On the Foundations of the Strategic Theory of the Firm: Should We Rely on Governance, Capabilities, or Both? (original) (raw)
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Capabilities and the Theory of the Firm
papers.ssrn.com, 1996
The recent decade has witnessed a strong expansion of work on the firm, both from a capabilities perspective and from a contractual perspective. These two bodies of theories are often thought to be fundamentally different, because their domains of applications are different (knowledge-accumulation vs contracts and incentives). However, we need to integrate propositions from capabilities perspectives with ideas about economic organization (markets, hybrids, firms). This is because only a more unified theory will allow us to understand such issues as the dynamics of the modern corporation, and, more topically, the costs and benefits of outsourcing. I discuss the relations between these two bodies of theories. It is possible to argue in favor of a relation of complementarity between the two and pursue a research strategy on this basis. However, it is also possible two claim that they are rivals. Along this line, it is argued that the capabilities perspective contains propositions about economic organization that are not to be found within the modern Coasian approach to economic organization, and thus may be seen as a distinct emerging perspective on economic organization.
A capability theory of the firm: an economics and (Strategic) management perspective
New Zealand Economic Papers
The business enterprise is the prime institution in economic development and growth; yet, until recently, mainstream economics has mostly treated firms as homogeneous black boxes managed by untrustworthy agents. Using economic principles, the field of strategic management has developed a nuanced approach to understanding how firms are created, organized, and grow; how they innovate and compete; and how managers manage. That approach has yielded a theoretical framework known as 'dynamic capabilities'. Contrasts are drawn between dynamic capabilities and other approaches to the theory of the firm, including transaction cost economics and agency theory. The application of capability theory allows intellectual blinders to be removed and an understanding of differential firm-level resource allocation and performance to emerge. This brings a richer conceptual understanding of the nature of the business enterprise and its management consistent with evolutionary and behavioural economics. Policy insights into governance, inequality, economic development, and the wealth of nations follow.
The business enterprise is the prime institution in economic development and growth; yet, until recently, mainstream economics has mostly treated firms as homogeneous black boxes managed by untrustworthy agents. Using economic principles, the field of strategic management has developed a nuanced approach to understanding how firms are created, organized, and grow; how they innovate and compete; and how managers manage. That approach has yielded a theoretical framework known as 'dynamic capabilities'. Contrasts are drawn between dynamic capabilities and other approaches to the theory of the firm, including transaction cost economics and agency theory. The application of capability theory allows intellectual blinders to be removed and an understanding of differential firm-level resource allocation and performance to emerge. This brings a richer conceptual understanding of the nature of the business enterprise and its management consistent with evolutionary and behavioural economics. Policy insights into governance, inequality, economic development, and the wealth of nations follow.
Theories of the Firm: Implications for Strategy Research*
Journal of Management Studies, 1994
Theories of the firm provide a perspective for thinking about organizational objectives and a framework for analysing important research problems. Here, we demonstrate the usefulness of several economic theories of the firm for guiding strategy research. We evaluate the relevance of each ...
Recent Theories Of The Firm: A Critical Approach
Annals of Faculty of Economics, 2012
Besides the classical theories of the firms as complete or incomplete contract theories, in the last decades there were developed some new theories bringing new perspectives and approaches. Among these new perspectives we are presenting in this paper the evolutionary theory of the firm, the importance of resources and knowledge, and game theory. According to evolutionary theory the most important element for a firm is the company itself and its specific assets (physical and human). Evolutionist theories, in their diversity, are interested in issues such as the effects of changes in the long run within the firms, in terms of products, processes, decisions, analysis of the determinants of success. Resource and knowledge-based theories try to find a common point between transactions and organizational management analysis, focusing on development issues within companies, the importance of business strategy and achieving competitive advantages. Finally, cooperative game theory sees the firm as a coalition of various parts that compose it, emphasizing the importance of cooperative relations between employees and shareholders, risk sharing and effective collective skills, knowledge and funds using. This paper is part of the doctoral thesis on Integrate perspective on companies sector, coordinated by professor Ph.
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1999
This chapter is a survey of modern theories of the firm. We categorize these as belonging either to the principal-agent or the incomplete contracting approach. In the former category fall, for example, the Alchian and Demsetz moral hazard in teams theory as well as Holmstrøm and Milgrom's theory of the firm as an incentive system. Belonging to the incomplete contracting branch are theories that stress the importance of the employment relationship (for example, Coase and Simon) as an adaptation mechanism, theories that stress the importance of ownership of assets for affecting incentives when contracts must be renegotiated (Williamson, Grossman and Hart, Hart and Moore), and some recent work on implicit contracts (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy). We argue that these different perspectives on the firm should be viewed as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive and that a synthesis seems to be emerging.