The Institutional Determinants of Political Transactions (original) (raw)
Policymaking in Latin America, How Politics Shape Policies
What determines the capacity of countries to design, approve, and implement effective public policies? To address this question, this book builds on the results of case studies of political institutions, policymaking processes, and policy outcomes in eight Latin American countries, structured around a common methodology with foundations in game theory and institutional analysis. The result is a volume that benefits from both micro detail on the intricacies of policymaking in individual countries and a broad cross-country interdisciplinary analysis of policymaking processes in the region.
Determinantes institucionales de transacciones políticas
2007
Public policies are the outcome of the interaction among a variety of key political actors, each with its own preferences and incentives, who meet in different arenas and interact within the constraints of the institutions that frame their engagement. Therefore, to recognize the reasons behind the success or failure of any public policy it is necessary to understand the country's political institutions and the policymaking process they in turn help shape.
Political Institutions, Actors, and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking
2010
In the past thirty years, democratic freedom and competitive electoral processes have taken hold as never before in Latin America. is book zeroes in on the intricate workings of democratic institutions, the actors that participate in democratic systems, and the arenas in which political and policy interactions take place in Latin America. e focus is on how those institutions, actors, and arenas a ect the policymaking processes (PMP) of Latin American countries for better or worse.
Latin American Politics and Society
he initial inspiration for this project came from the work on Argentina by two of the editors of this book, Pablo Spiller and Mariano Tommasi, reflected in their book, The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina (Cambridge University Press, 2007). In that work, Spiller and Tommasi developed a methodology that, with some refinements and adaptations, became the basis for the conceptual framework used in the related volume Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies, published in this series in 2008. While that volume focuses on country cases, this one looks at the role of specific institutions and actors in the policymaking process. The book is part of a larger agenda on political institutions and policy outcomes in Latin America being carried out by the Research Department of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which includes the 2006 Report on Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, The Politics of Policies. The chapters in this book were written by well-known experts under the auspices of the IDB Research Department, and the coordination of Ernesto Stein and Mariano Tommasi. Luis Estanislao (Koldo) Echebarría, and, in particular, Mark Payne, also helped coordinate part of the work. Carlos Scartascini joined this project at a later stage and was instrumental in transforming a collection of working papers into the cohesive set of chapters that follow. The process of writing the book was highly interactive, with ample opportunities for cross-fertilization among the authors of the chapters, as well as frequent give and take (in both directions) between these authors and the project coordinators. A seminar organized by the IDB in Washington, D.C. in March 2005 was a very important focal point in this interactive process. For their help in organizing this seminar, as well as for their invaluable support during the whole process, we want to thank Norelis Betancourt and Raquel Gómez of the IDB. We would also like to recognize our colleagues at the Research Department of the IDB and at the Universidad de San Andrés for their ACkNOwlEdgmENTS viii support, encouragement, and feedback. Within the IDB, we especially want to recognize the support received from Guillermo Calvo, Santiago Levy, and Eduardo Lora, Chief Economists and Managers of the Research Department at different stages of progress of this project. Without their support, this project would not have been possible. Mariano Tommasi acknowledges the support of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and the Inter-American Development Bank. Apart from the authors of the chapters and those already recognized above, many others deserve recognition for their valuable comments at different stages of the process. These include
How Democracy Works. Political Institutions, Actors, and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking
Over the past 30 years, democratic freedoms and competitive electoral processes have taken hold as never before in Latin America. How Democracy Works takes a detailed look, from an institutional perspective, at each of the main actors on the policymaking stage in Latin America, emphasizing the extent to which institutions facilitate or hinder intertemporal political cooperation and compromise. It analyzes official political actors and arenas, as well as a number of societal actors, and explores the (formal) roles of these players, their incentives, capabilities, and the way in which they actually engage in the policymaking game. The conclusion: these political institutions and actors matter for policymaking in Latin America and leave an indelible imprint on the policy process and the resulting policies.
Political Institutions, Policymaking, and Policy Stability in Latin America
Latin American Politics and …, 2011
In some Latin American nations, policy change occurs frequently, while in others it is stable, less prone to shifts with the prevailing political climate or shocks. The conditions under which institutional rules and the powers of key actors influence the capacity for governance vary, and this variation is seldom addressed in the literature. This project examines the effects of the interactions between key policymakers (the executive and the legislature) in Latin America on policy stability across different institutional frameworks. Countries with simultaneously strong executives and weak legislatures are shown to have unstable policy environments, as are countries with a history of unified government and, to a lesser extent, candidate-centered electoral systems.
How (Not) to Produce Effective Policies? Institutions and Policymaking in Latin America
The Oxford Handbook of Latin American Political Economy
Analysts and practitioners have always searched for policy recipes to solve the economic and social problems of developing countries. The last "universal recipe" recommended and adopted throughout Latin America were the market-oriented reforms of the 1990s. The varied and less-than-stellar performance that ensued have redirected intellectual attention. The so called "Washington Consensus" has lost its intellectual appeal and has been replaced by a number of initiatives, none of which has completely gained center stage. Perhaps one of the most respected lines of reasoning is the one pioneered by Dani Rodrik and others, which calls for "home-made" as opposed to universal solutions: identify the most binding constraints to development in your country, experiment with policy or institutional innovations to see what works for you, and adjust accordingly. 1 Both the old style policy recipes and the new more eclectic approach place a heavy burden of responsibility on the countries' capacity to develop and implement complex public policies.
2004
Este artículo caracteriza la evolución del proceso de elaboración de políticas (PMP) en Paraguay durante el período 1954-2003. El siguiente trabajo ofrece una perspectiva general del PMP durante la dictadura de Alfredo Stroessner (1954-89) y explora el contexto institucional resultante a partir de 1989. Tras analizar la fragmentación del partido Colorado, se describen los patrones característicos de la elaboración de políticas surgidas con la Constitución de 1992. Se sostiene como hipótesis que la presencia de un amplio número de jugadores con capacidad de veto ha dificultado el cambio y que los legisladores tienden a promover políticas particularistas. Para poner a prueba tal supuesto, utiliza una base de datos que contiene los proyectos de ley ingresados al Congreso desde abril de 1992. Las conclusiones sugieren que el proceso político paraguayo puede ser flexible para generar beneficios particularistas y rígido a la hora de realizar amplias transformaciones de tipo regulatorio o redistributivo.
Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes: The Case of Uruguay
… Processes and Policy …, 2004
Uruguay generates different kinds of policy outcomes. First, relatively stable policies, such as the commercial and financial openness of the country. Second, inflexible and low quality policies, such as those related to social policies, some areas of the State reform (civil servants' wages and hiring mechanisms), the bankruptcy regime, and so on. Third, volatile outcomes across economic shocks, such as the discretionary public spending side. In the cases in which history or the availability of external enforcement devices do not lead to relatively stable policies, the main outer feature of Uruguayan policies is rigidity. The source of rigidity appears to be a mixture of institutional factors (multiple veto points, factionalized parties and direct democracy mechanisms) and political conflict (divergent policy preferences), in which it is very costly to move from the status quo, due to the credible threat of policy reversal. Political institutions in Uruguay are conducive to political compromise with a short run perspective, but not to effective cooperation about stable and flexible policies in the long run. The difficulty to achieve intertemporal political exchanges is consistent with the main characteristics of the political environment: large number of key political actors and veto points, a relevant amount of unobservable political moves, poor enforcement technologies in the economic arena, politically influenced bureaucracy, political exchanges occuring outside the legislative arena, a particular constellation of parties and preferences, and costly policymaking and institutional change.
The Institutional Determinants of State Capabilities in Latin America
F. Bourguignon and B. Pleskovic (eds.) Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics Regional: Beyond Transition. World Bank Publications, 2007.
This paper is part of an agenda that aims to move the discussion away from universal policy recipes toward a focus on the determinants of policy-making capabilities, including the ability to reach societal consensus as a foundation for the credibility and effectiveness of public policies. In this paper we explore the politico-institutional determinants of good public policies.
Institutional incentives and contentious politics in post-Neoliberal era in Latin America (1985-2010
Party Politics, 2023
The article focuses on the supply-side of protest activity in Latin America in the post-neoliberal era. It argues that parties' cohesive voting in Congress under different power constellations and parties' linkage strategy to voters create institutional conditions of power collusion, inter-branch stalemate, or party erosion that delineates political terrain for social mobilization. First, the firm control of a single party or coalition over the executive and legislature with cohesive voting of party members in line with party leadership denotes power collusion and incites underrepresented actors to protest. Second, the dislocation in the executive-legislative relations (either with party members voting against the president's proposals in a majority government or with cohesive opposition bloc(s) acting against the president's will in a minority government) leads to policy immobilism and pushes legislative parties to ignite popular discontent. Third, more programmatic party linkages increase the degree of party institutionalization and predictability about policy commitment and mitigate struggles in extraelectoral arenas. The theoretical argument is tested with a battery of statistical tests that lends credence to the institutional explanations of mass mobilization and corroborated with empirical cases that show the plausibility of the statistical findings in particular contexts.
2008
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS viii help in organizing these seminars, as well as for their invaluable support during the whole process (from the initial call for proposals to the completion of the final drafts), we want to thank Norelis Betancourt and Raquel Gomez. The second of these seminars was co-organized with Jeff Frieden, Stanfield Professor of International Peace at Harvard University, who helped us put together the seminar back to back with the prestigious biannual conference on Political Institutions and Economic Policy (co-organized with Ken Shepsle). Jeff assembled an all-star roster of political scientists (including, in addition to himself, Jim Alt, Robert Bates, Adam Przeworski, and Ken Shepsle) and asked them to provide feedback on different aspects of the overall project. Their invaluable contributions were a key input for the project. Beyond his role in the organization of this seminar, Jeff has provided constant encouragement and feedback, and we owe him a huge debt of gratitude. Similarly, we are very grateful to Fernando Carrillo from the IDB Office in Europe, and to Javier Santiso and BBVA, who hosted a workshop in Madrid so that we could disseminate our findings in Europe, and receive feedback from European scholars.
The Making of Policy: Institutionalized or Not?
American Journal of Political Science, 2012
This paper develops a framework for analyzing different policymaking styles, their causes and their consequences in Latin America, finding that lower institutionalization and greater use of alternative political technologies (APTs) are more likely the lower the cost of using these technologies, the higher the potential damage they can cause, the lower the wealth of the economy, and the more asymmetric the distribution of de jure political power. Moreover, strategic complementarity exists in the use of alternative political technologies; for instance "bribes by the rich" and "protests by the poor" are likely to be countervailing forces, and will both occur in polities with weaker political institutions.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2003
* This paper has been written primarily as a guide for the project "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes" of the Latin American Research Network (Inter-American Development Bank). Its primary audience consists of researchers in the Network's member institutes, for the preparation of proposals to participate in the project. For that reason, some of the language is introductory. Yet, we believe that there is enough new substance to make the paper also suitable for more specialized audiences.
Some Thoughts on the Political Economy of Latin America
Governance, 2005
There are two broad traditions that provide alternative ways of understanding policy choice and the factors that influence the adoption, implementation, and consolidation of economic reform initiatives. The first is called the new political economy (NPE), which applies the tools of economic analysis to political phenomena. The second strand is the new institutionalism, with origins in sociological theory, which stresses concepts of conflict, group consciousness, institutions, and power. The theoretical divide, then, is that between those who draw on economic theory and those who draw on sociology. The first group searches for explanations that apply to large cross sections of countries; the latter prefers the case study approach and insists that political behavior is always rooted in context and specificity.
Why do Institutions Matter? Global Competitiveness and the Politics of Policies in Latin America
Capital & Class, 2009
This paper subjects to critique the 'new institutionalism ' in development policy literature. It highlights the way 'secondgeneration' institutional reform processes in the Latin American region are to be engineered through a politics of global competitiveness while their success is to be gauged, first and foremost, in capital-functional terms The paper culminates in the focused critique of an Inter-American Bank flagship report. The Politics of Policies, which demonstrates the new institutionalism !r prejudice against any form of political leadership that does not seek to guarantee a competitive investment climate as well as an uncompromising commitment to a politics of global competitiveness