Schopenhauer und die Philosophien Asiens. [uncorrected proofs] (original) (raw)
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Philosophy East and West 67.4 (Oct. 2017), pp. 1191-1221.
This essay discusses Swami Vivekananda’s unduly neglected critical remarks on Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which are contained primarily in lectures delivered in America and England between 1895 and 1896. I argue that Vivekananda, one of the first commentators to critique Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the will from a Vedāntic standpoint, occupies a unique place in the late nineteenth-century reception of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. To set the stage, I outline briefly in Part I the interpretations of two of Vivekananda’s contemporaries, Paul Deussen and Max Hecker, the pioneers in the field of Schopenhauer’s relation to Indian thought. In Part II, I discuss Vivekananda’s critical remarks on Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the will and place them in dialogue with the views of Deussen and Hecker. In contrast to Deussen and Hecker, Vivekananda claims that Schopenhauer equates the will with the noumenal thing in itself. According to Vivekananda, Schopenhauer’s conception of the will as the noumenal reality is mistaken for two main reasons: first, the will is at least subject to time and hence cannot be identified with the Kantian thing in itself beyond time, space, and causality; second, Schopenhauer’s conception of the will as the noumenal thing in itself conflicts with the soteriological thesis that the will can be transcended through self-denial and asceticism. Vivekananda also reproaches Schopenhauer for misinterpreting Vedānta, which conceives the noumenal reality not as the evil will but as the transcendental Ātman/Brahman beyond all willing and suffering. In Part III, I argue that many of Vivekananda’s views on Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the will and its relationship to Vedānta and Buddhism find echoes in recent scholarly interpretations of Schopenhauer’s philosophy.
Schopenhauer's Metaphysics of Will
2017
This thesis is a detailed examination on Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will. I first present the inconsistencies in Schopenhauer’s philosophy and point to the problems related to his metaphysical claims. I then demonstrate an alternative reading of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, focusing on its two characteristics: its contraction of reason and its phenomenological emphasis. I concede that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is burdened with the tension between his adaptation of Kant’s epistemology and his ambitious metaphysical goal to break away from the Kantian tradition. However, these inconsistencies and problems do not render Schopenhauer’s philosophy valueless. In contrary, they open up possibilities for Schopenhauer to address another arena of philosophy that Kant does not pay attention to, that is, human embodiment and human agency. Understanding Schopenhauer’s theories on this topic sheds great light upon his metaphysical project as a whole.
In Schopenhauer's account of the Will as discussed in "The World as Will and Representation", two potential problems arise. The first potential problem involves the irrational structure of the Will and how it can account for an ordered world. The second potential problem involves originating a desire to escape the Will, when the Will is supposed to be the only thing that drives living beings. I will first explain what the Will is, then follow with a discussion of the problem of structure. Then I will discuss Schopenhauer's remedies for alleviating the sufferings of the Will, which brings about the problem of origin. Though it seems that these concerns would cause serious problems for Schopenhauer, I argue that it is possible they may only be arising from misunderstandings of his writings. 1
ON THE WILL IN NATURE (Posthumous Edition) - by Arthur Schopenhauer, 2001
This is a re-edited version of the original article on Schopenhauer's philosophy published in the 'Westminster Review' in 1853. The author of 'Iconoclasm in German Philosophy' has read a number of works by Arthur Schopenhauer - listed at the top of the article - which has enabled him to appreciate the Weltanschuung of this philosophical author. The article is an excellent achievement in encapsulating the complex thought of a deep thinker in effective English prose. The article is famous for the fact that it was single-handedly responsible for kickstarting the appreciation of Schopenhauer's philosophy in the United Kingdom, at a time when he had already become famous in Germany. Interestingly though, it took forty years for Schopenhauer (1788-1860) to gain fame in his own country and only during the last decade of his life did he become a widely appreciated author. In his own view this was because his own philosophy was at odds with the reigning philosophy of his day - Hegelianism - and he was never ready to dilute or deform his own thought-system in order to conform with the 'State Philosophy', as he called it. This article is an eye-opener and it should be borne in mind that Schopenhauer was a great Anglophile - he had attended public school in England (albeit briefly), read the English newspapers daily and held up as the finest master of prose the philosopher David Hume - and English fame was something that was a great honour for him.
Problems and Interpretations of Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation
Voluntas - International Journal of Philosophy, 2019
In this paper we present an overview of the current interpretations of the first volume of Arthur Schopenhauer's main work The World as Will and Representation (W I) and discuss their problems. We discuss four issues, which in our opinion must clarify a current interpretation implicitly or explicitly, if it claims to be an interpretation of the whole book: (1) What does Schopenhauer mean by the fact that his work shares only one (single) thought? (2) How are the individual books of W I related? (3) Do we have to read Schopenhauer's W I as a normative guide to the denial of will-to-live or as a neutral description of the world? (4) Do the often discussed contradictions and aporias within the book follow a plan or are they errors of thought? Resumo: Neste artigo, apresentamos uma visão geral das interpretações atuais do Tomo I da obra principal de Arthur Schopenhauer, O mundo como vontade e representação (W I), e analisamos seus problemas. Discutimos quatro questões, que em nossa opinião podem lançar luz a uma interpretação atual, implícita ou explicitamente, no caso de se pretender uma interpretação do livro como um todo: (1) O que Schopenhauer quer dizer com o fato de que seu trabalho exibe apenas um (único) pensamento? (2) Como os livros individuais de WI estão relacionados? (3) Precisamos ler a obra de Schopenhauer como um guia normativo para a negação da vontade de vida, ou como uma descrição neutra do mundo? (4) As contradições e aporias frequentemente discutidas no interior do livro seguem um plano ou são equívocos de pensamento? Preface Not only the content and argumentation of the first volume of Schopenhauer's main work The World as Will and Representation (W I) are decisive for its understanding, but also its structure, organisation, form of argumentation and systematization. However, there is no consensus in research regarding the interpretation of its structure and content. In essence, the discussions revolve around four questions or areas of conflict: (1) What does Schopenhauer mean by the fact that his work shares only one (single) thought? What role I Privatdozent (Adjunct Professor) at
The discovery of the identity of the will and the thing in itself in Schopenhauer is a path that begins with Kant's distinction between appearance (Erscheinung) and the thing in itself (Ding an sich), and leads to moral conclusions about the world and its essence as a continuous form of suffering. Although Schopenhauer's path starts from Kant, he departs from him at an important point and separates his way. By distinguishing between two types of access to our body (external and internal), he attempts to discover the thing in itself, which he calls the will. However, regarding the foundation of the world as the will and equating it with the thing in itself leads to problems in Schopenhauer's philosophy. In this article, I investigate and analyze how Schopenhauer intends to solve Kant's thing in itself problem, and then I demonstrate how his answer to this puzzle creates problems for his philosophy. I also point out two interpretive currents of Schopenhauer's philosophy that attempt to address these problems, and I present a Spinozian reading of Schopenhauer's philosophy, including my own understanding of the thing in itself and the will. Finally, I attempt to solve the problems that arise from Schopenhauer's consideration of the thing in itself as identical with the will.
Functional Analysis and Schopenhauer's Theory of the Will
The metaphysics of Arthur Schopenhauer centers on the notion of the 'Will'. This paper provides an analysis of Schopenhauer's notion of the will, as well as an exploration of his teleological assumptions. It should be useful in clarifying this notion as well revealing Schopenhauer's epistemic warrant for asserting his claims regarding the 'Will'.