A Businessman's Arrest and the Decline of a Regime (original) (raw)

Belarus and the Eurasian Union: Balancing on the sheet

in David Cadier (ed) The Geopolitics of Eurasian Economic Integration, LSE Ideas Report, June 2014 Belarus is Russia’s only formal ally. Therefore Russia will keep subsidizing its economy. Two decades of privileged cooperation in various sectors – economic, political and military – have not led to genuine integration but have cemented an overarching dependency on Russia. Lukashenka’s regime, surfing on Belarus’ symbolic and strategic importance for Russia, has successfully traded off its loyalty at a high price, seldom delivering on promises however. Whilst Russia will continue to keep Belarus`s beleaguered economy afloat, the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent Western response - seen as weak in Minsk - have altered Minsk’s strategic calculus. It is no longer balancing between the EU and Russia, but between integrating economically with the Eurasian Union and being diluted in the so-called Russian World. Belarus, along with Kazakhstan, will sign the Eurasian Union Treaty, but will push hard to keep its privileges and refrain from transferring competences to any kind of supranational body, should this entail abandoning sovereignty to Russia. It will continue extracting rent benefits from its transit situation for Russian exports of hydrocarbons amidst shifting geopolitics in the region. In so doing, Lukashenka’s regime can continue delivering services to Belarusians, thereby expanding its chances of survival in the face of both internal collapse and Russian pressures. .

Divided we fail: Time for the EU to speak with one voice to Belarus

FIIA Briefing paper #85, 2011

Brussels’ attempts to draw Belarus closer to the EU have evidently failed. Active engagement with the regime did not result in democratisation nor a rapprochement with the EU any more than the previous policy of isolation did. • The failure is partly due to persistent divergences within the EU itself: when dealing with Belarus, too many EU members go it alone. Far from being a prudent division of labour, the preference for bilateralism leads to free riding. • Key to understanding the EU’s divisions is how each of the 27 member states perceives Russia’s role in the shared neighbourhood. The incapacity to envisage Belarus outside the frame of relations with Moscow is the main common denominator in the EU countries’ (too) many foreign policies on Belarus. • Whatever its national variations, this scheme prevents the EU from building a realistic partnership with Belarus. This trend should urgently be reversed, in fact, since it plays into the hands of the regime and pushes it back into the arms of Moscow. • To remedy this situation, the EU should not only speak with one voice, but in a language that the authorities understand: pragmatism. Provided that Minsk sets political prisoners free, a roadmap for the conditional support of economic reforms and gradual regime evolution can be negotiated. • A coalition of the willing should be formed to carry out the task. Regional leadership is needed, but under the supervision of EU member states able to broker the new deal with the Belarusian elites.

More State than Nation: Lukashenko’s Belarus

Journal of International Affairs, 2011

Belarus, a post-Soviet country ruled by Alexander Lukashenko since 1994, is a case of a contemporary regime that reverted to authoritarianism after a brief stint as an independent democracy. While some of the characteristics of the Belarusian system are typical of other nondemocratic regimes around the world and in the post-communist region in particular, others are distinct and set Belarus apart. This article emphasizes the role that social cohesion and national-identity formation play in perpetuating the current system.

" The Election Game: " Authoritarian Consolidation Processes in Belarus

Democratizatsiya: The Journal for Post-Soviet Democratization, 2017

Elections without content are characteristic of electoral authoritarianism. This article illustrates how the “election game” featuring “elections for the sake of elections” can contribute to the consolidation of an authoritarian regime. It analyzes how Belarusian authorities’ “menu of manipulation” shaped both the discourse and “practice” of “politics” in favor of the current system. Using selective repression – targeting mainly those openly wanting to change the status quo, while allowing some controlled openness for individuals, as long as they refrain from “doing politics” – discouraged political activism and contributed to a negative perception of the “opposition” as a noisy sub-group of the population. Such developments reinforced a perception of organized politics in general, and elections in particular, as abstract, unattractive and irrelevant to most.

Preventing a Colour Revolution: The Belarusian example as an illustration for the Kremlin

Much has been written about Russian authoritarian promotion in the former-Soviet Union and further afield, but there has been little analysis of Russian learning from other regimes. This article argues that the Belarusian regime provides lessons to Moscow for overcoming democratic protests, having learnt from the 2000 overthrow of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia. The Belarusian case therefore expands a literature primarily centred on Russia, extending understanding of authoritarian learning and questioning Russia's role as the primary authoritarian promoter in the region.

The Sundry Motivations of Caucasians in Ukraine (The Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst)

One attribute of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas area has been numerous speculations on the involvement of foreign fighters on both sides to conflict. Amid the diverse body of volunteers and mercenaries involved in the war, Chechens and other North Caucasians have received particular attention due to their fame as fierce warriors, and because their involvement in the conflict on the side of pro-Russian forces has constituted solid evidence of Moscow’s military engagement in the war. Yet the fact that Caucasian volunteers participate also on the Ukrainian side, and the ambivalence toward the conflict locally in the North Caucasus, demonstrate the diversity of motives and incentives inducing Caucasians to fight in Ukraine.