Drawing a Line in the Sand: A pragmatic theory of vagueness (original) (raw)

The theory of vagueness I advocate here has three main parts: it is pragmatic, dynamic, and relies upon the notion of “open texture.” First, I argue for the pragmatic claim that there is no special class of words that are vague; rather, any word can be used vaguely. Next, I argue that natural language is rough and approximate--words have open texture--and so meaning is usually only partially settled. Then I explain the “dynamic” nature of vagueness: Discrepancies between how precisely a word is used and how much precision is required are worked out in conversation. So vagueness cannot be properly understood when considered statically, it must be considered as part of the dynamic process of communication. Finally, I put these three pieces together and show that vagueness, on this picture, is well modeled by bivalent, classical logic. In that way, I solve the sorites paradox by recommending a new perspective on the relationship between formal and natural languages, not by recommending substantive changes to either.