Human Dignity and the Foundations of Human Rights (original) (raw)
Human Dignity and Human Rights
This chapter aims, first, to briefly present how the notion of human dignity has been conceptualized over centuries of philosophical thought; second, to stress the foundational role it currently plays in international human rights law; third, to emphasize its even more crucial role in the international policy documents relating to bioethics; fourth, to present the reasons for the recourse to human rights in the formulation of global bioethical standards; and finally to briefly address the challenge to the universality of human dignity and human rights posed by cultural diversity.
Human Dignity - A Heuristic Discipline Of Human Rights
2013
Dignity is an appeal to human nature. Transposed in the juridical field, human dignity highlights the necessity to establish (in favour of the individual) a juridical treatment compatible with human nature. Our disquisition is destined to analyse the contributions brought by the concept of human dignity in the process of the juridical avowal of human rights and to study, at the same time, the category of relations between two frameworks of analysis: human rights and human dignity. We propose the thesis of conceptual correspondence human-rights-human dignity, in the attempt to demonstrate two fusing frameworks of analysis, that can almost mutually define one another. The intricacy, the hardship of legal reconnaissance, the variety of significance, give the precise nature of human dignity and human rights, pleading in favour of this conjugate study. The defining of man – as an analytical category – is seated within human dignity, pointing out, as natural consequences of this seating, ...
The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity
Cambridge University Press eBooks, 2014
Many venerable legal documents suggest that human dignity is the ground of human rights. The German Constitution (1945) opens in Article 1 with the captivating declaration: 'human dignity is inviolable' , and goes on in Article 2 to state: 'The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world' (emphasis added). 1 The Helsinki Accords (1975) even more explicitly claim that human rights 'derive from the inherent dignity of the human person'. On this view human beings have rights because they have dignity. On an even stronger view, which is also quite common in constitutional law, it is the very function of those rights to protect the dignity of human beings. In that case, all human rights are specifications of one fundamental right: the right to have one's dignity (or the dignity of the human species?) respected. At the other end of the spectrum of possible views we find the sceptical idea that all appeals to human dignity are entirely vacuous: they can be made for any specific claim about human rights whatsoever, they are routinely being made for opposing views, for example about euthanasia, and have no argumentative, butonlyrhetorical,force.'Dignityisauselessconcept...andcanbeeliminated without any loss of content' (Macklin 2003). 2 I shall argue that both views are mistaken. Appeals to human dignity have a proper role in human rights discourse, but it is not a foundational and also in some other respects a limited role.
This Chapter explores four prominent objections to the overarching role that human dignity plays in constitutional and human rights law. In the eyes of its critics, human dignity is objectionable because it (1) is too variable to be captured by a coherent constitutional theory; (2) stands in opposition to a liberal vision of constitutional governance; (3) fails to offer guidance for resolving constitutional disputes; and (4) is incapable of justifying anything until it is itself justified. My aim is to unearth the presuppositions that generate these objections, explain why these presuppositions are controversial, and to formulate a set of plausible alternatives that do not give rise to these objections. Since the leading objections stem from presuppositions that need not be accepted, these objections do not preclude the formulation of a comparative constitutional theory of human dignity.
Human Dignity - Functions and Meanings
Global Jurist Topics, 2000
The concept of Human Dignity has become more and more prevalent in legal, moral and philosophical discourses. However, as much as linguistic functions of the concept have become widespread, its meanings have become ambiguous and blurred. This paper seeks to map and depict the main functions and meanings that the concept of human dignity encompass, and, hence, to enable both those concerned with law and its interpretation, and moral-philosophers to discern the different linguistic-spheres and the different meanings this concept encircle. The analysis will show that the meanings of human dignity are socially constructed in accordance with particular cultural and historical contexts. There is no one "true" meaning of human dignity, but rather different levels of "thickness" and "thinness" that are culturally determined in each society. The paper advances insights regarding the use of human dignity in both the legal parlance -as a justification for human rights in legal documents; and in the moral-philosophical parlance -as compared to a worldview on the one hand, and as related to humiliation on the other.
Dignity and International Human Rights Law
2021
The Punta del Este Declaration, and this book dedicated to elaborating upon it, is devoted to exploring the ways that human dignity for everyone everywhere can be a useful tool in helping to address the challenges and strains facing human rights in the world today. In 2018, an initiative was instigated to revitalize the human rights project by way of engaging the notion of human dignity. This resulted in the Punta Del Este Declaration on Human Dignity for Everyone Everywhere (Punta Del Este Declaration), a declaration co-authored by over 30 human rights experts from all over the world. The Punta Del Este Declaration simplifies and brings coherence to the concept of human dignity in 10 brief statements that capture the many dimensions and aspects of human dignity and the practical ways that human dignity is useful in the promotion of human rights. This book provides an overview of how the notion of human dignity has been used to strengthen human rights. It discusses how human dignity plays many different roles in human rights discourse and has the force to revitalize the human rights project; it is the foundational principle upon which the human rights project is built. But it is also the telos, or end goal, of human rights. At the same time, it is an important evaluative mechanism for assessing how well a country is doing in the implementation of human rights. The book will be a valuable resource for all those working in the areas of International Human Rights Law, Legal Philosophy, and Law and Religion.
The Legal Significance of Human Dignity
In this thesis, I traced the history of human dignity through the history of ideas from its inception in Stoic anthropology, religion and the Enlightenment, to dignity's legalization in Modernity. In discussing the history of dignity in the legal systems of Germany, South Africa and the US, I worked on the premise that dignity comprises of three universal elements, as identified by prominent academics. These elements are the equal inherent dignity paradigm, the claim that everybody's dignity must be protected and respected and the injunction that states must progressively realize dignity by way of socio-economic rights, within their respective means. These elements are part and parcel of the constitutional architecture of dignity, whether applied as a value or a right, or both, in constitutional systems that protect dignity. I theorized that there is a correlation between the three elements and the conceptualization of dignity by Kant, the renowned Enlightenment philosopher, who claimed that inherent dignity is priceless, a sort of an uber right that operates as a categorical imperative - in constitutional terms not subject to limitation. Consequently; everybody has a reciprocal duty to protect and respect each other's dignity. In applying Kant's claim of dignity as manifested in the three elements to the adjudication of constitutional dignity in the aforementioned legal systems, I based my interpretation on the distinction of constitutional norms as rules and principles as advocated by Dworkin and mainly Alexy. I came to the conclusion that the German application truly corresponds with Kant's categorical imperative as Alexy's distinction of rules and principles is correctly applied. South African adjudication of dignity is underdeveloped in the perspective of Alexy's distinction in instances where there is a conflict between adjudication of dignity as a value and dignity as a right, when the principle of proportionality is applied to competing rights. To correct this, I proposed a model of interpretation of the dignity-clause in the Constitution along the lines of Alexy's theory of constitutional rights, to ensure legal consistency and to determine the legal significance of human dignity. The US system differs from that of Germany and South Africa, as dignity is solely employed as a value to strengthen rights claims and the three elements of dignity are not applied as a first-order rule.
Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of ' dignity ' or ' human dignity ' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of ' dignity ' , beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specifi c, varying signifi cantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to signifi cant judicial manipulation, increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its signifi cant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally, highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of ' human dignity ' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.