Conflict dynamics in post-2011 Libya: a political economy perspective, Conflict Security and Development, Vol. 16, No.5, 2016 (original) (raw)

It's the Economy Stupid: How Libya's Civil War Is Rooted in Its Economic Structures

Rome, IAI, September 2019, 27 p. (IAI Papers ; 19|17), ISBN 978-88-9368-109-4, 2019

As Libya's struggle for post-Qadhafi succession enters its ninth year, international peace-making efforts remain doomed, so long as they fail to address the root causes of the country's malaise: flawed economic institutions and the lack of a social contract. The economic structures established during the Qadhafi period deliberately incorporated inefficiencies, redundancies and a lack of transparency. Not only has this system survived unreformed, but paradoxically, the ensuing political vacuum after Qadhafi's ouster has helped it become more entrenched. Benefiting from this vacuum of oversight and ringfenced by international policymakers, various economic entities can now be considered semi-sovereign institutions, arguably more critical to resolving the drivers of conflict than even the competing political factions. The way forward, therefore, requires developing a deep understanding of these structures. The international community should pivot towards an economic-focused approach to peace-making. The first step is to commission a mapping of Libya's economic structures.

Libya: The Politics of Power, Protection, Identity and Illicit Trade

2017

Post-Revolution Libya has fractured into a volatile plethora of political ecosystems and protection economies, in which access to resources has become critical to survival. The struggle for control over illicit flows has shaped Libya’s civil conflict and remains a decisive centrifugal force, actively preventing central state consolidation. Illicit flows exposed the deep fissures within Libyan society, divisions that the Gaddafi regime had controlled through a combination of force and the manipulation of economic interests in both the legitimate and illicit economy. The impact of illicit flows, however, has been different in different parts of the country: in a perverse resource triangle, coastal groups, while linked to the illicit economy (particularly through the control of ports and airports), have been paid by the state, while also relying on external financial support in a proxy war between competing interests centered in the Gulf. In the southern borderlands of the country, by ...

The Libya Crisis: Militarisation of the New Scramble and More

The conflict in Libya that invited involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the demonisation of Colonel Gaddafi as a ruthless tyrant clearly showed the desire of the West to militarise the New Scramble for African resources, a process which has become so pervasive in the current age. This paper argues that while the political misgivings of the Libyan regime under Gaddafi were clear for all to see, the problem did not need the intervention of NATO. The paper also advances the opinion that the Libya crisis will cause instability domestically and regionally. Finally the paper also holds that the Libya war is the same as the Iraqi and Afghan wars whose other objective is the creation of conflict in the hope of making huge profits in post-conflict reconstruction, a phenomenon called for profit war. The paper recommends that African leaders should not hold their people at ransom by monopolising political space as this creates room for the entrance of World powers who thrive on creating chaos in the hope of gaining scores in the New Scramble for African Resources.

The Libya Crisis: The Militarisation of the New Scramble and More

2012

The conflict in Libya that invited involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the demonisation of Colonel Gaddafi as a ruthless tyrant clearly showed the desire of the West to militarise the New Scramble for African resources, a process which has become so pervasive in the current age. This paper argues that while the political misgivings of the Libyan regime under Gaddafi were clear for all to see, the problem did not need the intervention of NATO. The paper also advances the opinion that the Libya crisis will cause instability domestically and regionally. Finally the paper also holds that the Libya war is the same as the Iraqi and Afghan wars whose other objective is the creation of conflict in the hope of making huge profits in post-conflict reconstruction, a phenomenon called for profit war. The paper recommends that African leaders should not hold their people at ransom by monopolising political space as this creates room for the entrance of World powers w...

Paradoxical Africanisation of Libya after 2011. Growing Influence of Sub-Saharan African Government, Rebel, Diplomatic and Criminal Actors in the Post-Gaddafi State

EuroMeSCo Paper Nº49, 2022

The 2011 downfall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi marked a tipping point for Libya’s southern neighbours in re-defining their roles on the regional north-south axis. The era of an assertive Libyan foreign policy on Africa came to a halt. Simultaneously, as a consequence of the civil war, multiple African actors, both state and non-state, assumed greater influence inside and over Libya. The country moved from being an exporter of security and insecurity to sub-Saharan Africa, as under Gaddafi, to becoming an importer. Some aspects of this largely unnoticed, multi-dimensional “Africanisation” of Libya are likely to take root. Changes in Libya’s and sub-Saharan African actors’ standings within the regional setting represent a new reality on the ground that has not been contextualised and analysed thoroughly enough. Only when the international actors do so will they be able to adequately navigate and constructively engage social, political and security structures within the Libya-sub-Saharan Africa framework. Thus, this paper aims to answer the following research questions: in which specific north-south security-related phenomena did sub-Saharan African actors assume agency? Are the motivations of the ac- tors involved opportunistic or do they include long-term political goals? Which aspects of “Africanisation” are taking solid roots and could be sustained beyond the period of Libya’s instability? Will this change to the regional order be temporary and reversible? What are the implications for the European Union (EU) policies related to peace, security and governance in Libya? For the research, several interviews with representatives of the regional armed groups, policy advisors, policy-makers and researchers with an insightful understanding of local and regional dynamics have been conducted since 2018, including during field research in Sudan in 2019. Those have been supplemented by a comprehensive review of existing literature on cross-border conflict dynamics in the Libya-Sudan-Chad-Niger borderlands, Libya-sub-Saharan African relations and relevant documents of international organisations. Historical methods focus- ing on the long-term and comprehensive processes seen within a big picture are being supplemented with an analytical approach seeking logical consequences and formulating predictions out of hard data and a comparative approach, where models, institutions and experiences are put together with more or less adequate processes found elsewhere.

From Warlords to Statelords: Armed Groups and Power Trajectories in Libya and Yemen

ISPI Report, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, co-edited with Federica Saini Fasanotti, (my chapters: pp.13-25; pp. 107-116) , 2022

Armed groups play a central role in Libya and Yemen. Pervading weak and contested institutions, they have gradually brought their webs of survival, profit and governance under the state umbrella: warlords have become the new lords of the state. Armed groups control most of the energy revenues, critical infrastructure, smuggling and illicit trafficking. Their leaders are multifaceted: they are simultaneously military commanders, tribal chiefs, politicians and businessmen. Combining comparative analysis and case studies, this Report sheds light on the “economic face” of the armed groups and their power trajectories. How do armed groups build networks of profit and loyalty in the territories they hold? How does clientelism mark a continuity trend with former authoritarian regimes?

A Social and Economic Perspective on the Libyan Conflict. Tribalism and Oil Cases

Land Forces Academy Review, 2020

The Libyan conflict has become an issue at the global level since its beginning. The foreign aid and support help got by the revolutionaries in their attempt to overthrow the Qaddafi regime and the role of tribes not only during these events but also afterwards, the country’s strategic position and oil reserves are the main points of interest when considering the North African internationalized civil war. While the role played by the tribes in stabilizing the political and social framework still lays at crossroads, being extremely controversial, the economic value and strategic importance of oil, for domestic actors as well as the international ones, are above any doubt.

The Libya Conflict and its Implications for the Broader Region

2020

Libya is fractured. Its civil war is a complex conflict fought out between myriad smaller militias loosely integrated into two main factions. Khalifa Haftar’s siege of Tripoli and its UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) has at the time of writing gone on for almost a year. After some major gains for Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA), the siege has been stuck in a stalemate with frontlines running along the southern suburbs of the capital. Each side is backed by various regional and extra-regional powers, and the ensuing military stalemate has taken precedence over the democratic transition that many were hoping for after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The civil war was born out of the power vacuum that followed Gaddafi’s removal. This report looks at the evolution of the Libyan conflict since 2011 and maps out the various domestic and external – both state and non-state – interests that clash directly or indirectly in Libya. Moreover, it analyses the various security implications that the conflict has for the country itself and the broader region more generally. Lastly, the report comments on the prospects of the conflict and the peace process pursued by the United Nations and other international actors.

Master thesis: Informal Institutions and Protracted Social Conflict – the Case of Libya

This thesis aims to examine the influence of Informal Institutions of Political Participation (IIPP) on the perpetuation of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) in the case of Libya. It does so by utilizing the theoretical framework of Hans-Joachim Lauth who isolated three “destructive” types of informal institutions: clientelism, corruption and threat of violence. It follows Edward Azar’s claim that PSC is caused by deprivation of basic communal needs, and I focus on the limitation of political access in particular. By using the interpretative case study, I determine that the Libyan conflict can be marked as PSC and I isolate the presence of IIPP. The key finding is that IIPP can influence the perpetuation of PSC directly, by radically limiting the space for political participation and indirectly, by obstructing the state institutions and eroding their legitimacy. The thesis calls for further investigation on this topic.