Thailand's contentious referendum spells uncertain political future (original) (raw)
2015
In this paper, Dr. Prajak argues that the failed 2 February 2014 election produced critical and deep implications for the future of Thailand’s political development. The PDRC was the first social movement in Thailand that mobilized mass support against electoral process and institutions. Their animosity towards the election marked an unprecedented development in the country’s prolonged political conflict. The PDRC’s rejection of the election escalated the deep-seated political conflict to another level from which it will be difficult for the country to recover.
The 2014 Military Coup in Thailand: Implications for Political Conflicts and Resolution
In 2014, the Thai army staged its thirteenth coup claiming to resolve the decade-long political conflict. This article seeks to analyze conflict resolution efforts by Thailand’s incumbent military regime and the way in which these efforts actually affect the trajectory of the conflict. Drawing on the Thai case, I argue that the junta’s conflict resolution efforts aggravate the conditions conducive to conflict entrapment because: (1) military rule closes down a channel for meaningful dialogue among conflict parties; (2) the army’s association with Thailand’s traditional elites implies the continuation of socio-economic inequality underpinning the current crisis; (3) military rule undermines Thailand’s development of democratic institutions needed to overcome the ongoing power struggle; and (4) the junta’s political partisanship is likely to exacerbate social division in Thailand.
The Land of Forced Smiles: Military Rule in Thailand and its Discontents
2016
ince the military coup of 2014, Thais have been living under one of their most repressive regimes in decades. Various junta appointed bodies are currently working in accordance with a 'roadmap' they claim will restore democracy to the country -but what kind of democracy remains to be seen. This discussion paper places the recent coup in a historical context, arguing that it was a way for traditional elites to gain the upper hand in a decades-long struggle against elected politicians. With this in mind, it seems clear that the 'roadmap' and any constitution drafting overseen by the junta and their allies will actually be a way to reduce the power of elected politicians to the detriment of Thai democracy. The paper then turns its attention to those who opposed the coup, asking to what extent opposition to the junta has been possible in Thailand and what conditions might lead to a mass mobilisation against it.
A Democratic Coup? The 2006 Military Coup in Thailand
This article investigates the military coup d'état occurred in Thailand in 2006 and aims to discern whether it is to be considered a democratic coup. Therefore, a theoretical overview of the concept of democratic coup is undertaken and, after adopting Ozan Varol's definition of the term, the paper considers if the latter fits the Thailand case. In the light of these premises, I argue that the 2006 Thai coup does not hold the requisites for being defined as democratic since it did not foster the establishment of a democratic regime. Furthermore, it set the roots for a period of political instability and democratic recession that continues nowadays.
Constitutions, Regimes and Power in Thailand
2007
Constitutions are both a site of social and political conflict and a means to structure and limit political participation. This article emphasizes the contested nature of constitutions and constitutionalism to explain how and why modes of participation have been affected. It maintains that constitutions are themselves punctuated by struggle over the kinds of participation that are promoted, tolerated, and suppressed. There is good reason for a focus on Thailand and its constitutional struggles over the past decade. Thailand is often said to have had serial coups and serial constitutions. The drafting of the 1997 constitution was a long process, pitting various social groups against each other, but grew out of a broad-based political opposition to military rule. A military coup in September 2006 scrapped the 1997 constitution, and established a highly controlled process to develop a new basic law. The process to develop the new constitution specifically limited participation to the elite and carefully selected representatives of civil society from the middle class.
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN THAILAND: AMENDING IN THE SPECTRE OF PARLIAMENTARY DICTATORSHIP
Journal of Comparative Law, 2019
This article focuses on a series of amendments of the now-defunct 2007 Constitution. From 2010 to 2014, the battle to amend was at its peak as politicians endeavored to regain their lost power. Some initiatives succeeded, whereas others failed. It looks specifically at the role of the Constitutional Court as an unexpected gatekeeper, presenting itself as the guardian of the constitution and democracy, but in the end contributed to the conditions that led to the coup. This oxymoron originated in the fear of the elected authoritarian regime of Thaksin. This article argues that such fear is misplaced in the Thai context, which is more complicated than the Constitutional Court described it to be. When such fear is overrated, it becomes counter-productive to democracy. That fear created a false sense of crisis among the elites when the people simply ask for a new constitutional arrangement. It paves the way for the rise of military dictatorship as the 2007 Constitution ended with the 2014 coup.
Thailand's Democracy: The Long Vacation
1992
a military junta calling itself the National Peace-Keeping Council (NPKC) ousted the civilian government of Thailand. The widespread corruption which had been a hallmark of Chatchai Choonavan's two-and-a-half year premiership was the keyjustiscation for the coup. Martial law was temporarily imposed, and a committee appointed to draft a replacement for the 1978 c o n s t i t u t i o n Key figures h m Chatchai's coalition cabinet were arraigned on uiminal charges, accused of having grown ' u n u s d y rich' during their spells in office. For a time, the junta appeared bent on a thorough overhaul of the political order. A well-respected civilian, former diplomat and businessman Anand Panyarachun, was appointed acting prime minister. Anand proceeded to assemble a Cabinet composed largely of prominent technocrats, along with a sprinkling of military officers. Although the junta failed to keep its original promise to hold a general election withjn six months, a new constitution was finally adopted on 7 December 1991. Following a March 1992 eledion, Thailand briefly returned to 'normal' parliamentary rule, one year and one month &r the coup.