Whose Knowledge is it Anyway? Feminist Epistemology and Science (original) (raw)

A Further Reflections on Some Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology

Chinese contemporary art series, 2020

The philosophical study of knowledge, the so-called epistemology, is of fundamental importance in understanding our position in the world. In recent years, feminists have pointed out that culturally entrenched stories on knowledge actually rely on a series of dichotomies that exclude "woman" from the class of knowing subjects. This dichotomy is mainly due to the association of the feminine with passivity and nature-as opposed to the masculine, which is associated with activity, being seen as a rational subject of knowledge and a dominant part of contemporary culture. Such gender implication is also engaged in the critique on the notion of "objectivity" in Western epistemology. This chapter, with the "further reflections" as part of its title, is a reflective response to, also an elaboration of this feminist project. I will first outline the main arguments of the feminist critiques of Western traditional epistemology, concerning the problems of knowledge as representation; the neutrality of knowledge and reason; the influences of masculinity, and the notion of objectivity. I will then delineate feminists' suggestions of knowledge formation and epistemological approaches by introducing two influential feminist positions: namely, the Feminist Empiricism and the Feminist Standpoint theories. The final discussion involves the problems, difficulties and criticisms these feminist suggestions received, all pointing to the question-Is a so-called "feminist epistemology" possible? 7.1 A Critique of Traditional Western Epistemologies: Main Objections and Arguments 7.1.1 Knowledge as Representation One of the main tenets of Western epistemology is "representationalism," in which knowledge is best understood in terms of how individuals represent their

Feminist Epistemology: Its Epistemological Import

A survey on the concern of feminist epistemology shows that Feminist Epistemology is an outgrowth of feminist theorizing about gender and traditional epistemological concerns. Feminist epistemology postulates an experiential kind of knowledge. The central theme of Feminist Epistemology is situated knowledge. In achieving their pursuit, feminist employ three paradigms namely feminist empiricism, standpoint, and feminist postmodernism. But what difference does feminist epistemology offer? This is the concern of this work.

What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology

Nous, 1999

Much of contemporary analytic epistemology has been concerned with the semantics of claims to know: What are the truth conditions of claims of the form S knows that p? With some notable exceptions, feminist epistemologists have not taken up this project-at least not in this form-so for those who are engaged in mainstream epistemology it may seem tempting to think that what feminists are doing is not relevant to their concerns, and to ignore feminist work as addressing a different set of issues. 2 Although I think it is right that a lot of feminist epistemology is addressing different issues, this response does not take into account that a significant amount of feminist writing explicitly undertakes to critique the mainstream epistemological questions; it is not simply that feminists are interested in something else, but that they have principled reasons for not engaging the issues as standardly framed. My interest in this paper, however, is not in evaluating the feminist challenges to the search for the truth conditions for knowledge claims. Although I am sympathetic with the complaint that there are many other epistemological topics that mainstream epistemology could and should consider, I am not convinced that this project itself is misconceived or irretrievably sexist or androcentric. I do think, however, that there are problems with the ways that philosophers have undertaken to provide an analysis of knowledge, and the problems suggest that an alternative approach informed by feminist concerns is desirable. My goal in this paper is to suggest a way of approaching the task of specifying the truth conditions for knowledge, that (hopefully) will make clear how a broad range of feminist work that is often deemed irrelevant to the philosophical inquiry into knowledge is in fact highly relevant.

Feminist Epistemology: An Exposé

The text of a talk I gave a talk to the philosophy society at Birkbeck College, University of London on feminist epistemology on March 23, 2017. The talk was mainly a critique of the feminist theory of domination and power as outlined by Catharine MacKinnon, but also deals with feminist epistemology: consciousness raising, standpoint theory and postmodernism as well as Miranda Fricker's epistemic injustice.

Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology

1997

ntroductory remarks. The very idea of feminist epistemology throws some philosophers into near apoplexy. Partly this is social and psychological: an aversion to the revisionist challenges of feminism abetted by a healthy if residual misogyny. Partly this is intellectual: how could a politically and intellectually partial form of inquiry have anything to say about epistemology, which is or ought to be about very general questions concerning the nature of knowledge? The former is worth noting, but not discussing; the second, however, goes to the heart of what feminist epistemology is. This essay pursues one line of thought in feminist epistemology with a view to sorting out the relation between it and general epistemology, and between it and other approaches in feminist theory of knowledge. First I should note what feminist epistemology is not. It is not the study or defence of feminine intuition, of 'women's ways of knowing', of subjectivism; it is not an embrace of irrat...

Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology: Helen E. Longino

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1997

I ntroductory remarks. The very idea of feminist epistemology It hrows some philosophers into near apoplexy. Partly this is social and psychological: an aversion to the revisionist challenges of feminism abetted by a healthy if residual misogyny. Partly this is intellectual: how could a politically and intellectually partial form of inquiry have anything to say about epistemology, which is or ought to be about very general questions concerning the nature of knowledge? The former is worth noting, but not discussing; the second, however, goes to the heart of what feminist epistemology is. This essay pursues one line of thought in feminist epistemology with a view to sorting out the relation between it and general epistemology, and between it and other approaches in feminist theory of knowledge.