Election Processes Management and Election-Based Violence in Eastern and Southern Africa (original) (raw)

Election-related Violence in Uganda: A case of Uganda's Multiparty Elections

Nabukeera, M. (2018). Election-related Violence in Uganda: A case of Uganda’s Multiparty Elections. Journal of African Interdisciplinary Studies. 2(5), 40 - 58., 2018

Uganda experienced a stuffy dogmatic past and is yet to witness a self-governing succession of power. The present National resistance movement establishment has for the past three decades steered in relative peace and made substantial changes in the direction of democratic unification through numerous political transformations including but not limited to the re-emergence of multiparty representation during elections of 2006, 2011 and 2016. Nevertheless, the expression and existence of electoral violence in these elections presents a disturbing inconsistency to Uganda's entitlement to democratization as well as generating hypothetical confrontational aftermaths in Uganda's previously difficult and confusing political past. The objective of this study is to present a thematic presentation of this problem through specifically identifying the types, causes and manifestations of electoral violence, the impact these have on Uganda's democratisation process and to explore strategies that may strengthen Uganda's multiparty democratic system. The study achieves this through using a conceptual framework of electoral violence framed over the case studies of the 2006, 2011 and 2016 multiparty general elections and using the documentary review method. The findings conclude that electoral violence manifested as both an isolated phenomenon aimed at subverting electoral outcomes as well as a form of greater political conflict generated out of frustrated political goals and a lack of a democratic culture. The conclusions suggest a need for implementation of a wide range of civic education programs and the strengthening of democratic institutions these can help Uganda move towards a genuine consolidation of democracy and foster the development of a non-violent culture in Uganda's electoral affairs.

Elections Without Democracy: A Case Study of Uganda

Informed by the central claim of the democratization by elections theory that elections [even flawed ones] under an authoritarian regime can eventually bring about democracy by raising the costs of repression and lowering the costs of toleration, this paper explores the case of Uganda to examine the conditions which have deterred democratisation and instead facilitated authoritarianism persistence regardless of the regular multi-party elections. Adopting four theoretical proposals from eight propositions developed as the papers analytical approach from Andreas Schedler's electoral authoritarianism framework and Staffan Lindberg's democratisation by elections theory, the paper argues that electoral democratisation has failed to occur in Uganda due to the immense presidential powers; patronage distribution and clientelism networks; weak and antagonised opposition parties coalitions; and the regime strength hinged on the presence of natural resources, the security role the regime, and alliance with international actors whose interests are less concerned with democratisation. In this way, these arguments have implications in the growing literature questioning the democratisation power of regular multi-party elections under electoral authoritarian regimes that seem to be increasingly normal political conditions of most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, conclusive results situate Uganda's empirical case in the larger conversation on electoral authoritarianism and electoral democratisation.

Electoral Violence In Africa: Political Violence And Intimidation As An Electoral Strategy

2015

According to the fifth round of the Afrobarometer survey more than 40% of the Kenyans and almost 45% of the Zimbabweans feared ‘a lot’ that they would become victims of political intimidation and violence during election campaigns, demonstrating that vio-lence as political strategy is heavily pronounced. As violent conflicts are stronger dur-ing election times (Gutiérrez Romero 2012) it seems reasonable to assume that most of this violence is strategically used to alter election outcomes. Against this background, the present paper examines electoral violence in Africa by focusing on the following questions: Under which conditions is pre-election violence more likely to occur? And, who is targeted by electoral violence? For empirical inves-tigation the models of electoral violence by Chaturvedi (2005) and by Collier and Vi-cente (2012) are compared as well as further theoretical assumptions addressing the victims of electoral violence are tested using Afrobarometer round five data. [WRITTEN IN 2015]

Is Electoral Politics A New Source Of Human Insecurity In Africa

2012

Violence and conflicts have characterised electoral processes in a number of African countries since the mid-1990s and created an atmosphere of insecurity. The prevalence of such violence reflected a confluence of factors, including the intensification of the competition for access to the state, perceived as a channel of accumulation. This perception raised the stakes to an unprecedented level during elections as vanquished parties went every length to stake a claim to the spoils. Other factors inducing violence included the poor organisation of elections, government interference in the work of election management bodies (EMBs), the insatiable desire of some presidents to seek third terms in contravention of constitutionally mandated two terms, and in some cases because the electoral model excluded loosing parties from parliament. It is noted further that, contrary to Afro-pessimist claims, African countries are capable of credible elections but this is conditional on adequate atten...

Explaining Election Violence in Tanzania: the Interplay Between the Union Politics and Electoral Administration and Management

Book Chapter, 2015

It is today becoming very difficult to find African countries successfully conducting elections without any violence. Electoral violence has become a norm in many ‘democratic’ African countries for a number of reasons, mainly those related to the conduct of elections, management and administration of votes counting and results declaration/announcement, as well as context specific factors such as electoral laws and procedures, state structures, etc. Despite the fact that election violence is becoming common in many African countries, explaining why it is recurrent remains debatable. This is mainly because election violence is complex and dynamic such that it involves a number of factors. In many other cases, country specific conditions and factors make election violence inevitable. This makes it very difficult to draw generalizable conclusions about why election violence keeps recurring in Africa. For example, although the 2000/2001 Zanzibar and 2007/08 Kenya election violence were largely motivated by election mismanagement, understanding why they happened would require going beyond mismanagement of elections to look at the underlying political, social and economic conditions. Given this, this chapter uses secondary sources to examine the forces behind recurrent election violence in Africa by using the case of Tanzania. The chapter takes, as its analytical framework, election violence in Tanzania as a product of the interplay between the Union politics (the desire by the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) to make sure the union is upheld by any means) and elections management and administration. The key argument is that election violence in Tanzania has largely been a function of CCM’s desire to protect and uphold the union by maintaining a stronghold over Zanzibar which in turn compromises election management and administration. This results in election related violence as the opposition tries to push for fairness and independence of the election process.

Electoral Institutions and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa

British Journal of Political Science, 2014

Political violence remains a pervasive feature of electoral dynamics in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, even where multiparty elections have become the dominant mode of regulating access to political power. With cross-national data on electoral violence in Sub-Saharan African elections between 1990 and 2010, this article develops and tests a theory that links the use of violent electoral tactics to the high stakes put in place by majoritarian electoral institutions. It is found that electoral violence is more likely in countries that employ majoritarian voting rules and elect fewer legislators from each district. Majoritarian institutions are, as predicted by theory, particularly likely to provoke violence where large ethno-political groups are excluded from power and significant economic inequalities exist.

Explaining electoral violence in Africa's 'new'democracies

African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 2011

The electoral process in many of Africa's 'new' democracies has been characterised by violence. However, recent manifestations of electoral violence have assumed an unprecedented magnitude and changing form and character, with negative implications for democratic stability and consolidation. This paper analyses electoral violence in Africa, with emphasis on its manifestations, causes, implications and possible solutions. The paper argues that rising electoral violence in Africa is closely connected with the neo-patrimonial character of the African state, the nature of contestation for power, the weak institutionalisation of democratic architectures, including political parties and electoral management bodies (EMBs), and the fascinating political economy of among others. Shola Omotola electoral violence. This is complicated by the absence/paucity of democrats, with democratic mindset, to play the game of politics according to established rules. Worse still, avenues for democratic redress, including the judiciary and civil society, are also deeply implicated in the deepening contradictions of the state. The result is the deinstitutionalisation of the people in the democratisation process. Electoral violence is thus a major source of democratic instability with palpable threats of deconsolidation. These contradictions will have to be redressed to tame the monster.

Uganda's 2006 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections

2006

Ugandan voters decided who will govern for the next five years. 1 These were the first multi-party elections in the country since 1980 and marked the end of 20 years of "no-party democracy". 2 It was also the first tripartite elections, with voters electing the President and parliamentary representatives (including special seats for women) on the same day. An important day indeed, 3 but elections are more than the casting and counting of votes. Much is decided in the weeks and months prior to election day, and events in the aftermath of the polling may alter the outcome. To judge an election on the basis of a narrow focus on the polling and tallying of results, and perhaps the last part of the campaign, often yields a very different verdict than if the basis for analysis is the broader process, where the parameters and structures are set that underpin and restrain the electoral process. This report analyses the 2006 presidential and parliamentary election in terms of the broader process starting with the processes of setting the rule for political contestation, through the registration of voters and parties, the nomination of parties and candidates, the campaign, the voting, counting and tallying and finally, the handling of election complaints. The report shows how problems and irregularities at various stages of the election cycle tilted the playing field and compromised the integrity of the 2006 elections. The report comes out of research collaboration between the departments of Political Science and Public Administration, Public and Comparative Law (Makerere University) and the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen, Norway. The project analyses the development of democratic processes in Uganda by focusing on institutions aimed at securing democratic accountability. To ensure that elected political leaders 'play by the rules' and act in accordance with their mandate without violating citizens' rights, is a key challenge for new democracies in sub-Saharan Africa, and elections and succession 'test' the strength of political institutions to check against executive dominance. In many cases incumbents find ways to win electoral mandates without opening for genuine political competition, and we ask to what extent the institutions established to guard against executive dominance in Uganda were able to exercise their functions in the context of the 2006 elections. The research project examines four sets of institutions charged with ensuring an impartial and fair electoral process: the institutions comprising the electoral channel, the party system, parliament, and the judiciary. 4 These four institutions are interdependent but also partly autonomous from each other and to understand how they operate and interact is necessary in order to grasp the degree of democratic institutionalisation. The quality and impartiality of the electoral administration is central for whether an election is seen as a legitimate process for delegation of authority from citizens to representatives. In new democracies the organisation of the electoral process is often characterised by ambiguous rules and problems associated with enforcement of the rules. The political party has become a most significant actor in electoral processes and democratic governance. Parties also serve to link citizens with parliament, which represents the citizens in setting the rules of the electoral game, influencing policy decisions and acting as an institutional 1 Local council elections were held later: L.C.5 Elections on March 2, and L.C.3 Elections on 10 March 2006. 2 In the previous elections held since the coming into power of the National Resistance Movement in 1986, presidential and parliamentary candidates all ran under the Movement umbrella, competing on the basis of individual merit. 3 The local elections were, however, held on different dates as were the elections of representatives to parliament for special groups (the army, workers, youth, and people with disabilities). 4 The study is designed to allow comparisons with findings from similar research projects in Zambia