A Representation Theorem for Voting with Logical Consequences (original) (raw)
2006, Economics and Philosophy
AI-generated Abstract
This paper investigates the implications of logical consequences in voting theory, particularly in the context of Arrow's impossibility theorem. It introduces the concepts of Individual Logical Closure (ILC) and Social Logical Closure (SLC) to demonstrate that voting systems adhering to these principles are constrained to oligarchic functions. The findings underscore the tension between social choice theory and deliberative democracy, suggesting that only unanimous voting functions can be deemed fully democratic, thereby challenging the foundations of conventional democratic systems.
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