Equality of Opportunity and Differences in Social Circumstances (original) (raw)

Fair Equality of Opportunity and the Place for Individual Merit in a Liberal Democratic Society

Brazilian Political Science Review, 2022

Although equality of opportunity is a fundamental idea of the egalitarian project, there is a continuing controversy about the effective distributive implications of the notion. This paper focuses on this controversy, and maintains that when equality of opportunity is correctly understood, it entails strong distributive implications. In this way, this paper intends to reject the notion that equality of opportunity is associated with a non-institutional idea of meritocracy: an idea which is often used as an ideological tool to make unacceptable inequalities seem acceptable. This paper defends the argument that only an 'institution-dependent' conception of equality of opportunity, such as Rawls' fair equality opportunity, is the most adequate interpretation for a liberal democratic society. Nonetheless, it does not mean that individual merit has no place in liberal democratic societies. Fair equality of opportunity-if correctly understood-is deeply relevant and might contribute to a significant reduction of economic inequality, much more so than is currently perceived in the public debate.

The Principle of Equal Opportunity

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1977

My purpose here is to justify a choice among rival possible principles of equal opportunity, for the concept of equality of opportunity has been variously interpreted at different times by different political theorists, all of whom endorse one version or another. In its most conservative form appeal to the concept can be used to apologize great inequalities in the status quo distribution of goods; while at the other end of the scale it is radically egalitarian, a call for perfectly equal chances at goods or advantages. Such widespread endorsement in this case, as in others involving broad emotively loaded social concepts, indicates little more than radical ambiguity in the concept involved. I will first try to distinguish different senses or dimensions of the notion of equal opportunity from political right to left; then make more precise the particular sense I take to be justified in application. Equality of opportunity becomes an important social concept when there are inequalities in the distributions of benefits held justifiable. If shares are to be unequal, opportunities for attaining them ought not to be limited or fixed arbitrarily. At its worst, equal opportunity is appealed to in order to excuse otherwise unjustified inequalities in distributions-the myth of free and equal competition becomes an apology for the results of social Darwinism. Given that inequalities are not only large, but handed down from generation to generation, belief that the survivors in such unregulated systems are fittest is obviously false (even if such an outcome were moral). We may then accept that application of the concept cannot in itself legitimize otherwise unjustified inequalities in benefits. The criterion for its own legitimate use is when these inequalities in distributions are justified on other grounds. When they are so acceptable, they will generally be more just if opportunities to acquire the fatter shares are not arbitrarily limited. Let us turn to the various senses in which opportunities can plausibly be considered held open. Three possibilities for principles will emerge.' The first and minimal sense is that in which positions or other goods are to be allotted only according to performance or predicted performance along some socially useful (nonarbitrary) scale. This means that they are not to be allotted invidiously according to race, sex, national origin, or social position or background. Jobs, for example, are to be formally open to all strictly according to their competence qualifications. Enforcement of such provisions can be seen to be morally insufficient, however, unless all people are given equal chances to acquire such qualifications or develop their potential abilities. We

Putting educational equality in its place

Educational equality is one important value of justice in education, but it is only one. This article makes a case for a meritocratic principle of educational equality and shows that certain arguments against that principle do not justify rejecting it. It would be wrong to, for the sake of educational equality, undermine the value of the family or economic growth in ways that damage the prospects for flourishing of the least advantaged. But insofar as educational equality can be improved without harming those other values, it should be pursued; in practice, educational equality can be pursued effectively within the limits set by those values.

FAIR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND SELECTIVE SECONDARY SCHOOLS

Can selecting on the basis of academic ability at secondary school level be reconciled with equality of opportunity? One common view is that although the two can be reconciled in principle, for various contingent reasons selection tends to undermine equality of opportunity in practice, for example, it tends to advantage children who have been fortunate enough to be born into better off families. In this article it is argued that the problems with selecting on grounds of academic ability go deeper because of the fact that children develop at different rates, and that a proper appreciation of the difficulties this creates for reconciling equality of opportunity with selection casts doubt on the meritocratic conception of equality of opportunity, including Rawls's principle of fair equality of opportunity. It concludes with some thoughts concerning what a better approach to theorising equality of opportunity would look like in light of the issues raised by secondary school selection, drawing upon social egalitarian ideas and a Dworkinian hypothetical insurance scheme.

Fair Equality of Opportunity and Education

In this paper I argue that all citizens of a just society, regardless of their age, gender or occupation, should have a genuine access to (free) higher education. This is not because education is a public good that benefits the entire society, but because denying any person the genuine right to education is to deny him the moral status as an equal citizen. Comments and suggestions are welcomed

Crafting a Solution: Problems with the Moment of Equal Opportunity

2017

In her article "Each Outcome is another Opportunity: Problems with the Moment of Equal Opportunity," author Clare Chambers presents a concept known as a "Moment of Equal Opportunity" or "MEO" (Chambers, 374). 1 The moment of equal opportunity (MEO) is defined as the specific moment contained within the course of an individual's life where the equality of opportunity (EO) ought to be required for admission into institutions within society (378). 2 After this moment, equality of opportunity is no longer applicable (374). Chambers believes that current liberal egalitarian theories support the concept of a moment of equal opportunity as the time within an individual's life where equal opportunity must be used by the institutions within society, in order to compensate for "unfair advantages or disadvantages" which impact the individual in some way (377). Chambers argues that the more egalitarian a conception of equality of opportunity appears to be, the higher the probability a "moment of equal opportunity" is used within the theory (374). In this article, Chambers approaches the problems associated with policies designed to support a 1 I have strong misgivings about Chambers use of this terminology which I will expound upon within this essay. 2 Equality of Opportunity is considered within this argument by the author to be one component of an acceptable theory of justice, however the author does not elaborate as to exactly which theory of justice she supports (396). The working definition of Equality of Opportunity within Chambers argument appears to be the concept that all the members of a society have equal access to apply and equal consideration to institutions within society (i.e. institutions of higher learning, jobs and other "positions of privilege") despite prior disadvantages or disadvantages in life (378). The author also concedes that another discussion must evaluate issues that may result in terms of the "efficiency" of such policies but she does not elaborate on such issues in this argument.

The Nature and Distinctiveness of Social Equality - An Introduction

Equality is not one idea, and one can advocate or criticize a number of forms of egalitarianism. Many egalitarians advocate the equal distribution of one of a range of equalisanda-in other words, what it is that should be equalized, such as political power, human rights, primary goods, opportunities for welfare, or capabilities. This notion that equality is best described according to some "thing" that should be distributed equally has been subject to criticism by a range of schools of thought. Of these critics, a number