Substrata and Properties: From Bare Particulars to Supersubstantivalism? (original) (raw)

The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars

Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1981

classic tradition in first philosophy, descending from Plato and Aristotle, A and recently reaffirmed by D. M. Armstrong,' proposes two equally essential, yet mutually exclusive, categories of reality: Substances (or Particulars), which are particular and concrete, and Properties (and Relations), which are universal and abstract Material bodies are the most familiar examples of Concrete Particulars, and their characteristics, conceived of as repeatable entities common to many different objects, are paradigms of Abstract Universals. Particular being's distinguishing mark is that it is exhausted in the one embodiment, or occasion, or example. For the realm of space, this restricts particulars to a single location at any one time. Particulars thus seem to enjoy a relatively unproblematic mode of being.

A Bundle of Universals Theory of Material Objects, Philosophical Quarterly

I offer a mereological bundle of universals theory of material objects. The theory says that objects are identical to fusions of immanent universals at regions of space. Immanent universals are in the objects that instantiate them, and they can be wholly located at many regions of space (at once). The version of the bundle theory I offer explains these characteristics of immanent universals, and it captures the instantiation relation in terms of the part-whole relation. The version of the theory I offer is simpler and more unified than other mereological bundle theories. Yet, it is not as encompassing as other versions (mereological or not). For I suppose throughout that space is a particular substance, but not a bundle of properties.

METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST ORDINARY OBJECTS

Philosophical Quarterly, 2006

Several prominent attacks on the objects of ‘folk ontology’ argue that these would be omitted from a scientific ontology, or would be ‘rivals’ of scientific objects for their claims to be efficacious, occupy space, be composed of parts, or possess a range of other properties. I examine causal redundancy and over determination arguments, ‘nothing over and above’ appeals, and arguments based on problems with collocation and with property additivity. I argue that these share a common problem: applying conjunctive principles to cases in which the claims conjoined are not analytically independent. This unified diagnosis provides a way of defending ordinary objects against these common objections, while also yielding warnings about certain uses of general conjunctive principles.

Nominalism about Properties: New Essays

2015

Nominalism, which has its origins in the Middle Ages and continues into the Twenty-First Century, is the doctrine that there are no universals. This book is unique in bringing together essays on the history of nominalism and essays that present a systematic discussion of nominalism. It introduces the reader to the distinction between particulars and universals, to the difficulties posed by this distinction, and to the main motivations for the rejection of universals. It also describes the main varieties of nominalism about properties and provides tools to understand how they developed in the history of Western Philosophy. All essays are new and are written by experts on the topic, and they advance the discussion about nominalism to a new level.

Super-Relationism: Combining Eliminativism about Objects and Relationism about Spacetime

Philosophical Studies, 2016

I will introduce and motivate eliminativist super-relationism. This is the conjunction of relationism about spacetime and eliminativism about material objects. According to the view, the universe is a big collection of spatio-temporal relations and natural properties, and no substance (material or spatio-temporal) exists in it. The view is original since eliminativism about material objects, when understood as including not only ordinary objects like tables or chairs but also physical particles, is generally taken to imply substantivalism about spacetime: if properties are directly instantiated by spacetime without the mediation of material objects, then, surely, spacetime has to be a substance. After introducing briefly the two debates about spacetime (§1) and material objects (§2), I will present Schaffer's super-substantivalism (§3), the conjunction of substantivalism about spacetime and eliminativism about material objects at the fundamental level. I shall then expose and discuss the assumption from which the implication from eliminativism to substantivalism is drawn, and discuss the compatibility of eliminativism with relationism: if spacetime is not a substance, and if material objects are not real, how are we to understand the instantiation of properties (4§)? And what are the relata of spatio-temporal relations (5§)? I then show that each argument in favor of super-substantivalism offered by Schaffer also holds for super-relationism (§6) and examine several metaphysical consequences of the view (§7). I conclude that both super-substantivalism and super-relationism are compatible with Schaffer's priority monism (§8).

On the ontology of spacetime: Substantivalism, relationism, eternalism, and emergence

I present a discussion of some issues in the ontology of spacetime. After a characterisation of the controversies among relationists, substantivalists, eternalists, and presentists, I offer a new argument for rejecting presentism, the doctrine that only present objects exist. Then, I outline and defend a form of spacetime realism that I call event substantivalism. I propose an ontological theory for the emergence of spacetime from more basic entities (timeless and spaceless ‘events’). Finally, I argue that a relational theory of pre-geometric entities can give rise to substantival spacetime in such a way that relationism and substantivalism are not necessarily opposed positions, but rather complementary. In an appendix I give axiomatic formulations of my ontological views.

Bare Particulars: Some Remarks

Fostering the Ontological Turn, 2008

The paper shows and discusses three of Bergmann's main reasons for acknowledging the ontological category of bare particulars. The first motivation is recognized in his agreement with the principle of acquaintance, according to which the simplest entities of ontological analysis must be presented to us directly. Since it seems very hard to maintain that we are acquainted with bare entities rather than with something qualitied, this argument turns out to be not very compelling. The second ground for admitting bareness is indeed that it seems to be an easy way to solve the problem of individuation. There are, however, some classical paradoxes of identity, which cannot be adequately handled with the theory of bare particulars. Finally, the strongest claim in support of bare particulars is seen in the ideal language method, which has been employed by Bergmann since his earliest works, and that has never been completely dismissed by him.

The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects

Philosophy Compass, 2010

The basic philosophical controversy regarding ordinary objects is: Do tables and chairs, sticks and stones, exist? This paper aims to do two things: first, to explain why how this can be a controversy at all, and second, to explain why this controversy has arisen so late in the history of philosophy. Section 1 begins by discussing why the 'obvious' sensory evidence in favor of ordinary objects is not taken to be decisive. It goes on to review the standard arguments against the existence of ordinary objects-including those based on problems with causal redundancy, parsimony, co-location, sorites arguments, and the special composition question. Section 2 goes on to address what it is about the contemporary approach to metaphysics that invites and sustains this kind of controversy, and helps make evident why debates about ordinary objects lead so readily to debates in metametaphysics about the nature of metaphysics itself.