Experimental Evidence for the Existence of an External World (original) (raw)
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Epistemological Solipsism as a Route to External World Skepticism (Philosophical Perspectives)
I show that some of the most initially attractive routes of refuting epistemological solipsism face serious obstacles. I also argue that for creatures like ourselves, solipsism is a genuine form of external world skepticism. I suggest that together these claims suggest the following morals: No proposed solution to external world skepticism can succeed which does not also solve the problem of epistemological solipsism. And, more tentatively: In assessing proposed solutions to external world skepticism, epistemologists should explicitly consider whether those solutions extend to knowledge of other minds. Finally, and also tentatively: epistemological solipsism warrants more philosophical attention than it currently enjoys.
Against Phenomenal Externalism
2017
In this paper, we maintain that no extant argument in favor of so-called phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. (PE) is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely, that is, in extrinsic terms, insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties the experience puts its bearer in relation with. We will consider what we take to be the five best arguments for (PE): the 'irrelevance of indistinguishability'-argument, the transparency argument, the error argument, the individuation argument, and the weirdness argument. We will try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. As things stand, unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism will show up in the debate, we presently see no reason to relinquish an idea that sounds intuitive and has attracted many cognitive scientists. This is the idea that phenomenology is narrow, i.e., that phenomenal properties are intrinsic, hence monadic aka non-relational, properties of our experiences. Such an idea grounds the opposite philosophical position, phenomenal internalism (PI).
Goldman's cosmic accident counterfactual scenario is a classic example of a bad thought experiment (Goldman 1988). The dismissal of this and many other appeals to possible worlds has led to prejudice against the entire category of thought experiments in particular among the scientific community. Reinterpreting Sorensen's limiting cases theory (Sorensen 1998), I present here an explanation of why good thought experiments should have the same normative value as their good empirical counterparts. This essay is meant to defend the epistemic legitimacy of good thought experiments and to remind of the theoretical and practical importance scientific thought experiments have whenever empirical testing is physically or ethically impossible. The urge to scientifically (not ethically) legitimize good thought experiments is impelling, considering the number of present unsolved debates on medical procedures like proton therapy (Shrader-Frechette 2001).
Knowing the World by Knowing One's Mind (Synthese 2000)
This paper addresses the question whether introspection plus externalism about mental content warrant an a priori refutation of external-world skepticism and ontological solipsism. The suggestion is that if thought content is partly determined by affairs in the environment and if we can have non-empirical knowledge of our current thought contents, we can, just by reflection, know about the world around us – we can know that our environment is populated with content-determining entities. After examining this type of transcendental argument and discussing various objections found in the literature, I argue that the notion of privileged self-knowledge underlying this argument presupposes that we can learn, via introspection, that our so-called thoughts are propositional attitudes rather than contentless states. If, however, externalism is correct and thought content consists in the systematic dependency of internal states on relational properties, we cannot know non-empirically whether or not we have propositional attitudes. Self-knowledge (a propos-itional attitude) is consistent with us lacking the ability to rule out, via introspection, the possibility that we don't have any propositional attitudes. Self-knowledge provides us with knowledge of what is in our minds, but not that we have minds. Hence, the combination of externalism with the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge does not allow for an a priori refutation of skepticism and is therefore unproblematic.
I develop an account of productive surprise as an epistemic virtue of scientific investigations which does not turn on psychology alone. On my account, a scientific investigation is potentially productively surprising when (1) results can conflict with epistemic expectations, (2) those expectations pertain to a wide set of subjects. I argue that there are two sources of such surprise in science. One source, often identified with experiments, involves bringing our theoretical ideas in contact with new empirical observations. Another, often identified with simulations, involves articulating and bringing together different parts of our knowledge. Both experiments and simulations, then, can surprise.
A Dialectical Account of Thought Experiments
2017
In this paper, we defend a dialectical account of thought experiments. First, starting from a fairly broad characterization of what thought experiments are in general, we focus on a tension between two of their characteristics, a tension that puts thought experiments in what we will describe as an ontological state of unstable equilibrium. Second, having interpreted the epistemological debate between James Robert Brown and John Norton in terms of this ontological unstable equilibrium, we will clarify our position in this debate. To put it bluntly, we agree with Norton when he argues against Brown's Platonist positions, but we do not agree with him when he maintains that thought experiments are only arguments in the sense of valid arguments. According to us, scenarios that thought experiments involve always including some kind of opacity that can not be immediately reduced, thought experiments can not be assimilated to arguments. Third, we argue that, to account for the acquisiti...