Towards a computational theory of experience (original) (raw)
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A vehicular theory of corporeal qualia (a gift to computationalists)
Philosophical Studies, 2011
The idea that certain aspects of human cognition involve the construction and utilization of non-sentential representations akin to pictures and scale models has been with us at least since Aristotle's De Anima (4 th-century B.C./1987). Among the most vocal latter-day critics of this idea are those, like Pylyshyn (1981, 1984, 2002, 2003), who favor an across-the-board computational theory of cognition, where 'computation' should hereafter be understood in what might be termed the strict sense that involves the application of syntax-sensitive rules to sentential data structures (e.g., as opposed to a looser sense of the term that allows for transformations to other kinds of information-bearing vehicles). As these critics know all-too well, computational theories of cognition automatically enjoy the status of being neurally realizable, at least for all practical purposes. One way of showing this is to note that a device that approximates a universal Turing machine can be constructed out of neuron-like processors that interact purely on the basis of biologically plausible operating principles. 1 In fact, McCulloch and Pitt's early work in this regard inspired von Neumann to show that this same sort of device can be created out of electronic components (e.g., vacuum tubes) (Boden 2006, 196). This latter achievement yielded a platform on which many high-level cognitive models and architectures would be constructed, which clearly accelerated the ascent of the computational theory cognition. Clearly it would do much to bolster the credibility of the theory that brains sometimes realize nonsentential images and models if it could be shown that we have equally good reason to believe that brains are capable, at least in principle, of realizing representations of this sort. For this reason, I have taken great pains to demonstrate that certain computer scientists and engineers have, by creating what are known as finite element models, inadvertently shown precisely this (Waskan 2003, 2006, 2008). What their work shows, in particular, is that because non-sentential images and models can be realized by (strict) computations, they too can-if not directly, then at least indirectly via computations-also be realized by neural machinations. I am realistic enough to know that many of those who favor an across-the-board computational theory of cognition, especially the philosophers among them, will reject these proposals, so what I will try to show here is that by accepting them they actually stand to gain a great deal. My efforts will be directed towards showing how the proposal that some computers realize non-sentential images and models can resolve one major facet of the 11 There are, of course, also important differences between InCoMs and scale models (Waskan 2005). 12 http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Searle/searle-con4.html (last accessed 9/25/08). 13 Searle bristles at this terminology, but I feel that it is perfectly apt in light of the foregoing exposition. 14 To overcome the limitations imposed by human memory and, worse still, by the fairly rigid constraints governing perception and thought, this project will surely require the construction of vast computational models of neural systems (see Waskan 2006, chapter 9). Admittedly, to the extent that these models do explain qualia, it will sometimes (viz., as concerns creatures with radically different perceptual organs) be akin to the way in which computational models of black holes or the big bang explain these occurrences. Apart from inspiring a wealth of useful metaphors, in the end they may not provide us with the exact kinds of insight and understanding that Mary and Nagel seek. Still, unlike their topic-neutral predecessors, these models and metaphors would, in their own way,
On the practical nature of artificial qualia
2010
Can machines ever have qualia? Can we build robots with inner worlds of subjective experience? Will qualia experienced by robots be comparable to subjective human experience? Is the young field of Machine Consciousness (MC) ready to answer these questions? In this paper, rather than trying to answer these questions directly, we argue that a formal definition, or at least a functional characterization, of artificial qualia is required in order to establish valid engineering principles for synthetic phenomenology (SP). Understanding what might be the differences, if any, between natural and artificial qualia is one of the first questions to be answered. Furthermore, if an interim and less ambitious definition of artificial qualia can be outlined, the corresponding model can be implemented and used to shed some light on the very nature of consciousness. 1 In this work we explore current trends in MC and SP from the perspective of artificial qualia, attempting to identify key features that could contribute to a practical characterization of this concept. We focus specifically on potential implementations of artificial qualia as a means to provide a new interdisciplinary tool for research on natural and artificial cognition. 2
From Quanta to Qualia: How a Paradigm Shift Turns Into Science
Philosophy Study, 2014
Ever since the development of quantum mechanics in the first part of the 20th century, a new world view has emerged. Today, the physicalist objective assumption that objects exist independently of acts of observation has been challenged. The repercussions of this radical challenge to our common-sense perception of the world are far-reaching, although not yet generally realized. Here we argue that there is a complementary view to the way science which is being practiced, and that consciousness itself is primary and qualia form the foundation of experience. We outline the arguments of why the new science of qualia will tie objects that are being perceived to the subjective experience, through the units of subjective experience called qualia. If there is a reality that exists outside of perceptions in consciousness, it is indeed inconceivable. The reason is that once one subtracts everything that one can sense, imagine, feel, or think about, there's nothing left. Since qualia are subjective, they challenge the dominant world view of science as practiced today, which is reductionist, objective, and mathematical. Our view is a natural continuation of the quantum world view. We outline what the steps will have to be in order to fully develop the science of qualia.
Ineffability of Qualia: A Straightforward Naturalistic Explanation
Consciousness and Cognition, 2000
In this paper I am offering an explanation of the ineffability (linguistic inexpressibility) of sensory experiences. My explanation is put in terms of computational functionalism and standard externalist theories of representational content. As I will argue, many or most sensory experiences are representational states without constituent structure. This property determines both the representational function these states can serve and the information that can be extracted from them when they are processed. Sensory experiences can indicate the presence of certain external states of affairs but they cannot convey any more information about them than that. So, format-or code-conversion mechanisms that link different systems of representation (linguistic and perceptual) to each other will fail to extract any relevant information from sensory experiences that could be coded in language. The only way to establish specific roles for sensory experiences in communication and the organization of behavior is to attach to them, by associative links, words or other behavioral responses. If a sensory experience has no linguistic label associated to it in a particular subject, then no linguistic description can Ineffability of qualia 3 token, or activate, that state in the subject. In other words, no linguistic description can cause a subject to undergo an unlabelled perceptual state. On the contrary, complex, or syntactically structured perceptual states can be built up, on the basis of descriptions, by mechanisms of constructive imagination (conceived here as one sort of formatconversion). It is this difference between complex and unstructured representational states that gives us an understanding of the phenomenon we call the ineffability of qualia.
Thoughts on Qualia for Machines
I speculate upon the idea that qualia comprise of quanta or packets, and that each packet is generated by physical processes within a neuron, possibly at the quantum level. Pattern-specifi c neuronal activation causes wave-like interactions among the packets, leading to phenomenal sensation. In essence, I provide in this paper a new panpsychic interpretation of the hard problem of consciousness.
A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience
There are two fundamentally distinct computational approaches to phenomenal consciousness: either consciousness depends on the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is a product of special processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories, respectively. Process theories dominate the recent literature, but this orthodoxy is imposed on cognitive science largely by the classical computational theory of mind. Connectionists, on the other hand, are in a position to explore a vehicle theory of phenomenal experience. In this paper we develop and defend this vehicle theory. We show that while it leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, it does so in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways.
Qualia: The geometry of integrated information
PLoS computational biology, 2009
According to the integrated information theory, the quantity of consciousness is the amount of integrated information generated by a complex of elements, and the quality of experience is specified by the informational relationships it generates. This paper outlines a framework for characterizing the informational relationships generated by such systems. Qualia space (Q) is a space having an axis for each possible state (activity pattern) of a complex. Within Q, each submechanism specifies a point corresponding to a repertoire of system states. Arrows between repertoires in Q define informational relationships. Together, these arrows specify a quale—a shape that completely and univocally characterizes the quality of a conscious experience. Phi— the height of this shape—is the quantity of consciousness associated with the experience. Entanglement measures how irreducible informational relationships are to their component relationships, specifying concepts and modes. Several corollaries follow from these premises. The quale is determined by both the mechanism and state of the system. Thus, two different systems having identical activity patterns may generate different qualia. Conversely, the same quale may be generated by two systems that differ in both activity and connectivity. Both active and inactive elements specify a quale, but elements that are inactivated do not. Also, the activation of an element affects experience by changing the shape of the quale. The subdivision of experience into modalities and submodalities corresponds to subshapes in Q. In principle, different aspects of experience may be classified as different shapes in Q, and the similarity between experiences reduces to similarities between shapes. Finally, specific qualities, such as the ‘‘redness’’ of red, while generated by a local mechanism, cannot be reduced to it, but require considering the entire quale. Ultimately, the present framework may offer a principled way for translating qualitative properties of experience into mathematics.
1998
This paper is based upon a talk I gave to the 1998 cognitive science class and will follow the same structure of that talk. To start, I will describe the problem of qualia and will show that it poses a real problem for physicalist and functionalist theories of the mind. Further highlighting the problem, I will talk about androids. These entities of the future are functionally identical to humans, however it is claimed that if they existed, they would have no qualia or any conscious experience whatsoever. The final section of this paper will be concerned with Frank Jackson's Knowledge argument. The Knowledge argument is a very powerful thought experiment, which is supposed to show that physicalism about the mind is false.
Capturing qualia: Higher-order concepts and connectionism
Philosophical Psychology, 2001
Antireductionist philosophers have argued for higher-order classifications of qualia that locate consciousness outside the scope of conventional scientific explanations, viz., by classifying qualia as intrinsic, basic, or subjective properties, antireductionists distinguish qualia from extrinsic, complex, and objective properties, and thereby distinguish conscious mental states from the possible explananda of functionalist or physicalist explanations. I argue that, in important respects, qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties of conscious mental states, and that, contrary to antireductionists' suggestions, these higher-order classifications are compatible with qualia reduction. I demonstrate this compatibility by examining the putative higher-order properties of qualia and comparing them to the higher-order properties characteristic of connectionist models of cognitive processes. I contend that the higher-order properties characteristic of connectionist networks approximate (in intertheoretic terms) the putative higher-order properties of qualia sufficiently well to conclude that qualia reductionism can (1) accommodate claims that qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties, and (2) explain the motivating intuitions for those claims generated by inverted, absent, and alien qualia thought experiments. In this way I argue that (approximate versions of) the putative higher-order classifications of qualia not only fail to defeat qualia reduction but, ironically, turn out to support it.