Higher-Order Intentionality and Higher-Order Acquaintance (original) (raw)
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The Conscious Theory of Higher-Orderness
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, 2023
The massive debate in philosophy and psychology and neuroscience about higher-order theories of consciousness has not adequately distinguished between the following two claims: (Necessary Awareness): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M. (The Higher-Order Theory): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then M is conscious because S is aware of M. While I will assume that the first claim is true, I will argue that we should reject higher-order theories of consciousness. We should turn them on their head to go with the following theory: (The Ascending Road): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M because M is conscious.
Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality Comments on The Significance of Consciousness
I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isolates, to intentionality. The first is whether, contrary to Siewert, phenomenal consciousness requires higher-order representation. The second is whether intentional features of conscious states are identical with phenomenal features, as Siewert argues, or merely conceptually supervene on them, with special attention to cross modal representations of objects in space. The third is whether phenomenal features are identical with what we can have first person access to, with special attention to features of thoughts that are individuated by reference to the self and the present time.
"Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function"
Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one's cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one's mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states' being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious.
An Unacceptable Purpose of the Higher Order Theories of Consciousness
There are many theories about consciousness, which approach it from different perspectives and according to different definitions. In this essay I will deal with one of them, that is the higher order theory of consciousness. The higher order (HO) approach is considered by some of its theorists an attempt to explain a specific feature of our conscious thinking (awareness) and by others an attempt to describe what it is necessary and sufficient to be conscious in the broader sense of having an experience. In this essay I am going to argue that an explanation of experience itself cannot be an acceptable purpose of higher order theories. I will take into consideration a paper by Rocco J. Gennaro (2004) as the starting point to introduce the discussion.
David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory is a theory of state consciousness. The HOT theory posits that a form of higher-order awareness is required for a subject to be conscious of the mental states they bear. Higher-order awareness on this theory takes the form of a thought. The driving force behind the theory is the intuition that a conscious state is a state that a subject is aware of themselves as being in. The wide intrinsicality view advocated by Rocco Gennaro and ‘complex’ self-representationalism advocated by Uriah Kriegel are contemporary alternatives to Rosenthal’s HOT theory. The central thesis presented in this dissertation argues that, despite objections presented by both Gennaro and Kriegel, we are not given sufficient reason to abandon Rosenthal’s HOT theory.
Consciousness and Intentionality: The Face of the Phenomena
Prolegomena, 2016
In his book The Significance of Consciousness, Charles Siewert argues that some of our phenomenal features are intentional features, because we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having these phenomenal features. In this paper, I will, first, show that this argument stands in need of disambiguation, and will emerge as problematic on both available readings. Second, I will use Thomas Szanto’s recent ideas to develop a deeper understanding of the difficulties with Siewert’s argument. Szanto emphatically contrasts the Husserlian, constitutive conception of intentionality with the mainstream, representational conception. If we interpret Siewert’s ideas in representational terms, it will be possible to add to my critical objections. However, I will suggest that it is also possible to interpret, or perhaps to modify, Siewert’s views in Husserlian constitutive terms, thereby addressing the objections raised in the present paper.