ART HISTORY, NEW MUSEOLOGY AND THE DOCUMENT (original) (raw)
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2014
My thesis explores the role played by form in our experience of objects of consciousness as art. In doing so, I look at the concept of form as it was understood by prominent philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, as well as form in Immanuel Kant's aesthetics in The Critique of the Power of Judgment. My method is phenomenological and rooted in my experience of making and writing about art, as a student of studio art and of philosophy. To connect philosophical understandings of form to the experience of art in a way reflective of my experience, I show the connection between and influence on art critical understandings of form by philosophical understandings of form. In particular, I focus on Modernist formalism as Clive Bell, Roger Fry and Clement Greenberg articulated it. Modernist formalism played a role in the teaching style and content of art studio classes I attended. The role of form in our experience of art was problematized by Conceptual Art, which movement also deeply impacted the teaching style and content of my studio art classes. The tension I experienced between these two movements in art and its criticism led to my interest in this topic and informed my choice to limit the scope of my investigation to Modernist formalism and Conceptual Art. In particular, I focus on philosophically trained Conceptual Artists such as Adrian Piper and Joseph Kosuth. Changes in the way art was made and understood impacted the understanding of the concept of form not only for art critics, but also for philosophers. I include contemporary philosophical discussions of form by Bernard Freydberg and Rudolphe Gasché to show the movement and interrelatedness between art and philosophy about the concept of form. The conclusion I reach is that form in our experience of art is constructive of that experience if our consciousness of art objects is conceived of as an engaged, rather than disinterested. My rejection of disinterest in favour of engagement is adapted from Arnold Berleant's account of the aesthetic experience. I retain a place for the object as it is given, using H.J. Gadamer's terms "changing" and "unchanging aspects." The object's properties are its unchanging aspects while the shifting contextual ground on which art as an experience is built is the changing aspect. I conclude that form is a way of seeing that requires both of these aspects. Daniel Regnier, and my committee members Dr.s Karl Pfeifer and Eric Dayton. Dr. Regnier provided patient and generous support throughout the process, including hiring me as a research assistant during my second year. During my first year, I enjoyed the support of a Graduate Teaching Fellowship from the Department of Philosophy. In addition, Dr. Leslie Howe, kindly let me temporarily inhabit her home as a house-sitter while I was between places. Without the support of these individuals, and of the Philosophy Department at the University of Saskatchewan generally, I would not have entered graduate school, let alone finally finished this thesis. I must also acknowledge the role played by the Gwenna Moss Centre for Teaching Effectiveness, from whose staff I learned a great deal about teaching and assessment strategies and at which I eventually secured meaningful, fulltime employment. Finally, I acknowledge the support of my wonderful family and friends. Chapter Two-Form, Engaged Consciousness and context 2.1 Consciousness as Engaged-Arnold Berleant 2.2 Making art 2.3 Ways of Seeing-Art 2.4 Ways of Seeing-Meaning 2.
Nelson Goodman’s Aesthetics—A Critique
Arts, 2021
Nelson Goodman (1906–1998) is one of the leading American philosophers of the twentieth century. His well-known book Languages of Art is considered a major contribution to analytical aesthetics. While his views on particular issues have often been criticized, on the whole, he is considered to be a leading figure in twentieth-century aesthetics. Contrary to such a stance, I intend to argue that Goodman’s overall contribution to aesthetics is not as outstanding and valuable as is often maintained. Rather, I will try to show that his aesthetic views are grounded on a distorted representation of the earlier aesthetic tradition, without which they lose the novelty and originality ascribed to them. Once that representation is corrected, some of Goodman’s proposals turn out to be derivative and redundant. Additionally, where they do actually diverge from the earlier tradition and might stake a claim to originality, they turn out to be simply erroneous and misconceived, and sometimes even l...