Alan F. Chalmers: The Scientist’s Atom and the Philosopher’s Stone: How Science Succeeded and Philosophy Failed to Gain Knowledge of Atoms (original) (raw)
2011, Science & Education
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Alan F. Chalmers discusses the historical and philosophical connections between atomism and modern atomic theory, asserting that philosophical atomism did not prepare the way for modern scientific atomic theorizing as commonly believed. He critiques the prevalent evolutionary or continuist view held by many contemporary philosophers and educators regarding the development of atomic theory, proposing that modern experimental developments in atomic science reflect a significant departure from earlier conceptualizations. Chalmers emphasizes the importance of integrating history with philosophy of science to clarify the distinctions between past and present methodologies in understanding atomic structures.
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