Constructing Grievance- Chapter 1 (original) (raw)
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The Paradoxical Role of Russian Nationalism in a Future Soviet State
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Thiks report is cleared for public release; Cstuibutiois unlimited. Comments pertaining to this publication are-invited and may be forwarded to: Director. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,-Cdie ics, PA 17013-50.,Ccmments atofii-ybe cnveCed by Ea-lii-teD-irct6-of _Rei~earch via commercial (717)245-3234 or AUTOVON 242-3234. FOREWORD The Communist Party, once the center of all Soviet power, has lost its preeminence to new governmental institutions-the presidency, the Congress of People's Deputies, and the Supreme Soviet-and to new centers of power in the union republics-city governments, striking workers, and nascent political parties. Change, formerly dictated froin the top, now rises from multiple centers across the vast and decaying Soviet Empire. The process of change may be blocked or accelerated by events that are unforeseen. This study focuses on the role of Russian nationalism in these changes. Paradoxically, the author concludes that Russian nationalism, in sharp contrast to its counterparts in the non-Russian Republics, has played a surprisingly small role in the dynamics that are pushing the Soviet State closer to an as yet unknowable alternative future. The"coup" of August 19,1991, is the most recent and dramatic example of the old guard's inability to use traditional symbols of Russian nationalism to mobilize support or to discredit the supporters of Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev.
The Soviet legacy and Russian federalism, 1991–93
Manchester University Press eBooks, 2010
Russian federalism and the Soviet legacy According to the 1977 Constitution, 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' was a 'unified, federal, multinational state formed on the principle of socialist federalism'. The federation, which was established according to the dual principles of ethnicity and territory, encompassed fifteen ethnically defined union republics, twenty autonomous republics, eight autonomous oblasts, ten autonomous okrugs, and 159 territorially based regions. But if we adopt the definition of a federation given by Watts in chapter 1, then clearly the USSR was not an authentic federation. For whilst the Constitution proclaimed the republics' rights of sovereignty (article 76), and secession (article 72), the right to enter into treaties with foreign powers (article 80), and local control over economic developments (article 77), such rights were heavily qualified in practice, by the provisions of other articles, which made a mockery of the republic's sovereign powers. 1 And, in any case, whilst the state was supposedly based on federal principles, the party, which declared itself to be 'the leading and guiding force in society', was a unitary body. Moreover, party and state bodies operated under the principle of 'democratic centralism', whereby each administrative level was subordinate to the level above it, and centralised control from Moscow. In 1989 Gorbachev publicly admitted that the republics' rights of sovereignty were largely formal in nature, 'Up to now', he noted, 'our state has existed as a centralized and unitary state and none of us has yet the experience of living in a federation'. 2 This is not to say that the federal subjects in the USSR were totally powerless and subservient to the central authorities or that nationalist demands had been quelled when Gorbachev took over the reins of power in 1985. For paradoxically, the very policies which the communists had used to placate nationalism ended up giving it succour. As Bialer notes,
This essay defines three categories of Russian nationalist actors: nonstate actors, whose agenda is anti-Putin; parastate actors, who have their own ideological niche, not always in tune with the presidential administration's narrative, but who operate under the state umbrella; and state actors, in particular, the presidential administration. In the future, the Russian ethnonationalism embodied by nonstate actors is the main trend that could pose a serious threat to the regime. However, the Kremlin is not "frozen" in terms of ideology, and its flexibility allows it to adapt to evolving situations. One of the most plausible scenarios is the rise of a figure inside the establishment who would be able to prevent the polarization of Russian nationalism into an antiregime narrative and could co-opt some of its slogans and leaders, in order to gradually channel the official narrative toward a more state-controlled nationalism.
The development of Russian nationalismunder Gorbachev (1985-91)
1998
This thesis examines the development of Russian nationalism under Gorbachev, with special reference to new political organisations. Nationalism is defined as a combination of sentiment, political principle and movement. The political principle 'holds that the political and national unit should be congruent'. For Russia, this was not a straightforward matter: some considered the political unit to be a greater (imperial) Russian state; whilst others considered it to be a Russian national state (based on the RSFSR). In addition, the Russian language has two terms to define the national unit: russkii androssiiskii narod. Russian nationalism existed to a limited degree in the Soviet Union before 1985. Glasnost and perestroika reduced the limitations on expressions of Russian nationalism and provided an opportunity for opinions to coalesce, resulting in the appearance of organised movements. At first, most Russian nationalists welcomed this change, although some soon started to di...
Abstract. The essence of the internal geopolitics of the Russian Federation (RF) and its influence on the foreign policy of Moscow is analyzed in the article. It was found that on the background of Russian nationalism the activation of separatist sentiments in the Russian national autonomies had occurred, particularly in the North Caucasus (Chechnia, Dahestan).Eventually, it caused two Chechen wars, as well as to the formation of dissatisfaction with the Center’s actions in Tatarstan, South and East Siberia and others. However, after internal politics and internal economy shocks of the 1990-th Russia has outlined a course to restore the status of a great state. An important factor for the Russian government is the support of its foreign policy by the population. It is traced that the level of electoral support of the Russian president entirely depends on the success of the Russian Federation on the international arena. Kremlin actively cultivates and uses imperial mood of society in order to justify the return of its “unjustly deprived” great power status. Therefore, governmental expansionist geostrategy obtains active support among theintelligentsia and broad social strata. Key words: Geopolitics, internal geopolitics, foreign policy, social attitudes, authoritarianism.