Consenting to Gender? Trans Spouses after Same-Sex Marriage in Barker, N and Monk, D (eds.) From Civil Partnership to Same-Sex Marriage 2004-2014: Interdisciplinary Reflections (Routledge): 79-94 (Pre-Publication Version) (original) (raw)

We are Family (Sometimes): Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships after Fitzpatrick

Edinburgh Law Review, 2000

Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association is offundamental importance as thefirst time that the House of Lords has held that a same-sex couple can he a “family” for certain legal purposes. It consigns the concept of a “pretended family relationship” to the dustbin of history and is one of a line of important decisions from supreme courts around the world which, in different ways, are developing the law in the same direction. This article analyses Fitzpatrick and explores how it relates to international developments in discrimination law. It also identifies Scottish statutes which may now be accessible by same-sex couples in this jurisdiction and explores how similar foreign statutes are already accessible by such couples.

A critical evaluation of the law on same-sex marriage

2015

The aim of this research is to identify why LGBTQ people are prohibited from the institution of Marriage and to critically plot the development of same-sex marriage and legally recognised same-sex partnerships within England and Wales. An examination of why LGBTQ people are statute barred from the established act of Marriage but have only been able to enter into a formal legal partnership (CPA 2004) inferred as second-class in comparison to the status of Marriage will be explored at length. Equality is a central theme throughout, but specifically I discuss the effect of same-sex partnership legislation along with an examination of the development of a system to recognise actual same-sex marriage. The institution of Marriage, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 are all separate institutions, and I will discuss their relationship to each other, along with a comparison of other jurisdictions with same-sex provisions currently in operation. The co...

Genders that don't matter: Non-binary people and the Gender Recognition Act 2004

In: Raj, Senthorun and Dunne, Peter, eds. The Queer Outside in Law: Recognising LGBTIQ People in the United Kingdom. Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies . Palgrave. ISBN 978-3-030-48829-1, 2020

In July 2017 the UK government committed to "streamlining" the process for a legal change of gender in England and Wales. At present, the legal recognition of a change of gender is conditional upon applicants submitting two detailed medical reports certifying their diagnosis with "gender dysphoria", as well as a number of documents that attest to the "permanence" of their so-called "new" gender. In addition, legal recognition is limited to those applicants who identify-at least for the purpose of the application process-with a binary system of sex/gender. Drawing on comparable legal frameworks, this chapter will consider the limitations of the current legal framework regarding non-binary people, as well as the potential changes proposed more recently.

The Denial of Opposite-Sex Couples' Access to Civil Partnership as Discrimination

2016

As a result of the extension of marriage via the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, same-sex couples can choose whether to secure formal legal recognition of their relationship via marriage or civil partnership. In Steinfeld and Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 128 (Admin), the claimant couple argued that sections 1 and 3(1)(a) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, which restrict eligibility to enter into civil partnership to same-sex couples, were incompatible with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights taken together with Article 8, and sought a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Andrews J dismissed their application for judicial review, reasoning on alternative grounds. Firstly, the claim did not fall within Article 14 read together with Article 8. Secondly, were the couples’ claim seen to fall within the ambit of Article 14 read together with Article 8, differential treatment of same-sex and opposite-sex couples in terms of their access to civil partnership was objectively justified (para. 86). The High Court judgment in Steinfeld is important in four respects: first, it highlights the importance of seeing the couple’s discrimination claim as equality-based, which means it is properly addressed by the courts, rather than Parliament; second, it demonstrates the impact of the uncertainty over the relationship between domestic and ECtHR jurisprudence; third, it underlines the difficulties of relying on the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in Wilkinson v Kitzinger and another (No 2) [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam) in this context; fourth, it evidences significant assumptions made in this context about both the immutability and flexibility in the meaning of civil partnership and marriage, as well as the nature and relevance of the public interest to any reform of civil partnership.