" Who Doesn't? " —The Impact of Descriptive Norms on Corruption (original) (raw)
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Corruption and corruption perception can be considered as cultural phenomena because they depend on how a society understands the rules and what constitutes a deviation. Indeed, it does not depend only on societies but also on personal values and moral vies. While a person ...