Climate change: the ultimate ‘tragedy of the commons’? (original) (raw)
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Constructing a Climate Change Logic: An Institutional Perspective on the “Tragedy of the Commons”
Organization Science, 2013
D espite increasing interest in transnational fields, transnational commons have received little attention. In contrast to economic models of commons, which argue that commons occur naturally and are prone to collective inaction and tragedy, we introduce a social constructionist account of commons. Specifically, we show that actor-level frame changes can eventually lead to the emergence of an overarching, hybrid "commons logic" at the field level. These frame shifts enable actors with different logics to reach a working consensus and avoid "tragedies of the commons." Using a longitudinal analysis of key actors' logics and frames, we tracked the evolution of the global climate change field over 40 years. We bracketed time periods demarcated by key field-configuring events, documented the different frame shifts in each time period, and identified five mechanisms (collective theorizing, issue linkage, active learning, legitimacy seeking, and catalytic amplification) that underpin how and why actors changed their frames at various points in time-enabling them to move toward greater consensus around a transnational commons logic. In conclusion, the emergence of a commons logic in a transnational field is a nonlinear process and involves satisfying three conditions: (1) key actors view their fates as being interconnected with respect to a problem issue, (2) these actors perceive their own behavior as contributing to the problem, and (3) they take collective action to address the problem. Our findings provide insights for multinational companies, nation-states, nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders in both conventional and unconventional commons.
The Governance of Climate Change
The International Journal of Climate Change: Impacts and Responses, 2011
This paper outlines the evolution of the concept of global environmental governance, and its expression within climate-change related problem-solving institutions. A number of institutions address climate change on a global level, with a variety of institutional structures and processes. This leads to difficulties for comparative analysis, particularly when it comes to assessing quality of governance. Governance performance is important, since it helps stakeholders determine whether a given institution is sufficiently legitimate to merit participation, or whether their efforts are better served in other forums. Using a set of principles, criteria and indicators of governance quality, the paper provides an analysis of the 'REDD-plus' process (United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries). It highlights REDDplus' strengths and weaknesses and provides a rating of institutional legitimacy. It concludes with some observations on the challenges facing REDD-plus, and calls for the development of standards to ensure institutional quality-of-governance.
Process and Critical Approaches to Solving the Systemic Climate Change Governance Problem
2020
The most important and urgent task, besides avoiding nuclear war, is abatement of the existential threat of systemic climate change, which must engage the thinking and action of humankind at all levels of organization and every sphere of endeavor. The threat of nuclear war is subdued for now, but because humankind is a significant geological force in the ‘Anthropocene’, the probability of the Earth’s climate system tipping over, due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, increases with each passing day.<br><br>International climate change governance, with the legal instruments of United Nations Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol (KP), was established to stabilize GHG concentrations. This ‘monocentric’ approach had failed. Emissions are still increasing and global average temperature will likely reach 3.0°C above pre-industrial level by 2100. The 2015 Paris Agreement, based on voluntary nationally determined contributions (NDCs), was then universally adopted. It relies on state and non-state actors at all levels to cut GHG emissions and reduce it by 55% or 25% in 2030 (vs. 2017) and carbon neutrality by 2050 for a least-cost pathway to keep temperature rise to 1.5°C or 2.0°C respectively in 2100. The ‘rule-book’ for its implementation has been agreed upon at the 2018 Katowice Conference.<br><br>A multi-factorial and multi-level solution set that constrains and works with the dynamics of the social-ecological system is required. Nation-States must focus on implementing concrete plans at both national and sub-national levels that engender reciprocity, reputation and trust for concerted collective action. Free riding does not go away but there is extensive empirical evidence that lower-level communities do cooperate to avoid the tragedy of the commons. The multiple benefits of actions from many decision-making centers establishing rules-in-use and plans in context will add up, albeit not optimally, to reduce catastrophic climate risks at this critical juncture. As part of the 'polycentric' approach, the thesis advocates the immediate use of carbon tax legislation to ratchet up NDCs to the required progressive ambition levels. A national carbon tax system, e.g. Baker-Schultz Carbon Dividends Plan, will restrain indiscriminate emissions at national and sub-national levels as well as incentivise efforts for greater energy efficiency and low-carbon energy sources usage. If US, China, EU and India with about 60% of total nominal GDP and about 60% of total GHG emissions were to introduce carbon taxes, it would have a domino effect on the rest of the world.<br><br>The “Integrated Systemic Process-Oriented” (ISPO) framework, integrating the socio-ecological system of Elinor Ostrom, process approach of global governance by the Commission on Global Governance, and New Haven School of social jurisprudence associated with Myers S. McDougal, was developed for understanding, explaining and solving the climate change problem. As an evolutionary and dynamic framework, it was used for analysis or framing questions in the study of the evolution of ocean commons governance, systemic nature of the climate system, evolution of international environmental governance, the evolution of international climate change governance, critical success factors for effective governance, and limitations of international law and international politics.<br><br>Evolution of international climate change governance from the scientific period to international law period was paused at the 1989 Noordwijk Ministerial Conference when the US delegation forced the conference to abandon agreement to freeze GHG emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 due to the turn in US political economy from classical liberalism to neo-liberalism, which was also responsible for the US-Europe political divide, the North-South economic divide, and the resistance of US to concede national sovereignty and power to a supranational authority. In fact, these differences in international politics were responsible for the non-implementation of the deep seabed regime in the law of the sea convention at about the same time. These differences were also responsible later for failure to extend the KP. The negotiating positions of developing countries hardened in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, which was due to indiscriminate implementation of neo-liberal economic policies. They were against emission targets/timelines for developing countries during negotiations to extend the commitment period of KP. Meanwhile the developed countries, especially the US, were adamant that developing countries, especially fast developing ones, should share the burden of emissions cut. Provisions of flexible market-based mechanisms, based on neo-liberal ideology, also contributed to the failure of KP, resulting in another pause in the evolution of international climate change governance. It led to the disastrous 2009 Copenhagen Conference. Evolution of climate change governance…
Global Climate Change Governance: A Rethinking
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs, Institute for Research and European Studies - Bitola, 2023
The decades of increased Green House Gas (GHG) emissions have increased global average temperature to 1.1 degrees over pre-industrial levels. In order to hold the global average temperature rise below 2degreesCelsius and, if possible,1.5 degree Celsius, the governments signed various treaties. However, countries ‟collective agreements to reduce their emissions were never kept. This study outlines why the method of mitigating global climate change has failed. The main problem was the inability to enforce goals and timelines. Ideas for even tighter emission limits will be ineffective unless they solve the enforcement gap. Trade restrictions are one method, but they introduce significant complications, particularly when used to enforce economy-wide carbon reduction agreements. The applied methodology is qualitative. This study proposes a novel strategy to unpack the climate challenge, targeting various gasses and industries with various instruments. It also illustrates how failing to address the climate problem fundamentally would generate incentives for various solutions, offering new problems for climate change governance.
Subglobal regulation of the global commons: The case of climate change
2005
In this Article, the authors challenge the conventional wisdom in the legal, economics, and policy literature that unilateral (as opposed to collective) action by individual countries to restrain despoliation of the global commons is presumptively irrational. The conventional view flows from Garrett Hardin's classic "Tragedy of the Commons" analysis, in which commons preservation, though collectively desirable, is economically irrational when undertaken by individuals, hence the tragedy. Motivated by the unexpected actions of many individual nations and states to address climate change (a classic global commons problem) even in the absence of an unambiguous global framework, the authors show that the market imperfections that characterize some global commons problems, including those of climate change, can diverge from those underpinning the standard "Tragedy of the Commons." The authors argue that this divergence makes room for significant rational unilateral action towards commons preservation, and that this has been underappreciated by many scholars who instinctively disparage unilateral action. In place of the conventional wisdom, the authors suggest that short of the ideal "full glass" of optimal collective action, there exists a "glass half full" of suboptimal unilateral action by larger subglobal governments that is better than no regulation (and hence no benefits) at all, and, indeed, the evidence shows that some larger subglobal governments, the United States in particular, should actually be doing more to address climate change. Furthermore, action
Global Warming: A Tragedy of the Commons
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010
This paper scrutinises two of the leading models for dealing with so-called 'tragedy of the commons' issues as to their suitability to tackle the problem of global warming; the polycentric model favoured by Ostrom, and the Leviathan approach as advocated by Ophuls. The paper then sets out a hybrid approach which it argues is the only viable solution to the current crisis of global warming. It proposes that, while agreement setting out goals for reductions in GHG emissions must be reached on the international arena, such an agreement should confer on each individual nation the choice of the manner of implementation, and that each nation, and also each region or locality, should devise their own strategy for achieving their required reduction. Such decentralised implementation would not only reduce the costs of both formulation and enforcement of solutions, but also permit more broad-based input by the local community, thereby resulting in an enhanced solution. Furthermore, local solutions would enable the development of a more responsive framework of rules and also facilitate regulatory competition. While legal rules will necessarily constitute a large proportion of the governmental response, this paper also addresses the role that non-legal rules such as social norms may play. Such norms can be altered through the use of taxation, which can effect "carefully biased options," as well as education as to the consequences of certain everyday actions. As Charny noted, systems of non-legal sanctions for the violation of the rules of conduct specified by the norm system help to explain, "in terms of 'rationality'" why individuals often act in ways that ostensibly depart from rational self-interest. Such departure from rational self-interest is exactly what is required to counteract the rational actions which result in 'the tragedy of the commons.' That efficient norms may evolve among members of a close-knit community is yet another argument in favour of decentralisation of the implementation of centrally agreed goals.
Climate Change- Global Governance
The urgent challenge of climate change poses a critical test for modern democracy and rules based international politics. Democracies need to shift from loose policy commitments to real and binding action. Yet, there are enormous collective action problems in combating climate change. Can democratic systems evolve to confront the challenge? At global governance level there has so far been a failure to generate a sound and effective international framework for managing global climate change, whilst at state level solutions are weak and struggle to transcend the normal push and pull of partisan politics. By setting out a range of focused governance and policy recommendations, this paper proposes steps for reforming a rulesbased politics, from the nation state to the global level. To coherently combine democracy, markets and universal standards, global governance systems need to develop into inclusive and representative institutions with the legitimacy and capacity to translate policy commitments into real world outcomes. This will require the wealthy industrialised states to shoulder a significant part of the cost of the transformation in developing countries. The nation state holds the key; it must broaden and deepen the deliberative process through democratic agency, involving citizens and civil society in the making and delivery of policy and ensuring that flexible regulation is in place to encourage entrepreneurialism and drive technological innovation.
Governing climate change: lessons from other governance regimes
2009
. He is currently working on the governance of the climate change regime. His work engages with technology development and transfer, including global governance arrangements and the use of market-based measures to increase collaboration between developed and developing countries. In addition, Arunabha also works on the linkages between the trade and climate regimes and has written on the monitoring implications of enforcing climate rules using trade measures, and is now investigating how trade and investment treaties regulate the energy sector. Arunabha is also working on the evolving national-level institutional and regulatory structures in large developing countries, for the coordination of energy and climate policies, in general, and monitoring and verification activities, in particular. Arunabha was previously Policy Specialist at the United Nations Development Programme in New York and co-author of three Human Development Reports, and has worked at the World Trade Organization in Geneva. He has led research on transboundary water basins, intellectual property and the rights of indigenous people, violent conflict and extremist movements, and has undertaken/advised research projects on aid, financial crises and trade negotiations for DFID (UK), IDRC (Canada), and the Commonwealth Secretariat. His advocacy efforts for human development span a documentary on the water crisis set out of Africa, presentations to the President of India, the Indian Parliament and other legislatures, training of ministers in Central Asia, public lectures in several countries, and regular articles in the print media. He is on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Human Development and Capabilities.
This article proposes a way to strengthen international environmental agreements, such as the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol. Multilateral environmental agreements such as these are extremely fragile. At the heart of the problem is what is known as the tragedy of the commons—a unique dynamic that viciously sabotages cooperation. The cause of this tragedy is that no one can trust that other actors will conserve the common resource, which triggers a race to the bottom—a race to deplete. Global warming and our inability to halt it is perhaps the ultimate example of a tragedy of the commons on a truly massive scale. On a domestic level, the tragedy of the commons is easily solved through regulation. However, on a supranational level, where there is no overarching authority, governance mechanisms tend to collapse. The hard truth is that without robust enforcement of some kind, international cooperation is extremely difficult to maintain. This article proposes the following idea: governments joining (or already party to) an agreement, contribute an upfront deposit to an international regulatory body (the Commons Management Fund (“CMF”)) with the understanding that their contribution will be forfeited if they fail to honor their treaty commitments. The idea, while ostensibly simple, is deceptively complex. The focus is not the penalty, but rather the ability of governments to credibly signal commitment. In game theory, credible signaling can prevent a tragedy of the commons by generating confidence that everyone will stick to their commitments. The CMF is designed to exploit this effect. Now, more than ever, a solution to the tragedy of the commons on a supranational level is desperately needed—the CMF is such a solution.