Nonexistence Without Nonexistents (original) (raw)
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Synthese, 2018
This paper deals with generalisations of modally based criteria for determining whether a given property is essential to an individual to the case of generic essences. These criteria usually presuppose extensionally individuated properties. The limitations of their generalisations are demonstrated using the case of the necessarily empty individual property and the necessarily empty individual office. I do not present a novel stance on the discussion of individual essences. The novelty of this paper lies in its claim that none of these criteria can be generalised to generic essences.
A Semantic Argument Against the Existence of Universally Held Real Properties
2014
In this paper I propose a semantic argument against the existence of universally held real properties. A semantic argument is a deductive argument from one or more premises about meaning. Real properties are properties that add something to (or modify) their bearers, such as being red, being triangular or knowing that 1+1=2. They are typically contrasted with Cambridge properties. A property is universally held if and only if everything that exists has it. The semantic argument is set within a neo-Fregean linguistic framework that distinguishes meaning from reference. Although, as Frege argued, meaning and reference do not coincide, they are quite closely related. The argument is premised on an identity criterion for (definite) meanings in terms of their reference characteristics. According to this criterion two meanings are identical if and only if their reference sets coincide. The notion of a reference set of a meaning will be made more precise in the paper.
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2018
A metaphysical system engendered by a third order quantified modal logic S5 plus impredicative comprehension principles is used to isolate a third order predicate , and by being able to impredicatively take a second order predicate G to hold of an individual just if the individual necessarily has all second order properties which are we in Section 2 derive the thesis (40) that all properties are or some individual is G. In Section 3 theorems 1 to 3 suggest a sufficient kinship to Gödelian ontological arguments so as to think of thesis (40) in terms of divine property and Godly being; divine replaces positive with Gödel and others. Thesis (40), the sacred thesis, supports the ontological argument that God exists because some property is not divine. In Section 4 a fixed point analysis is used as diagnosis so that atheists may settle for the minimal fixed point. Theorem 3 shows it consistent to postulate theistic fixed points, and a monotheistic result follows if one assumes theism and that it is divine to be identical with a deity. Theorem 4 (the Monotheorem) states that if Gg and it is divine to be identical with g, then necessarily all objects which are G are identical with g. The impredicative origin of suggests weakened Gaunilolike objections that offer related theses for other second order properties and their associated diverse presumptive individual bearers. Nevertheless, in the last section we finesse these Gaunilo-like objections by adopting what we call an apathiatheistic opinion which suggest that the best concepts 'God' allow thorough indifference as to whether God exists or not.
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2012
In this paper, I will defend the claim that there are three existence properties: the second-order property of being instantiated, a substantive first-order property (or better a group of such properties) and a formal, hence universal, first-order property. I will first try to show what these properties are and why we need all of them for ontological purposes. Moreover, I will try to show why a Meinong-like option that positively endorses both the former and the latter first-order property is the correct view in ontology. Finally, I will add some methodological remarks as to why this debate has to be articulated from the point of view of reality, i.e., by speaking of properties, rather than from the point of view of language, i.e., by speaking of predicates (for such properties).
A paradox about sets of properties
Synthese, 2021
A paradox about sets of properties is presented. The paradox, which invokes an impredicatively defined property, is formalized in a free third-order logic with lambdaabstraction, through a classically proof-theoretically valid deduction of a contradiction from a single premise to the effect that every property has a unit set. Something like a model is offered to establish that the premise is, although classically inconsistent, nevertheless consistent, so that the paradox discredits the logic employed. A resolution through the ramified theory of types is considered. Finally, a general scheme that generates a family of analogous paradoxes and a generally applicable resolution are proposed.
Existence as a Real Property - Synthèse Library
2012
This book is both an introduction to and a research work on Meinongianism. “Meinongianism” is taken here, in accordance with the common philosophical jargon, as a general label for a set of theories of existence – probably the most basic notion of ontology. As an introduction, the book provides the first comprehensive survey and guide to Meinongianism and non-standard theories of existence in all their main forms. As a research work, the book exposes and develops the most up-to-date Meinongian theory (called modal Meinongianism), applies it to specific fields, and discusses its open problems. The unifying focus of the work is a single, basic philosophical notion: the notion of existence. Each main theory of the notion available in philosophy is introduced via a detailed, self-contained exposition, and critically evaluated, with the original research emerging in the final Chapters. Part I of the book provides a historical introduction to, and critical discussion of, the dominant philosophical view of existence: the “Kantian-Fregean-Quinean” perspective. Part II is the full-fledged introduction to the Meinongian theories of existence as a real property of individuals: after starting with the so-called naïve Meinongian conception and its problems, it provides a self-contained presentation of the main neo-Meinongian proposals, and a detailed discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. Part III develops a specific neo-Meinongian theory of existence employing a model-theoretic semantic framework. It discusses its application to the ontology and semantics of fictional objects, and its open problems. The methodology of the book follows the most recent trends in analytic ontology. In particular, the meta-ontological point of view is largely privileged
Logically Simple Properties and Relations
Philosopher's Imprint, 2016
Metaphysicians generally agree that not all predicates are created equal. In the Parmenides, young Socrates affirms that there are Forms of the beautiful, the just, and the good, but denies that there is a Form of hair or of mud. In classical Indian metaphysics, Udayana’s followers distinguished ‘real’ universals (jāti) from those that are merely ‘constructed’ (upādhi).1 And in recent Western philosophy, Goodman (1955) has distinguished projectible from non-projectible predicates, Armstrong (1978) predicates that correspond to universals from those that don’t, Shoemaker (1980) genuine from ‘mere Cambridge’ properties, and David Lewis (1983; 1986) perfectly natural attributes from those that are less than perfectly natural.2 It is easy to notice that in each of these distinctions, one of the two respective classes of predicates (or universals, etc.) is in some way privileged. The distinction that this paper is concerned with also fits into this roster. I shall try to give an account ...
A Classical Logic of Existence and Essence
Logic and Logical Philosophy, 2020
The purpose of this paper is to provide a new system of logic for existence and essence, in which the traditional distinctions between essential and accidental properties, abstract and concrete objects, and actually existent and possibly existent objects are described and related in a suitable way. In order to accomplish this task, a primitive relation of essential identity between different objects is introduced and connected to a first order existence property and a first order abstractness property. The basic idea is that possibly existent objects are completely determinate and that essentially identical objects are just different individuations of the same individual essence. Accordingly, essential properties are defined as properties that are invariant with respect to this kind of identity, while abstract objects are determined by being characterized by essential properties only. Once such ideas are implemented, a number of classical intuitions about objects, their essence, and their way of existence can be consistently interpreted.
2016
The present paper deals with an aspect of the Navya-Nyāya "logic of property and location" (Matilal) in classical Indian philosophy, namely the so-called "absences" (abhāva). Following George Bealer (Quality and Concept, Oxford 1982) we may regard these negative properties as the result of applying certain algebraic operations to property terms, which Bealer names after their corresponding propositional or first-order operations ("negation of a property", "conjunction of properties", "existen-tial generalization of a property" etc.). Bealer introduces these operations in his property theories in order to explain how the de-notation of a complex property term can be determined from the denotation(s) of the relevant syntactically simpler term(s). An interesting case in Navya-Nyāya is the "conjoint absence" (ubha-yābhāva), which can be regarded as the Sheffer stroke applied to property terms. We will show that an extension of Bealer's axiomatic system T1 may serve to prove some of the Navya-Naiyāyikas' intuitions concerning iterated absences, such as "the relational absence of the difference from a pot", "the relational absence of the rela-tional absence of a pot" or "the relational absence of the rela-tional absence of the relational absence of a pot". The former, e.g., was claimed to be identical to the universal "potness".