Government Lawyers and the New Deal (original) (raw)
1996, Columbia Law Review
On March 29, 1937, America's constitutional landscape changed forever. A series of Supreme Court decisions upholding state and federal efforts to combat the Depression lowered Commerce Clause and other barriers to centralized planning. These decisions cleared the way for launching the administrative state. ' On April 26, 1995, the Supreme Court called into question the wisdom and continuing vitality of that constitutional revolution, ruling for the first time in sixty years that a federal statute exceeded the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.2 While it is too early to tell whether this return to "first principles"3 will prove to be "epochal"4 or merely a blip that will disappear from the radar screen altogether, this possible return of a "'Constitution-in-exile' "15may soon give New Deal nay-sayers another nail to hammer into the coffin of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's increasingly beleaguered legacy.6 Moglen for reading a preliminary draft of this Review. Thanks also to Rod Ingram and Dan Pringle for research assistance, and to the editors and staff of the Columbia Law Review for their care and persistence.
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