Wilhelm Stieber: King of the Sleuth Hounds (original) (raw)
Related papers
Cultures of Intelligence in the Era of the World Wars. Hrsg. von Simon Ball u.a., London, 2020
3 For the general staff system see Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning (New York, ), a classic work on the topic that interestingly ignores intelligence as part of what the author calls the 'deep-future-oriented war planning system'; also Gerhard P. Groß, Mythos und Wirklichkeit: Geschichte des operativen Denkens im deutschen Heer von Moltke d. Ä. bis Heusinger (Paderborn, ), -.
The Culper Ring: The Grandfather of American Intelligence
A comparison and analysis of the capabilties, history and techniques of the Culper Ring by comparing it to a theorized modern equivilant in the form of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The purpose is to establish the Culper Ring as the precedent of modern American Intelligence capability and as one of the most successful.
Ludwig Deubner: a professor from Königsberg and the birth of German signal intelligence in WWI
The Journal of Intelligence History, 2019
In World War I Ludwig Deubner, a professor of classical philology from Koenigsberg, became the important architect of the German radio intelligence network on the eastern front and of Russian code breaking from August 1914, and directed it until 1917 or later. From the battle of Tannenberg to the important victories of the Central Powers in 1915 and 1916, hetogether with the Austrian sigintcontributed decisively to their successes vis-avis a Russian adversary of largely superior numbers. This contribution of Deubner to Germany's military effort in the east has been described in a number of articles and books, by authors like David Kahn and Heinz Höhne. Nevertheless it is time for a fresh look especially since Deubner's diaries became accessible to research in 2002. In addition, new research on the military struc¬tures within which German ra¬dio intelligence evolved has raised our awareness of this variable and its importance for successful military application of radio intelligence as a tool of military control and command. Certain old assertions can now be adjusted, old questions can now be answered, new light shed on important remaining interrogations. The old Deubner story gains in credibili¬ty, in authenticity and in meaning, by introducing these new elements.
This essay will attempt to assess to what extent the term 'secret service' enlightens or obscures the interpretation of intelligence systems that existed in England between 1650-1909. Acknowledging that this is a broad period with many examples of intelligence systems this essay will focus on some unique case studies from the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, such as the role of the post office in intercepting communications and the development of a professional intelligence system for domestic and foreign espionage – William Wickham's Foreign Secret Service in the 1790's. We must also briefly acknowledge that many factors will influence our interpretation of the phrase 'secret service' but this essay will emphasise each systems source of financing, how widespread they were used and how professionally they gathered and used intelligence.
My presentation is entitled "Convictions, Acquittals, and Appeals: Fascist and Nazi Spies at the End of World War II." Abstract: During the Second World War, spies carried out the bidding of the Fascist and Nazi totalitarian regimes, infiltrating and dismantling Resistance networks across Europe. In Fascist Italy, most of these spies were affiliated with one secret police force, called OVRA. While the Fascists relied mainly on the OVRA, the Gestapo was but one section of the growing number of Nazi police organizations, all of which used spies and all of which were part of the Nazi universe of terror. What happened to these spies at the end of World War II? Were they tried and convicted, or did they manage to get away? This paper will follow the trail of some of the police and trial records, noting how both prosecutors and spies used the records to argue their cases. The paper will also dive into the incomplete postwar purges to measure the extent to which the Fascist and Nazi regimes built deeply proactive terror states. While spontaneous denunciations were important, previous historiography overstated the idea of the self-policing state operating within a consensus dictatorship. The Fascist and Nazi regimes purposefully used spies against their most active political opponents, in particular the communists, the anti-fascist exiles abroad, and Resistance networks in Nazi-occupied countries. I argue that the incomplete success of the postwar purges proves that these proactive terror states created these structures to last. The complex surveillance systems that the Nazi and Fascist regimes had carefully built were too embedded in society and politics to be completely eradicated. At the end of the Second World War, the regimes collapsed, but the many strands of their networks of collaborators were too hard to prosecute. It was easier to reabsorb them into the new governmental and police structures.