by authors (mainly Lloyd, Beatty, and Thompson) within the “semantic view of theories”. The concept of a model, strictly understood as meta-mathematical, was seen on the one hand as an improvement - relative to the logical empiricist “received view” (e.g. Suppe 1977) - for specifying the axiomatic structure of theories, on the other hand as a particularly appropriate description of the mathematical core of evolutionary biology. i.e. population genetics (e.g. Lloyd 1988), especially through the “state spaces” approach (Van Fraassen 1980). The semantic view and the model concept were also presented as resources for characterizing biology rightfully as a science, meeting some of its peculiarities such as the lack of “universal laws”. In the years that followed, the concept of model remained central in philosophical accounts of biology, but while the semantic view stood as an inclusive “big tent” (Godfrey-Smith 2006) the model concept diversified, drifting away from the primal logic-mathematical formulation (e.g. Downes 1992). Very soon, for instance, the variety of degrees of abstractions of models and the contextual nature of their relationships with the world were acknowledged (Giere 1988). Besides mathematical models, philosophers of biology began to consider and define other kinds of scientific models, like e.g. experimental laboratory systems or simulations, coming up to include among models even museum specimens and collections (Griesemer 1990). Recent works (Morgan & Morrison 1999) pointed out the heterogeneity of scientific models, the absence of general rules for their building, and their partial autonomy from both “world” and theories. Despite such a multiplication, the concept of model often appears in philosophical debates with insufficient specification, or without an agreement fitting with the discussed phenomena. As an instance, I conducted an analysis of the recent debate on “fitness landscapes” (Wright 1932) in evolutionary biology (e.g. Provine 1986; Ruse 1992; Skipper 2004; Kirkpatrick & Rousset 2005; Pigliucci & Kaplan 2006, 2008; Reiss 2007; Calcott 2008; Wilkins & Godfrey-Smith 2009). The analysis shows how diverging conceptions of model can confuse the debate, or prevent it from reaching issues by bending it towards general clarifications about models. Cases like this are particularly complex in that they offer different elements as potential candidates to the role of model (mathematical equations, diagrams with multiple interpretations, verbal descriptions, and more) and also potentially alternative terms like “theory” and “metaphor”. At present it is difficult to require, for the model category, universal criteria - whether they concern peculiar building strategies, particular relationships with world or theory, constitutional requirements or whatever else. It seems more promising to adopt a pragmatic approach (e.g. Plutynski 2004) that considers the scientific context to establish, case by case, “what counts as a model and how”. From such an approach stems a precautional request of clarification, agreement, and functionality of the meaning of model in debates in philosophy of biology.
Laws, Models, and Theories in Biology: A Unifying Interpretation
Springer eBooks, 2020
Author's personal copy 164 scientific practice (Achinstein 1968; Hesse 1966; Harré 1970), as well as investigating what role analogies and metaphors play in the construction of models (Black 1962; Hesse 1966) or of other components, linked to these, raised by historicist philosophers, such as exemplars (Kuhn 1970). At the present time, the importance of models in scientific practice is being emphasized. The semantic view-which deals with the subject matter of models within the framework of a general conception of scientific theories-is being imposed as an alternative to the classical and historicist views of scientific theories, 1 and model views of science are being developed-which deal with questions of the relationship between models and experience and between models and general theories independently of a general metatheory of science (
Routledge encyclopedia of …, 2009
In recent years, much attention has been given by philosophers to the ubiquitous role of models and modeling in the biological sciences. Philosophical debates has focused on several areas of discussion. First, the term ‗model' is applied to a bewildering array of objects in biology from mathematical structures, graphical displays, computer simulations, to concrete organisms. Each of these objects seems so different it raises the question of whether there is some one thing which is a model. Philosophers are investigating whether a unifying account of models can be found. Second, biologists rarely have fundamental theories as in physics and chemistry, but do have a variety of models. Many philosophers and biologists have suggested that biological theories are nothing more than a collection or family of models. Third, models are traditionally evaluated by their statistical fit to data or their explanatory power. However, biological models are highly idealizedliterally falsewhich can undercut their empirical adequacy and explanatory worth. As a result, biological models are often evaluated for the heuristic functions possibly unrelated to empirical adequacy and truth.
Sacrifices on the Altar of Science: The Case of Model Organisms
European Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, 2024
This research traces and examines specific examples of the application of model organisms during the experimentation of biomedical sciences and psychology. The main purpose of the study is to compare how scientists utilize animal models for experiments with specific cases of humans who were used as test subjects, focusing on methodologies and main motivations. A core question that motivated this work is: Can we use the term ‘‘model organisms’’ to refer to human beings? In other words, can human beings be considered analogue models, specifically model organisms? This study will try to respond to the above question, by drawing upon theoretical frameworks and definitions from the field of philosophy of science, particularly focusing on the concepts of the analogue model, model organisms, and animal model. It will also analyze specific examples of experimental utilization of animal models, such as Hippocratic physicians’ experiments involving goat brains, Galen's experiments on a pig during the Greco-Roman period, and the utilization of guinea pigs in modern scientific research. Finally, the study will examine historical examples where humans were used as test subjects including the Nazi medical experiments during World War II and the Stanford prison experiment conducted by psychology professor Philip G. Zimbardo.
Metascience, 2003
How have various forms of explanation-the models, metaphors, and machines of the subtitle-contributed to biologists' understanding of development over the course of the last century? This book is not a philosophical work on explanation, and the reader expecting it to be one will be disappointed. Instead, it is a largely historical and, to some extent, sociological, survey of what has counted as an explanation, for whom and, in a limited way, why. While Keller makes passing reference to some standard philosophical concerns about explanation, this is not her focus. This might be taken to be a serious flaw in the book, but it must be acknowledged that she explicitly states that her goal is not to resolve extant questions about the nature of explanation, but rather to raise new questions. Furthermore, she describes her work here as "empirical rather than philosophical (at least in the strict sense of the term), and hence as complementing rather than supplementing more traditional work in the philosophy of explanation" (p. 5). The question, then, is whether she really does raise new questions and whether these questions open up new directions for inquiry into the nature of explanation? The book is divided into three sections. In the first, Keller explores several explanations of development that were developed in the first part of the twentieth century using mathematical or material models. (Model organisms are mentioned only in passing at the beginning of Chapter 2 and in the introduction to the second section of the book.) She focuses primarily on the work of Stéphane Leduc, D'Arcy Thompson, and Alan Turing and examines how the models developed by these men failed to exert any substantial influence on experimental biology, noting the existence of an epistemic divide between theoretical and experimental biology with early versions of a mathematical biology at this time falling clearly within the realm of the theoretical. These models were largely non