Determinants of Compromising Behavior in Negotiation: A Meta-Analysis (original) (raw)
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Innovative Approaches to Research on Group Decision and Negotiation
1997
The study of group decision and negotiation is intensely multidisciplinary. Researchers from psychology, organizational behavior, operations research, and other disciplines bring their perspectives to bear on the topic. More important, they also bring their distinct methodologies. As pointed out, it is quite rare for scientific communities to approach a subject from incompatible viewpoints. This special issue, however, showcases the diverse and innovative approaches represented within our unusual research community.
One for all: Psychological differences between acting as group representative and as individual
PsycEXTRA Dataset
Collective bargaining, business alliances, diplomacy between nationsinteractions between group representatives include topics that may have some of the greatest impact on our lives. Nevertheless, the nature of such interactions is poorly understood. How do representatives approach such interactions? What goals do they pursue, and what expectations do they have of their counterpart? In the present research, we advance a theoretical framework with which to understand the mindset that is activated by the role of representative. In two studies, we measure what goals (Study 1) and expectations (Study 2) become salient in this role, compared with the related roles of individual or group member. Our findings reveal that representatives may display a more competitive mindset, consisting of more competitive goals and expectations of others. As competition can be harmful, rather than beneficial to the group, care should be taken when relying on representatives, so that we may exploit their strengths while curtailing their weaknesses.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2011
According to Scheepers and colleagues (2006), instrumental goals refer to the maximization of profit whereas identity goals are associated with the attainment of a positive social identity. In two experiments, we show that when negotiations are purely instrumental individuals prefer pro-outgroup deviants as representatives (Experiments 1 & 2). In contrast, when negotiations are identity-related, group members increase their preference for normative (Experiments 1 & 2) and pro-ingroup deviants (Experiment 1). Furthermore, these goals also impact perceptions of typicality of group members. Taken together, these results suggest strategic acceptance of deviance when the goal is to bring the other party to concede and increased preference for normativity when identity is the group"s main preoccupation. We discuss implications of these results for research on negotiation as well as on the influence of the intergroup context on intragroup dynamics.
Cat among the Pigeons? Cooperators' Response to Individualists in Negotiating Groups
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Cooperatively oriented group members (i.e., members concerned about both own and group outcome) typically negotiate smoothly with each other, but what happens when cooperators have to face group members with individualistic orientations (i.e., members concerned only about own outcome)? This study examines how cooperators' behavior and outcome are affected by the number of individualists in negotiating groups. We manipulated 174 students to adopt a cooperative or an individualistic orientation before they participated in a three-person negotiation simulation in one out of three group compositions: all-cooperative (no individualists), cooperative majority (one individualist), or cooperative minority (two individualists). The inclusion of one individualistic member in the group lowered the cooperative members' satisfaction; inclusion of two individualistic members also lowered the cooperative members' individual outcome. Furthermore, cooperative members changed their negotiation behavior to more yielding and less dominating when they met two individualistic members, and this change in behavior explained their lower individual outcome.
Team Negotiation: Social, Epistemic, Economic, and Psychological Consequences of Subgroup Conflict
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2008
Large collectives (e.g., organizations, political parties, nations) are seldom unitary players. Rather, they consist of different subgroups that often have conflicting interests. Nonetheless, negotiation research consistently regards negotiating teams, who represent these collectives, as monolithic parties with uniform interests. This article integrates concepts from social psychology, management, political science, and behavioral game theory to explore the effects of subgroup conflict on team negotiation. Specifically, the present research introduced a conflict of interests within negotiating teams and investigated how this internal conflict affects the outcome of the negotiation between teams. An experiment with 80 four-person teams found that conflict between subgroups had a detrimental effect on the performance of negotiating teams. This research also employed a recent model of motivated information processing in groups to investigate possible processes underlying the effect of subgroup conflict on team negotiation.
ETS Research Bulletin Series, 1969
University of Mannheim Following a preliminary testing session for assessing individual risk preferences on the choice-dilemmas task, subjects (8 at a time) were constituted as 4 leader-delegate dyads with status randomly assigned. Dyads reached joint decisions on half of the choice-dilemmas items. Subjects were then recombined as all-leader and all-delegate groups. For half of these combinations, leaders were discussants and delegates were observers; roles were reversed for the other half. The discussants' task was to negotiate a consensus on all of the choice-dilemmas items. Delegate discussants relative to leader discussants consulted more with their former dyadic partner and more often failed to achieve consensus (deadlock). Magnitude of risky shift did not differ significantly between leader and delegate discussants. However, delegate observers advocated higher risk levels than their leader discussants, whereas delegate discussants and leader observers did not differ in risk preferences. Discussant-observer discrepancies in risk preference were consistent with differences in decision satisfaction. On the whole, the presence of observers seems to increase t1loss of f'ac e " motivation in leaders and fears of sanction for deviation in delegates.
Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 2008
The purpose of the current study was to integrate two streams of research that have remained largely distinct: negotiation and group composition. Specifically, this experiment examined the interactive effects of two individual difference variables (polychronicity and dominance) on multi-party negotiation performance (task conflict and joint profit) in either unanimity or majority rule contexts. Results from business students in a multiissue negotiation exercise revealed that personality does play a role in group negotiation, but relationships were contingent, as revealed by the presence of a significant two-way interaction for task conflict and a three-way interaction for joint profit. Group polychronicity resulted in higher task conflict, but only when group dominance was low. The polychronicity-dominance interaction significantly predicted joint profit under majority rule, but had little effect under a unanimity decision rule. Consistent with task conflict results, polychronicity negatively predicted joint profit, but only for lower dominance groups under majority rule. Findings reinforce the importance of examining how multiple individual differences interact with each other, as well as with situational factors, to determine group negotiation outcomes.
In this research we investigated how group power influences the way members of groups in asymmetrical conflict approach intergroup negotiations. Drawing on theories of negotiations and of intergroup power, we predicted that group power would interact with features of the proposed negotiating agenda to influence willingness to ‘come to the table’. Based on the negotiation literature, we focused on two types of ‘sequential’ negotiation agendas: one beginning with the discussion of consequential issues before less consequential issues ('consequential first'), and one leaving the discussion of consequential issues until after less consequential issues are discussed ('consequential later'). B¬¬¬¬¬ecause they are motivated to advance changes to their disadvantaged status quo, we expected low power group members to favor ‘consequential first’ over ‘consequential later’ invitations to negotiate. High power group members, motivated to protect their advantage, were expected to show the reverse preference. Converging evidence from five experiments involving real-world and experimental groups supported these predictions. Across studies participants received an invitation to negotiate from the other group involving either a 'consequential first' or 'consequential later' agenda. Low power group members preferred ‘consequential first’ invitations because these implied less stalling of change to the status quo, and high power group members preferred 'consequential later' invitations because these invitations seemed to pose less threat to their position. Theoretical and practical implications for negotiations research and conflict resolution are discussed. Keywords: Negotiations; Conflict Resolution; Intergroup Relations; Power; Asymmetrical Conflict