In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act (original) (raw)
1997, 47 Case Western Reserve Law Review 1605 1642
AI-generated Abstract
The paper examines the implications of the Line Item Veto Act, focusing on Congress's motivations for its approval despite its potential to undermine traditional legislative power. It discusses the legal challenges faced by the Act, particularly the Supreme Court's ultimate decision regarding its constitutionality, and argues that political pressures and symbolism were significant factors in Congress's support. The analysis suggests that the item veto may serve more as a tool for political negotiation than as a definitive means of fiscal reform.
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