Regional security issues and conflicts in the Caucasus and the Caspian regions (original) (raw)
Related papers
The impact of the Caucasus crisis on regional and European security
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2009
The scale of the recent Caucasus crisis cannot be compared with that of other armed conflicts in the post-Soviet space or former Yugoslavia, not to mention the conflicts of the Cold War period. Triggered by regional developments, it is essentially the outcome of a clash of security interests between Russia and the US/ NATO. One of the main conclusions that should be drawn by the West from the Caucasus experience is that security in Wider Europe cannot be achieved contrary to Russia's interests. The lesson for Russia is that it should learn to actively create collective positions within the scope of international cooperation, because no single country can throw down a challenge to the whole world.
The South Caucasus: Stage for a 'New Great Game' between NATO and Russia
The South Caucasus is one of the most important geostrategic regions between Europe and Asia, a playground for many regional and global actors with enduring interests. These interests have been clashing through the centuries. Each actor endeavors to impose its rules and tries to capitalize on the geostrategic benefits of the region. This article analyzes the main aspects, challenges, and prospects of cooperation between the countries in the South Caucasus and Russia and NATO. The authors describe the competition for power and influence in the region, the "Old Great Game," the regional state of affairs, and possible effects of the Rus-sian factor on the South Caucasus-NATO cooperation. They illustrate Rus-sia's security interests in the South Caucasus vis-à-vis NATO's enlargement policy, outline the reasons for the Alliance's reluctance to engage in the region actively, and current and future prospects of South Caucasus-NATO cooperation. NATO's presence is said to counterbalance the Russian military presence in the region, but how is this managed without antagonizing the incumbent government in Moscow and what is its contribution to resolving the so-called "frozen conflicts" in order to maintain the security and prosperity of the South Caucasus? The combination of competition and confrontation has been designated as the "New Great Game," with clear similarities and differences vis-à-vis the "Old Great Game." The authors question whether a "New Great Game" currently exists and apply comparative analysis, synthesis, inductive, and deductive methods to come up with conclusive answers.
The South Caucasus: A playground between NATO and Russia?
In this article, the challenges and prospects of cooperation between the South Caucasus countries and NATO have been analyzed. The geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the region for both NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russia particularly) and reciprocal expectations of further cooperation with the Alliance have been considered. The regional state of affairs in the South Caucasus has been analyzed and the possible impacts of Russian influence on forging closer relations with NATO have been examined. The security environment after the Russo-Georgian war and its repercussions for the South Caucasus-NATO cooperation have been illustrated. NATO's vested interest in the region to contribute to a European security system for the foreseeable future was brought to the fore. The reasons for the Alliance's reluctance to actively engage in the region are examined. The recommendations are intended to counterbalance the Russian military presence in the region, without antagonizing the incumbent government in Moscow, and to eradicate the so-called "frozen conflicts" in order to maintain security and prosperity for the South Caucasus region as a whole.
Regional security in the South Caucasus: the role of Nato
Central Asia-Caucasus …, 2004
Unresolved security issues in the South Caucasus have a direct and negative impact on the security interests of NATO and the U.S. They impede access to Central Asia and Afghanistan, threaten the security of needed energy resources as well as access to friendly allies in the Wider Middle East, and create an environment of instability that Russia can both exploit and perpetuate. Unresolved security issues there exercise a decisive and adverse effect on democratic reform, market-based development, and overall prosperity across the South Caucasus. Continuing shortfalls in these areas threaten to turn the region into a haven for transnational organized crime and even terrorism. This paper argues that the national security interests of NATO and its members in the South Caucasus, especially concerning the war on terrorism, NATO's obligations in Central Asia and Afghanistan, and the role of the Alliance in the Wider Middle East, have grown to such a degree that its interests would be significantly affected negatively by instability and unrest in the South Caucasus. The individual and collective interests of NATO members therefore suggest that a larger role of the Alliance in strengthening the security of the South Caucasus is warranted. This paper does not propose the inclusion of South Caucasus countries as NATO members, which is unlikely under any circumstances for many years. But it nonetheless considers NATO to be the sine qua non for security in the South Caucasus. It argues that the most promising, and indeed sole, means of redressing the "security deficit" in the South C aucasus is through the gradual extension of the widest possible range of NATO programs into the area. In short, it shifts the focus from the question of "To Be or Not To Be?" with respect to NATO membership to one of how to select, develop, and compound NATO programs that will, together and increasingly over time, transform the regional security picture overall. By this point the region will also have evolved to a point at, or near, the doorstep of both NATO and the EU. This paper therefore suggests that NATO, in its June 2004 Istanbul summit, asserts that the security of the countries of the South Caucasus is an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Specific NATO initiatives holding the most promise for enhancing South Caucasus security include the following: Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO vi vi 1) Exploring the possibility of creating a special format for NATO's dialogue with the three nations of the South Caucasus, on the model of those set up for Ukraine and Russia; 2) Exploring the possibility of creating a NATO Defense College in the South Caucasus, similar in concept to that of the Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL) and building on its experience. 3) Greatly enhancing the number of regional officers receiving training through PfP in order to foster a cadre of officers benefiting from contact with Western militaries that, in turn, are able to share their knowledge and expertise with colleagues; 4) Raising the profile of the region in NATO's own hierarchy by appointing a political/military specialist as an advisor to the Secretary-General on the region; creating a "Security Working Group" under NATO in order to optimize security assistance efforts; and prioritizing the development of expertise amongst NATO's planning staffs on the IPAPs of the regional states. While this paper proposes an a la carte approach to NATO involvement as most promising to the interests of South Caucasus countries, it asserts that such an approach is impossible without a focused and strategic approach to the South Caucasus as a whole on the part of NATO. Central to such an approach is that the definition of NATO and U.S. interests and goals must be carried out initially without regard for Russian responses. Russia itself is in flux and its policies a half decade hence may differ from those of today, especially as they relate to former Soviet territories. If NATO and the U.S. demonstrate that their policies in the South Caucasus are compatible with Russia's legitimate security concerns (as opposed to political aspirations), and can even be supportive of them, it enhances the possibility that Russians not committed to zerosum thinking may gain influence in Moscow. Clarity by NATO in defining its own strategy, directness in articulating it, and flexibility in its execution are the hallmarks of any future success. The point of conjunction between U.S. and Russian long-term interests in the South Caucasus, and also those of Turkey and Iran, is the strengthening of sovereignties there, the progress of reform, and the development of sustainable modern economies that take advantage of regional complementarities. The policies set forth in this paper advance these objectives by creating a web of relationships and structures that strengthen the essential prerequisite: regional security. As such, they are not directed against anyone.
NATO's Push into the Caucasus: Geopolitical Flashpoints and Limits for Expansion
Defense & Security Analysis, 2018
The Caucasus has been a major flashpoint of contention between NATO and a resurgent Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rivalry saw the escalation of hostility in the region during the brief 2008 Russo-Georgian War where a NATO-backed Georgia challenged South Ossetia supported by the Russian military. In 2011, NATO officially recognised Georgia as a potential member, challenging Russia’s traditional sphere of influence in the Caucasus. Moscow says the Eastward expansion of NATO into the Baltics and to include Georgia as a member state is a method of containing a resurgent Russia. However, the former Soviet Republics of Ukraine, the Baltics and Georgia, maintain that Russia represents a threat to their sovereignty, as seen by the Russian support of the breakaway unrecognised Republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A hostile rivalry between the Russianbacked Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is reliant upon NATOmember Turkey, intensifies the polarisation in the Caucasus.
Geopolitics of Central Asia and the caucasus| continuity and change since the end of the Cold War
Milletleraras, 2001
The tremors experienced in international relations since 1989 have significantly altered political geography of Eurasia, sweeping away the international system that had been built up over may years. The sudden emergence of Central Asian and Caucasian states caught both the local populations and the world at large unprepared for the event. The fact that no major empire has dissolved in this century without their successor states undergoing Cİvil wars or regional conflicts made the occasion more dramatic. Even in those newly independent states, which so far avoided unrest and conflicts, the competition between various outside powers for influence, threatened widespread disagreements, hostility, and possible armed interventions, There is a need for a new broader and more flexible analytical model for the form er Soviet Central Asia and the Cacasus. This paper, in addition to suggesting an alternative geopolitical framework for analysis, will also try to identify the sources of unrest and possible threats to the stability of the region. And finally, mechanisms for diffusing at least some of the controversies and threats will be discussed within the context of the prospects awaiting the region in the mid-Iong term.
CMI Report, 2023
This report presents the different country perspectives, main findings, and an updated epilogue from the research project “Changing Geopolitics of the South Caucasus: The Prospect for Regional Cooperation and the Role of the External Actors”, funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Throughout the project period between July 2021 and June 2022, the region continued to evolve with a stream of fast-changing developments in the countries and how it is perceived globally. The Russian invasion of Ukraine severely shook the region, and the possible long-term consequences for Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and external actors are somewhat unclear. The 45-day war over Nagorno Karabakh in 2020 changed the geopolitical landscape dramatically. With Azerbaijan`s victory, new borders were drawn in the region. The regional balance of power also shifted, and the potential for regional cooperation increased while the role of external actors changed. Azerbaijan gained political and military dominance, Armenia`s power and influence dramatically decreased, and Georgia found itself in danger of being sidelined should Azerbaijan and Armenia manage to sign a peace agreement. Russia was the broker of the ceasefire agreement and increased the presence of military peacekeepers, and Turkey had a robust political comeback to the region and military presence in Azerbaijan. The new situation has set the stage for opening the region and increasing regional and international connectivity through new or re-opening transport corridors, railways, and energy transportation projects. Trade and transport are the most likely areas of cooperation between the regional countries and may proceed in tandem with, or independent of, the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The war and the Russian-brokered truce marked a significant blow to European and U.S. initiatives to solve the conflict through the OSCE Minsk Group format. And while the West stressed its readiness to contribute, the various actors needed more credibility to deal with hard security issues in the region. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the regional situation has become even more fragile, adding new risks to an unstable security environment. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan have initially tried to connect with the Western block while also attempting to avoid drawing any attention from Russia. The long history of conflicts in the region and Russian dominance means there are serious concerns within all the countries that Russian influence may now increase. Still, there is also the possibility that the trembles of Russian actions in Ukraine and changes in the international order might change the historical patterns of behaviour that, in a best-case scenario, might lead to regional unification against a common threat. All countries might see a need to reduce the consequences of Russian pressure and protect their national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. The war in Ukraine may catalyse the peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The E.U. , and morerecentlytheU.S.,1 hassteppedinasafacilitatortothebilateralprocessthatisperceivedtomake real progress. There is cautious optimism but also concern about how Russia will act. In general, the room for manoeuvring by external actors has increased. There is an awareness about a change in the regional power balance between Russia and Turkey, amongst the regional powers, and vis a vis external power. Turkey could increase its standing in the region and become a challenge to Russian dominance. However, this would necessitate a reshaping of its Russian policy. Under the current circumstances, the regional countries would no doubt benefit from a suitable platform to discuss the current situation and possible futures with external powers.
The Evolution of the Security Environment in the South Caucasus since the End of the Cold War
What a ‘New European Security Deal’ Could Mean for the South Caucasus / 17th Workshop of the PfP Consortium Study Group Regional Stability in the South Caucasus 4/2018, 2018
This paper sketches the historical evolution of the security environment in the South Caucasus since the end of the Cold War. It traces in particular the emergence of three independent countries in the region as full mem-bers of world community in the wake of USSR’s collapse. This article ar-gues that after the rise of Russia to world pre-eminence, today’s world is becoming bipolar again and the relations between super powers are more tenuous than they used to be during the Iron Curtain period. To that effect, a new Cold War period seems to be in the offing. Yet, the main conclusion drawn from this paper is that for small states in the South Caucasus the optimum security strategy is to strike the right balance between these two poles (Russia and NATO). As a result, with the assumption of the Russia-NATO partnership, the paper realizes that in order to bring harmony with-in the international security, specifically in the South Caucasus, there is a need for the two major players to work hand in hand
"After 24 February 2022: Imagining South Caucasus Security"
RSSC SG SGI 24, 2023
This Study Group Information booklet gathered the papers and policy recommendations from the 24th workshop of the PfP Consortium Study Group on Regional Stability in the South Caucasus (RSSC SG), held in Reichenau/Rax (Austria), on 03–06 November 2022. This workshop addressed “After 24 February 2022: Imagining South Caucasus Security”. February 24, 2022, will remain a landmark in European history: it is the date when Russian troops massively marched over the Ukrainian borders thereby crashing the basic principles of the OSCE-based security system. NATO and the EU have strongly reacted against the Russian war in Ukraine. More specifically, the EU has started to implement rounds of sanctions against Russia, and granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, while conditionally promising a similar status to Georgia. Experts have long ago warned that the largest geopolitical risk stemming from the new pattern of “balance of power” conflict management in the South Caucasus was that the unresolved conflicts might end up entangled with the ongoing Russia-West geopolitical confrontation. Indeed, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, and the ensuing Russia-West hybrid and economic wars, threatened the current geopolitical structure and arrangements in the South Caucasus, possibly leading into inherent geopolitical choices of the regional states; cancelled the prospects for cohabitation of the European and the Eurasian integration processes; and started to create geopolitical roadblocks to regional cooperation and infrastructure connectivity. In response, the RSSC SG deployed all its resources and efforts in attempting through its humble means avoiding a further East European conflagration. Now that the geopolitical collision which had been feared has come to pass, the Study Group turned its attention to what type of future, and what type of security would benefit the South Caucasus. For the first time in many years, this workshop considered also points of view which were not strictly geographic from the South Caucasus, but encompassed Ukraine and Republic of Moldova.