The Philosophy of the Daodejing – By Hans-Georg Moeller (original) (raw)
2008, Journal of Chinese Philosophy
AI-generated Abstract
Hans-Georg Moeller's examination of the Daodejing presents a wide-ranging analysis of its 'non-humanistic' philosophy, offering insights into its implications for contemporary thought regarding individual and societal values. The text is analyzed as a complex hypertext that challenges traditional narratives and engages with diverse topics such as politics, ethics, human desires, and mortality. Moeller's critiques juxtapose Daoist views with Western humanism, proposing a philosophical exploration that is both novel and deeply reflective, although the comparative themes could benefit from further elaboration.
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In this paper, I argue for links between two texts that are usually seen as fundamentally distinct and even opposed: the Mozi and the Daodejing. The first part of the paper lays out initial commonalities between the two texts, offering a justification for discussing them together. The second part addresses the two main points of opposition between the texts – the contrast between an anthropocentric heaven (tian 天) in the Mozi and the way (dao 道) in the Daodejing, and the conflict between Mohist activism and the Daodejing’s non-action. I argue that these differences actually emerge from shared assumptions, and that the Daodejing can be seen as working out tensions inherent in the Mozi. The third part of the paper briefly considers textual sources that suggest hybrid or middle positions between the Mozi and the Daodejing, discussing the last fifteen chapters of the received Daodejing (all of which are missing in the Guodian materials) and parts of the first seven chapters of the Mozi. I conclude by suggesting that these linkages give us a glimpse of some earlier viewpoint that attempted to derive actions from the impartiality and generativity of nature itself, an approach linked closely to opposition to war and to the oppression of the people. The Mozi and the different parts of the Daodejing would represent various developments of some original position, with different orientations and vocabularies. This essay is a companion to “Divergences within the Lǎozǐ: A Study of Chapters 67-81” (T’oung Pao 100 (2014): 1-33), which provides an extensive argument for reading those chapters as expressing a view different from the rest of the Daodejing.
The Dàodéjīng: A 2022 Translation
Asian Culture and History, 2022
This paper is divided into two sections. Section one is a translation of the Dàodéjīng in English. Section two is an in-depth analysis and explanation of the translation of the Dàodéjīng in section one. This paper includes both Chinese versions of the standard Wáng Bì and a reconstructed Mǎwángduī version of the Dàodéjīng with the addition of appropriate commas and full stops. The two key aspects in regard to this paper's commentary that may be somewhat different to previous works, is that this paper has defined the Dào as that action (or movement) within emptiness that cannot be seen with the naked eye but has brought all life into existence and also maintains it. Therefore, the translation of Lǎozǐ's cornerstone philosophy could be a play on words, where wúwéi 無為 not only takes wú 無 to mean "no" or "non" but also takes wú to mean "emptiness." The translation of wúwéi would therefore, also be, "emptiness [in] action," which refers to the actions that are happening within emptiness which cannot be seen by the naked eye. The second aspect is in relation to dé 德. The English and Confucian meaning of virtue is having high moral standards. Lǎozǐ's dé appears to have had little to do with morals in the modern sense of the word. From the 5 "virtues" mentioned by Lǎozǐ, we can clearly see that Lǎozǐ's virtue was based on following the principles of Dào. This paper therefore proposes that the dé can be translated as "quiescence."
Religions, 2022
Abstract: Between June and August 1947, Qian Xuexi and William Empson exchanged 12 letters on the issue of Arthur Waley’s misinterpretation of the Daodejing. Through a thorough analysis of these new-found letters and Qian’s English translation of the Daodejing, I intended to show that the central arguments between Qian and Empson are around two major problems concerning Waley’s translation: Waley’s ideas of the Daodejing being part of the “Yoga-Quietism” tradition that Waley himself tried to invent, and Waley’s idea of opposing Daoism to Legalism. Qian firmly rejected that the ideas in the Daodejing were the same as some Western ideas. Neither did he accept that the ideas of the Daodejing were under the influence of either Western culture or Indian religious philosophy. Instead, Qian explained that the so-called “Yoga-Quietism” did not derive from China. Therefore, in his view, Waley’s approach was fundamentally problematic. Qian’s view eventually convinced Empson, who initially opposed Qian’s stance. Qian and Empson’s letters and Qian’s English translation of the Daodejing, though never published, indicate the value of Qian’s ideas and the meaning of their intellectual interaction. // Keywords: Qian Xuexi (Chien Hsueh-hsi); William Empson; Arthur Waley; English translation of the Daodejing
Four Verses from the Daodejing
We engage the world via models. However, every model is necessarily incomplete: the faculty by which modeling works cannot itself be modeled, and thus, remains opaque to understanding. We thus apprehend the world with tools intrinsically incapable of encompassing it as a whole. I propose that several challenging philosophical problems are in fact expressions of this limitation. Among them is the problem of fundamentals: since every model of the world reduces to some set of fundamental facts, we expect the same thing to hold of the world as a whole. This, however, ultimately confuses the map with the territory.
This paper provides a 'thick description' (using Clifford Geertz's notion) of " *Tang zai Chi/Di men " , which is part of the Tsinghua Manuscripts. Exploring its communicative dimensions and analysing the interplay between text and performance, this paper reconstructs the social use of " *Tang zai Chi/Di men " in the discourse of the time. The manuscript text records an imagined dialogue held at the Chi/Di Gate between King Cheng Tang and his famous official, Yi Yin, consistently introduced as 'minor minister'. The text is highly patterned and presents a conversation about the 'innately good doctrines of old and their actuality in the present'. The conversation is framed by an introductory formula commonly seen in textualised " Shu " traditions, as well as a final appraisal, which concludes the text in 'dramatic' terms (using Helmut Utzschneider's notion). The text is rhymed while the items under discussion are presented as catalogues, suggesting completeness. The well-balanced composition is at odds with the seemingly meagre content of the text, staging oddly empty phrases that leave the modern reader rather puzzled. By drawing on content-form and communication theories, and considering its performative dimensions, this paper probes the apparent conflict between the content and the form and reconstructs the strategies of Warring States communities to develop meaning through patterned text. Once contextualised, this rather peculiar text serves as a reference for meaning-construction of performance texts in the intellectual landscape of the Warring States period (ca. 453–222 BC) more globally.
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