Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy (original) (raw)
Related papers
Military Doctrine in International Relations Strategy for the
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, 2015
Abstract: All life is preparedness for a great event that might never occur. The fundamental idea for the security of the state in question is military doctrine, which also aims to develop goals and tasks of the military policy of the state, and the identification of priority interests, and to express its position on issues of war and areas of use of military force and the drafting of combat missions assigned to the forces of the state in time of war or peace, and the diagnosis of the nature of the actual and potential military threats against the state and the nature of future war that can be plugged in the state, as well as for characterization methods by which to repel any aggression by military means and to develop new concepts of military strategies, and guidance on preparation of the State for the purpose of defending the territory of the State and the safety of its soil. The differences between religious belief and military doctrine. Some people who were not familiar with the term "military doctrine" that this term is given by a specific researcher or some academics or that the use of metaphor for the phrase "doctrine", or something else similar ; but many interested readers know that the military doctrine or army dogma as it is known, in some countries in the world is the basis corner for the definition of an army and military force. The military side includes the military doctrine, combat doctrine or creed combat and focus of the combat doctrine to direct destruction of the armed forces of the enemy, that means the combat doctrine in this sense, means the adoption of principles, methods and tactics of certain aims to destroy the armed force of the enemy side. There are a lot of military doctrines in this aspect. such as the doctrine of realistic intimidation: adopted by the United States and studied in the Soviet military schools previously chosen here to highlight the concept of military doctrine in this paper. The Doctrine of hybrid war dominates the world's conflicts and makes it more complex, strategic analysts consider that the 'hybrid wars' blend the deadly conflict of the State with fanatical zeal and prolong irregular warfare. Key words: Military Doctrine, Military Strategies, Big Powers, Role of The Army
The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, 1993
Great Powers in the international system exercise power and influence beyond their own borders. Necessarily, they make commitments to others whose survival they find vital and procure the military capability not just to defend themselves, but also to meet any international commitments they have made. For the United States, the transition from potential to full-fledged Great Power was delayed by domestic political constraints on military spending and on extending overseas commitments. Knowledge of these constraints, not typically discussed in international relations theory, is an essential prerequisite to understanding an otherwise inexplicable incoherence in U.S. grand strategy in the late 1930s and 1940s. In general, successful deterrence requires both commitment and capability. Capability, essential to credible threats of retaliation, must be matched by believable commitments and clear signals of desires and intentions. A strategy of deterrence cannot succeed if an adversary does not know how it is expected to behave and does not believe threats of retaliation. This is especially true if a state hopes to extend An earlier version was presented at the Conference on the Political Economy of Grand Strategy, UCLA, March 15-17, 1990. I offer my thanks also to conference participants, an anonymous referee, Amy Davis, and Robert Jervis for comments.
The Challenge Of Grand Strategy The Great Powers And The Broken Balance Between The World Wars
2016
The years between the world wars represent an era of broken balances: the retreat of the United States from global geopolitics, the weakening of Great Britain and France, Russian isolation following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the resurgence of German power in Europe, and the rise of Japan in East Asia. All these factors complicated great-power politics. This book brings together historians and political scientists to revisit the conventional wisdom on the grand strategies pursued between the world wars, drawing on theoretical innovations and new primary sources. The contributors suggest that all the great powers pursued policies that, while in retrospect were suboptimal, represented conscious, rational attempts to secure their national interests under conditions of extreme uncertainty and intense domestic and international political, economic, and strategic constraints.
Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of “Grand Strategy,” forthcoming in Security Studies
The questions of how to define grand strategy and whether it “exists” continue to vex the study of grand strategy, despite the ever-increasing popularity of the term. Scholars broadly agree that grand strategy refers to “something” that has the characteristics of being long-term in scope, related to the state’s highest priorities, and concerned with all spheres of statecraft (military, diplomatic, and economic). The precise entity or phenomenon that manifests these characteristics is less clear, indicating deficiencies in the methods used by scholars – usually implicitly – to define and operationalize concepts. This article traces the intellectual history and contemporary usage of the concept of grand strategy to identify the phenomenon or object to which the concept refers. This analysis demonstrates that there is no single concept of grand strategy. Instead, there are three, which are labelled “grand plans,” “grand principles,” and “grand behavior,” respectively. Each concept provides distinct, valuable framework for research and policy prescription.
Theory of War and Strategy_ US Army College
reviewed the manuscript for Chapter 13 and poses no objection to its publication. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of State.