Can social systems be autopoietic? Assessing Luhmann's social theory (original) (raw)
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developed an elaborate theory of social and cognitive systems, which combines Maturana and Varela's notion of cognition with Husserlian phenomenology (Arnoldi 2006, p. 117). That is, Luhmann developed the idea of autopoiesis of social systems and recognized that this use of autopoiesis could be problematic (Luhmann 1986, p. 172). As humans are central elements of social systems, it follows that, to be considered as an autopoietic system, a social system must be self-reproducing in terms of humans (Bednarz 1988, p. 61). How could this be possible? Luhmann proposed a very intelligent solution to this paradox. He redefined social systems as being realized in a domain of communication. In other words, the constituent elements of a social system are communications. Therefore, the social system is understood as a network of communication that emerges over time (Nassehi 2005, p. 181). Subsequently, the conditions for autopoiesis have to be evaluated in terms of the self-production of communication (Teubner 1991, p. 235). In fact, Luhmann understands communication not as a diffusion of meaning or information from one person to another but as an autopoietic system that appears out of the doubly dependent meeting of subjects (Arnoldi 2006, p. 116). As a corollary, we can consider that Luhmann's theory is an autopoietic theory of communication (Mingers 2010, p. 158). This means that Niklas Luhmann drew on the new theoretical ideas from systems theory of autopoiesis to produce '.. . the most developed and most radical attempt within contemporary sociology to recast completely the theory of society' (Harrison 1995, p. 65). Luhman suggests that we speak of autopoiesis whenever the elements of a system are reproduced by the elements of the system (Luhmann 1992, p. 128). This criterion, as he points out, is also met by non-biological systems. Apart from living systems, Luhmann identifies two additional types of autopoietic systems: social systems and psychic systems. While living systems reproduce themselves on the basis of life, social systems reproduce themselves on the basis of communication and psychic systems on the basis of consciousness. Furthermore, living systems can be
The autopoiesis of social systems and its criticisms
Constructivist Foundations, 2015
Although the theory of autopoietic systems was originally formulated to explain the phenomenon of life from an operational and temporal perspective, sociologist Niklas Luhmann incorporated it later within his theory of social systems. Due to this adoption, there have been several discussions regarding the applicability of this concept beyond its biological origins. This article addresses the conception of Luhmann’s autopoietic social systems, and confronts this vision with criticism both of the original authors of the concept of autopoiesis and of other social theorists in order to elucidate the main problems of this debate and its possible solutions. We claim that it is justified to extend the concept of autopoiesis from its biological origin to other disciplines, and to develop its interdisciplinary character, following the spirit of systems theory and constructivism.
Heinz von Foerster and Niklas Luhmann: The Cybernetics of Social Systems Theory
Cybernetics and Human Knowing, 2011
I offer a broad comparison between classical and neocybernetic epistemology and sketch the redescription of the subject/object relation as the system/environment relation. I situate von Foerster and Luhmann on the latter side of this comparison and suggest that their shared commitments to a constructivist epistemology informed von Foerster’s approval of Luhmann’s reworking of Maturana and Varela’s concept of autopoiesis.
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B l a c k w e l l P u b l i s h i n g , L t d . O x f o r d , U K J T S B J o u r n a l f o r t h e T h e o r y o f S o c i a l B e h a v i o u r 0 0 2 1 -8 3 0 8 © T h e E x e c u t i v e M a n a g e m e n t C o m m i t t e e / B l a c k w e l l P u b l i s h i n g L t d . 2 0 0 4 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4 3 4 4O r i g i n a l
The Complexity of Self-reference A Critical Evaluation of Luhmann’s Theory of Social Systems
The paper presents the basic elements of Niklas Luhmann's theory of social systems and shows that his theories follow quite naturally from the problem of the reproduction of social systems. The subsequent feature of the self-referentiality of social systems is discussed against the theory of hierarchical loops, as developed in particular by Robert Rosen. It will be shown that Rosen's theory is more general than Luhmann's. The nature of anticipatory systems and the problem of conflict are used as testing grounds to verify some interesting articulations of the general theory of hierarchical loops.
Zygon?, 1999
Replying to the variegated responses by theologian Langdon Gilkey, philosophers Richard McClelland and Robert Deltete, and biologist Rudolf B. Brun, I emphasize three elements of my theological use of autopoietic theory: (1) Autopoietic systems are less than self-constitutive, since they do not create themselves from scratch, but more than self-organizing, since they are capable of producing new elements inside the local system. Correspondingly, the theological importance of autopoietic theory is not found within the doctrine of a creation out of nothing but within the doctrine of nonuniform continuous creation. (2) Locating the concept of autopoiesis within third-generation systems theory, I underline the pluriform character of type-different systems; the possibility of giving a full causal account from the purview of any privileged single systems (including physics) is thus denied. (3) I distinguish between two complementary roles of theology in the dialogue between science and religion: whereas theology1 offers a participatory second-order description of the internal meaning of particular traditions of faith, theology2 provides a third-order inquiry into the external coherence between religious and nonreligious worlds of meaning. Theology2, however, always presupposes the internal descriptions of theology1. On this basis, my use of autopoietic theory is related to the theologies of creation and providence of Paul Tillich and Langdon Gilkey; likewise, I discuss various theological strategies for relating a theology of creation to standard interpretations of evolution.
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The purpose of this paper is to initiate the efforts towards an idea of a third order in cybernetics. Second order cybernetics will be used as a biological basis for social processes. Third order studies mutually observing systems, which endows them features of observed and observing systems. Also, while first cybernetics deals with allopoietic machines, and second with autopoietic or living machines, the object of analysis of third cybernetics is language as a cognitive machine that creates a common domain of interaction between living systems in order to interact. These types of machines are abstract mechanisms that have a basis in the human brain and that store, retrieve, process and create information, and as such is both allopoietic and autopoietic; therefore, cognitive machines are omnipoietic. This paper will also account for the creation of social reality by means of a collective assignation of functions by means of speech acts and will use the philosophical scholarship of J...
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"Knowledge and the communication of knowledge are critical for self-sustaining organizations comprised of people and the tools and machines that extend peoples’ physical and cognitive capacities. Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela proposed the concept of autopoiesis (“self” + “production”) as a definition of life in the 1970s. Nicklas Luhmann extended this concept to establish a theory of social systems, where intangible human social systems were formed by recursive networks of communications. We show here that Luhmann fundamentally misunderstood Maturana and Varela’s autopoiesis by thinking that the self-observation necessary for self-maintenance formed a paradoxically vicious circle. Luhmann tried to resolve this apparent paradox by placing the communication networks on an imaginary plane orthogonal to the networked people. However, Karl Popper’s evolutionary epistemology and the theory of hierarchically complex systems turns what Luhmann thought was a vicious circle into a virtuous spiral of organizational learning and knowledge. There is no closed circle that needs to be explained via Luhmann’s extraordinarily paradoxical linguistic contortions. Keywords: Autopoiesis, Organization Theory, Nicklas Luhman, Social Systems Theory, Self Observation, Karl Popper, Evolutionary Epistemology"
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In this article, we would like to discuss some aspects of a theoretical framework for Artificial Life, focusing on the problem of an explicit definition of living systems useful for an effective artificial construction of them. The limits of a descriptive approach will be critically discussed, and a constructive (synthetic) approach will be proposed on the basis of the autopoietic theory of Maturana and Varela.