Water Resource Competition in the Brahmaputra River Basin: China, India, and Bangladesh (original) (raw)
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Raging Waters: China, India, Bangladesh, and Brahmaputra River Politics
Marine Corps University Press, 2018
Raging Waters: China, India, Bangladesh, and Brahmaputra River Politics provides greater understanding of the equities and drivers fueling water insecurity and resource competition in the Brahmaputra River basin. It also considers security implications at the subnational, bilateral, and basin-wide levels of analysis. Drawing on original research conducted in the three countries—China, India, and Bangladesh—the authors offer recommendations for policy makers to take steps to manage rising water resource competition. By focusing on shared interests and solutions that address underlying long-term water needs and economic development of the basin, Brahmaputra stakeholders can draw on the book’s findings to strengthen regional security. Originating in China and traveling through India and Bangladesh, the Brahmaputra is an underexamined river basin whose management raises serious concerns for regional stability. China and India are actively constructing dams and considering water diversion plans, while Bangladesh faces human security pressures that will be magnified by upstream river practices. Unlike the Indus or Ganges Rivers, there is no bilateral or multilateral accord for management of the Brahmaputra River. Moreover, the basin is home to three of the most populous nations in the world—two of which (China and India) fought a war in 1962 over still-contested territory through which the Brahmaputra flows.
Strategic Analysis, 2013
The Himalayan river system, which is made up of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers, has a combined drainage area that covers the countries of China, India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. The basin of the Indus river, which originates in the Tibetan plateau, is the lifeline of regions in China, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan. The perception of the subcontinent being an India-centric region does not arise solely from the disparities in resources and power, but also from the geographic reality of all countries in the region sharing a border with India, and some of the most significant rivers passing through its territory. India, thus, stands in a unique position to initiate vigorous multilateral cooperation on water issues in the region. Despite this, the low level of integration, perennial conflicts, mistrust and misinformation that have plagued relations between South Asian countries have hindered regional cooperation on water security. Although multilateral cooperation on basin management is the ideal solution to water security issues in South Asia, due to the low level of regional integration, this may be preceded by holistic bilateral cooperation between two suitable countries. India has already had military conflicts with two of its co-riparian neighbours, Pakistan and China. The continuing discord between India and these two countries on a variety of issues is bound to hamper any comprehensive collaboration on river basin management. Bangladesh has maintained friendly ties with India since its independence but has never been subservient to her larger neighbour. This is exemplified by the vocal and constant protests by policymakers and civil society against India’s denial of the downstream country’s rightful share of water resources. Bangladesh and India, owing to their unique relationship, could be ideal partners to initiate robust cooperation on bilateral river basin management, which may set a precedent for multilateral cooperation on water security in South Asia. The two issues currently being negotiated bilaterally—an agreement to share the waters of the Teesta river and reviewing the impact of the proposed Tipaimukh Dam—thus present ideal opportunities to envision the advantages of cooperation by Bangladesh and India on water issues, as transcending national interests to impact regional ones.
Water Scarcity in Bangladesh: Transboundary Rivers, Conflict and Cooperation
In Part 1 of this report we present the two major bilateral treaties on river water in South Asia, i.e. the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan and the Ganges Water Treaty between India and Bangladesh, as well as the various water cooperation agreements between India and Nepal, to illustrate the successes, failures and ongoing challenges of South Asian transboundary river water management. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan was signed in 1960 and recognized as a landmark of cooperation between the two countries. The treaty resolved a 12-year dispute between the signatories regarding their respective rights over the waters of the Indus Basin, and has since survived three wars between India and Pakistan. The key framework for water-sharing between India and Bangladesh is the Ganges treaty on riverine water-sharing, signed in 1996. This treaty was also the outcome of a longstanding dispute over sharing of transboundary river water, especially following construction of the Farakka Barrage by India in West Bengal around 16 km upstream of the Bangladesh border. The Ganges Water Treaty assumes equitable sharing of river waters, subject to an impact review by either party. However, when it became evident that the flow at Farakka was far less than anticipated in the treaty, further negotiations were required to enable a compromise beyond the treaty’s initial agreement. Despite agreements being reached by state representatives, civil society and political actors across South Asia continue to question why their government is allowing the waters of ‘their’ rivers to be used by a neighbouring state. Part 2 presents findings from our case study of Bangladesh, starting with a review of patterns of rainfall and river flow as factors that exert a crucial influence on water availability in Bangladesh. The focus of our study is on key transboundary rivers that are central to Bangladeshi debates on upstream dams and diversion schemes. While our research does not indicate that there have been substantial declines or shifts in rainfall across Bangladesh over the past decades, more concerning is the long-term decline in the flow of the Ganges–Padma, which many assume to be exacerbated by the operation of the Farakka Barrage. Although the decline in river flow volumes began well before construction of the barrage, we suggest that its operation may be canceling out natural long-term cyclical patterns to create new average flows that are lower than those of the mid-20th century. Perhaps more importantly, our analysis has found no clear relationship between water scarcity and conflict in the past two decades, although in the case of the Ganges–Padma river there are indications that more conflict events have occurred as flow volumes have decreased, supported by interview data on several instances where violent and non-violent conflicts have arisen over the issue of water availability. Given increasing uncertainties over water supply, domestic water-sharing policies should therefore be considered as supporting not only livelihoods but also security. While it is essential to understand macro changes in South Asia’s climate and water ecosystems, good water management also requires an understanding of local dynamics in areas dependent on river water, including grassroots perceptions of water-related challenges and popular views about their causes. The stakeholder analysis made it clear that communication between water management policymakers and affected populations along the rivers is minimal, and that a very significant knowledge gap exists between policymakers and affected populations. Those who are facing the consequences of water management policies and projects are largely ignorant about decisionmaking and are not invited into policymaking processes, nor are their views sought by policymakers. As a result, policymakers do not have sufficient information about local challenges, views and interests. However, as a result of developments in the media, local residents are now becoming more aware of water-related issues, while projects such as the Tipaimukh Dam have become a burning issue of civil society protests, especially in the Sylhet area downstream of the proposed dam. Our study revealed a further communication gap and gap in awareness between policymakers and knowledge producers, and a lack of expert involvement in policymaking. Finally, there are also barriers to civil society contributions to decisionmaking. The danger is that policymaking outcomes are more influenced by political rivalry than by comprehensive scientific assessments of water-related challenges. Although bilateral treaties still form the primary mode of cooperation on transboundary rivers in South Asia, multilateral frameworks and transboundary River Basin Organizations (RBOs) are attracting increasing attention in the region as potential avenues forward in dealing with water challenges, as described in Part 3 of this report. The term ‘transboundary river basin organization’ describes a wide range of organizational types performing various functions, generally including most (if not all) of the countries within a particular river basin. The legal frameworks and statutes of these institutions are often determined by the basin’s context and history and the mandate given to the body established by the member states. This project looked specifically at the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), Mekong River Commission (MRC) and South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI) in order to illustrate their relevance for the region of study and explore possibilities for extracting important lessons relevant across cases. Whereas NBI and MRC are among the organizations often used as examples of comparatively successful transboundary water cooperation, SAWI is a relatively new multilateral framework initiative, and, so far, is the only multilateral initiative on transboundary waters in South Asia. It is therefore important to investigate this initiative, to inform the further development of multilateral river-basin cooperation on river water management in South Asia in general and Bangladesh in particular.
Sovereign States and Surging Water: Brahmaputra River between China and India
2015
Brahmaputra river basin is one of the most vulnerable areas in the world subject to combined effects of glacier melt, extreme monsoon rainfall and sea level rise. Water is emerging as a new possible irritant between China and India. For India, Water of Brahmaputra constitutes a major lifeline for people of Tibet and North Eastern states. The building of dams and diversion projects in Tibet by China is a matter of grave concern for lower riparian states. For China, it is having hidden inclination to create employment potentials for more than millions of people by making Brahmaputra diversion project forward. The requirement of fresh water as the pollution grows and population rise has forced China to have the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River project. The objective of this paper is to focus the reaction of both people on the water diversion issue, disastrous ecological consequences and the urgent necessity for having a water treaty between Asian giants. It also examines the hegemonic tendencies of China on Brahmaputra River & exercise of power for economic gains and outcomes. The policies China takes on trans-Boundary Rivers are not symptom of peaceful nature of its rise. In addition, it establishes the fact that sharing of information, ecosystem-friendly policies, thought and mutual understanding will dispel the suspicion and develop trust between two countries, creating an enabling environment for better management of Brahmaputra River.
Bangladesh-India Water Sharing Disputes: Possible Policy Responses (Journal of Bangladesh Studies)
2012
This paper assesses the Bangladesh-India water-sharing disputes which date back to the early 1970s with India's ill-conceived construction of the Farakka Barrage on the Ganges. Unfortunately, the bypassing of international laws and unilateral diversion of water from transboundary rivers has been the long-standing policy of India. Without any agreement with Bangladesh, it has embarked on constructing dams and diverting water from many transboundary rivers such as Teesta, Gumti, Khowai, Dharla, Dudkumar, Monu etc. India also reportedly blocked rivers such as Muhri, Chagalnaiya, Fulchari, Kachu, and many others in Tripura flowing into Bangladesh. This caused a steady reduction in water flow, mainly due to intensive water diversion by India. Meeting increased water demand of the fast-growing population in the coming decades will be a great challenge for Bangladesh while India continues its non-compromising attitude on water sharing from the international rivers. Against this backdrop, water scarcity will trigger conflicts and instability, its consequences may spill over state borders, and regional tensions will become a threat to international peace and security. The paper argues that the water issue need not be a cause for tension; rather, it can be a catalyst for cooperation as in the eastern Himalayas and Mekong river basin. Such cooperation is the only remedy to avert future water conflicts, obtain collective gains, and ensure sustainable ecosystems.
Policy Recommendations towards Water Sharing Geopolitics between India and Bangladesh
International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education (IJHSSE), 2021
This paper assesses the Bangladesh-India water sharing disputes which dates back to the early 1970s with India’s ill-conceived construction of Farakka Barrage on the Ganges. Unfortunately, the bypassing of the international laws and unilateral diversion of water from trans-boundary Rivers has been the long-standing policy of India. Without any agreement with Bangladesh, it has embarked on constructing dams and diverting water from many trans-boundary rivers such as Teesta, Gumti, Khoowai, Dharla, Dudkumar, Monu etc. India also reportedly blocked rivers such as Muhuri, Chagalnaiya, Fulchari, Kachu and many others in Tripura flowing into Bangladesh. This caused a steady reduction in water flow. Meeting increased water demand for the fast growing population will be a great challenge for Bangladesh, while India continues its non-compromising attitudes on water sharing. Against this backdrop, water scarcity will trigger conflicts and social instability in Bangladesh and it may spill over borders and can be a threat to international peace and security. This research paper argues that the water issues need not to be a cause for tension; rather it can be a catalyst for cooperation between India and Bangladesh. Such cooperation is the only remedy to avert future water conflict obtains collective rights and ensure sustainable ecosystem for both of the country.
Bangladesh-India Water Sharing Disputes: Possible Policy Responses
Journal of Bangladesh Studies, Vol. 14, No.1, 2012
This paper assesses the Bangladesh-India water-sharing disputes which date back to the early 1970s with India's illconceived construction of the Farakka Barrage on the Ganges. Unfortunately, the bypassing of international laws and unilateral diversion of water from transboundary rivers has been the long-standing policy of India. Without any agreement with Bangladesh, it has embarked on constructing dams and diverting water from many transboundary rivers such as Teesta, Gumti, Khowai, Dharla, Dudkumar, Monu etc. India also reportedly blocked rivers such as Muhri, Chagalnaiya, Fulchari, Kachu, and many others in Tripura flowing into Bangladesh. This caused a steady reduction in water flow, mainly due to intensive water diversion by India. Meeting increased water demand of the fast-growing population in the coming decades will be a great challenge for Bangladesh while India continues its non-compromising attitude on water sharing from the international rivers. Against this backdrop, water scarcity will trigger conflicts and instability, its consequences may spill over state borders, and regional tensions will become a threat to international peace and security. The paper argues that the water issue need not be a cause for tension; rather, it can be a catalyst for cooperation as in the eastern Himalayas and Mekong river basin. Such cooperation is the only remedy to avert future water conflicts, obtain collective gains, and ensure sustainable ecosystems.
Research Journal Social Sciences, 2016
This paper analyses the hydro-political dynamics and reviews the various challenges to environmental security in the context of trans-boundary water relations between Bangladesh and India, in South Asia. Environmental security is understood as the state of " absence of conflicts, explicit or latent " in the socioeconomic and ecological space of human existence. The spatial scope of trans-boundary waters is defined in the present study as the physical extent of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) basin, with the role of the river construed as a channel for the movement of water; generation, transport and deposition of sediments by the flows; and support to ecosystems and biodiversity. The paper then moves on to identify and discuss the ecosystem processes and services provided by the flows, highlights the critical linkages between human interventions and environmental security. It emphasizes that the present perceptions of reductionist engineering have generated a hydro-political situation prone to generation of disputes over the sharing of flows, especially during the lean season, in the numerous trans-boundary rivers shared between Bangladesh and India. It discusses the need for ensuring overall environmental security related to the trans-boundary flows that need to be based on an ecological perspective. By addressing the limitations of the reductionist engineering vision of trans-boundary waters, this paper emphasizes the need for a framework of an ecologically informed holistic engineering for reducing hydro-political tensions. The need is for a model of hydro-diplomacy in the region based on a negotiated balance between the totality of ecosystem processes and services as well as human well-being.
Brahmaputra River : A bone of contention between India and China
2016
The building of dams and diversion projects in Tibet by China is a matter of grave concern for lower riparian states. The requirement of fresh water as the pollution grows and population rise has forced China to have the TsangpoBrahmaputra River project. India is also racing to construct hydropower dams on the Brahmaputra River to take advantage of the river’s hydropower potentials. The nub of the resource competition thus connects with mass dam building and diversion plans. The Brahmaputra is now the target of project planning by both China and India. This article is a modest attempt for enquiring into the reaction of both people on the water diversion issue, disastrous ecological consequences due to race for dams building and the urgent necessity for having a water treaty between Asian giants. In addition, it establishes the fact that sharing of information, ecosystem-friendly policies, thought and mutual understanding will dispel the suspicion and develop trust between two countr...