Justifying an Adequate Response to the Vulnerable Other (original) (raw)
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2017
There are two general views about the nature of what matters, i.e. about the metaphysical ground of prudential concern, the ground of the concern we have for our own future welfare. On the one hand, the identity-is-what-matters view tells us that prudential concern is grounded on one’s continuing identity over time; I am concerned with my own future welfare because it is my own future welfare. On the other hand, the identity-is-not-what-matters view tells us that prudential concern is not grounded on such continuing identity; rather, it is grounded on some continuityrelation, which only coincides with identity. In this paper, I explore a primary motivation for the latter view—viz., Parfit’s fission case—and show that there are interesting ways to resist it.
1989
This thesis is concerned with what it is to be a person, and with what is involved in being the same person over time. I begin by making a survey of the major theories of personal identity, and mark some important divisions and distinctions between them, primarily between Reductionism and Non-Reductionism and, within this former category, between the Physical and Psychological Criteria, and argue that none of these ha5 proved to be satisfactory. I stress the importance of the work of Derek Parfit, and in particular his shifting of the agenda away from the relation of identity to that of 'Relation R', and his claim that it is the holding of this latter relation - namely psychological continuity by any means - that contains 'all that matters' to us regarding the future, and not necessarily whether I survive. I show how this theory avoids the pitfalls that defeated the other theories, and propose various developments of it. A critical eye is then cast over the methodolo...
Self-Identification and Self-Reference
Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Special Issue …, 1998
The phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) is examined at length from Wittgenstein's initial discussion of it over Anscombe and Shomaker, then focussing on a detailed examination of Evans' account. It is argued that Evans cannot explain IEM, and that it is misguided to conceive of IEM as based in a causal information-link. First, such links cannot determine who is the subject; second, the notion of an information-link introduces a fundamental distinction between the source and receiver of information that makes the notion unfit for guaranteeing immunity. I"-ideas develop from the subject's capacity to act on incoming information and thereby place herself in the objective order. Her interaction with the surroundings will give rise to an egocentric self-concept, that reflects what I call an indexical self-awareness. As long as we only consider situations in which the subject acts on information gained from the actual context, this self-concept will account for the knowledge that the subject has of herself. It has developed from the gaining of information that represents the context from the subject's point of view, making the subject aware of her position in relation to other objects in the context and of herself as enduring through time. It is inherently subjective and accompanies every self-representation, indexing them, as it were, with the mark of subjectivity. Indexical self-awareness is a direct consequence of being the nexus between incoming information and action. However, it cannot guarantee IEM: It will at most give rise to a Kantian I-think, that guarantees that every thought I have actually is my own. What is needed for IEM is an awareness that this (my) thought is *about me*.
Personal Identity and Human Nature
Science and Mind in Contemporary Process Philosophy, 2019
This paper argues that the specific trait of human nature can be found in the gap, as well as in the complementarity between the first person perspective and the view from nowhere (third person perspective). The human ability to conceive of a view from nowhere, of a God‘s eye, in other words, the ability to grasp a question from a third person point of view without losing sight of the first person view, appears to be unique. But it also asserts that it is impossible to solve the problem of personal identity using the strategy of the third person view.
INTRODUCTION: AN ETHICAL DEFENSE OF SELFHOOD AS OTHER-CENTRICITY
2017
Altruistic and greater-good considerations are not only fundamental aspects of ethical maturity, but also a basic means for coming to know each other. Rational egoism (the view that practical rationality requires some form of personal pay-off for the goal-driven agent) is not so easily snubbed, nor has it fallen terribly out of fashion in the social sciences and economics. I argue that it is not a truism that altruism is less natural than egocentrism for an ordinary self. It is false. I aim to reconceive the problem that altruistic considerations seem less rational than justified, egocentric considerations. I conclude that the self can identify with subjectivity as such, and thereby advance the interests of a “we-self.” While epistemically distant, the “we-self” is ontologically prior to the ego. I conceive the problem in terms of a central distinction in Indian philosophy; the distinction between an ego-self (ahaṅkāra) and either a bundle of property tropes (as we find in schools of Buddhist philosophy), or a persisting synthesizer of experiences that is not solely identified as “this body” (as we find in Monistic-Śaivism). For Mādhyamika-Buddhist thinkers like Śāntideva (c. 8th century C.E.), an error-theory of self provides good reasons for altruism. I argue that this is logically unconvincing. In chapter 3, I appropriate Levinas’s discussion of the Other/other to develop a Buddhist-inspired, Emptiness Ethics. However, I dismantle this in chapter 4, where I appeal to aspectual metaphysics, particularly, the notion of composition as identity (CAI), to clarify not only the rational status of other-centric considerations, but the very possibility of acting on such considerations. In chapter 4, I offer a Śaivist-inspired solution to the problem of other minds. Borrowing from Abhinavagupta (c. 10th-11th century C.E.), I contend that the possibility of identifying with and acting for a larger whole lies in recognizing ourselves as both individuals and others (bhedābheda). I develop this by showing how normativity and a concept of selfhood go hand in hand; and, furthermore, the reflexivity of consciousness allows us to recognize a self that is not limited to only practical and narrative identities, but to self as such.
The self and identity negotiation
Interaction Studies, 2005
Identity negotiation refers to the processes through which perceivers and targets come to agreements regarding the identities that targets are to assume in the interaction. Whereas past work has focused on the contribution of perceivers to the identity negotiation process, I emphasize the contribution of targets to this process. Specifically, I examine the tendency for targets to work to bring perceivers to verify their self-views. For example, people prefer and seek self-verifying evaluations from others, including their spouses and employers — even when this means attaining evaluations that validate negative self-views. Moreover, receiving self-verification has adaptive consequences, even improving the performance of workers in diverse groups. Some boundary conditions of self-verification strivings as well as implications for making of minds are discussed.
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2008
The self is at once both utterly familiar and infinitely elusive. Everyone reading these words has a self or, perhaps more correctly, is a self; yet it is difficult to say what this means or amounts to, because, unlike other objects of scientific scrutiny, the self resists being pinned down or pointed out. In frustration, some philosophers have contended that the “inner I” is an illusion (Nørretranders, 1998), the product of outdated dualistic thinking (Dennett, 1992) or of misinterpreted personal pronouns (Kenny, 1989).
First person: the demand for identification-free self-reference
The Journal of Philosophy, 1995
Not long ago after a trying railway journey by night, and much fatigued, I got into an omnibus, just as another gentleman appeared at the other end. 'What shabby pedagogue is that, that has just entered?' thought I. It was myself; opposite me hung a large mirror.