Commentary: Toward Resolving Some Dilemmas Concerning Psychiatric Advance Directives (original) (raw)
2006, Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online
AI-generated Abstract
The commentary discusses the challenges associated with psychiatric advance directives (PADs) and emphasizes the legal and ethical dilemmas regarding their enforceability in the context of civil commitment legislation. It introduces the concept of Joint Crisis Plans (JCPs) as an alternative to PADs, highlighting their effectiveness in reducing compulsory hospital admissions and empowering patients. The findings suggest that collaborative agreements between patients and service providers can lead to better treatment outcomes, advocating for the adoption of JCPs in various jurisdictions.
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