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Russia's New Authoritarianism: Putin and the Politics of Order
Under Vladimir Putin, Russia developed a new type of authoritarian political system. This book explores the ideas and concepts that underpin the worldview of "Putinism". It examines how Russia's political elite reinterpreted concepts of sovereignty, the state, democracy, and law to construct an authoritarian political system in a liberal age. Using the political theory of Carl Schmitt, this book explains how Russian conservative ideas shaped a political system that prioritised political order over all other values.
Presidential Power Blog, 2017
Rulers cannot rule alone. This simple wisdom is oftentimes forgotten with regard to Putin’s Russia. This blog post summarises a paper presented at the BASEES Annual Conference in Cambridge that attempts a systematic inquiry into the institutionalization of Russia’s ‘institutional presidency’ – the Presidential Administration – between 1994 and 2012. It argues that partial institutionalization over time contributed to an increase in presidential administrative power. But as personalism and proceduralism coexist, presidents remained weak and debilitated at the same time.
An Overview of the Russian Post-Soviet Political System from Yeltsin to Putin
Chapter in the book "Karl Marx and Russia Pre-Socialist, Socialist and Post-Socialist Experiences and Visions" (ed. Segrillo, Angelo), 2019
The breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991 gave rise to one of the most complex transitions in history. Political reforms were implemented simultaneously with the dismantling of a multinational state and radical economic changes marked the conversion from socialism to a market economy. This paper aims to analyze the institutional path taken by the main Russian political actors after the breakup of the USSR and how the arrangements established in the transitional period ultimately facilitated the subsequent “verticalization” of the political system. The central argument is that the combination of strong constitutional powers for the president and weak protection of the rules on the political competition permitted the president to conduct recurrent institutional changes and keep an advantageous political position. In other words, the flexibility of the 1993 institutional arrangements reduced the costs for the executive to engage in gradual reforms on the rules of the political game. Most of the changes that eroded the fragile system of checks and balances were not adopted by constitutional amendments, but by mere federal laws, which require absolute majorities in parliament, instead of supermajorities. Finally, it will be shown that the open arena for constant reforms on the rules of the political competition has also hindered the formation of a de facto federalism. The paper has six main sections: 1. Theoretical framework; 2. The Yeltsin first period (1990-1993); 3. The 1993 Constitution and the presidential powers; 4. The Yeltsin second period (1994-1999); 5. The Putin period (2000-2018); and 6. Evidences of the consolidation of the "power vertical” system. The period in which Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012) was in presidential office, also known as the “Putin- Medvedev tandem”, will be approached as part of the Putin period, since the latter continued to play a leading (personalist) role as prime minister.
Putin’s Elite and the Legacies of Soviet Quasi-Modernisation in Contemporary Russia
Transcultural Studies, 2013
In spite of its rich energy resources and strategic location, and in spite of the declared commitment to further liberal reforms by politi-cal leaders, Russia seems to be experiencing some transition and de-velopmental problems. Economic growth is uneven and relatively slow (compared with other BRICS and oil/gas exporters). The Russian state remains centralistic, controlling, corrupt and inert. Russian politics is undergoing a retrogressive ‘authoritarian turn’ accompanied by a tightening of control over the media. The political competition for the top political offices is so skewed, the opposition so restricted, and the mass media so constrained, that the Freedom House no longer classi-fies Russia as ‘free’ and ‘democratic’. State patronage, protectionism and the taxation burden remain high, corruption is endemic, access to financing is limited – all constraining Russia’s development and pre-venting the advanced modernisation of the state, economy and society. These developments in...
Putin's Etatization project and limits to democratic reforms in Russia
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2005
The paper evaluates Putin’s state building efforts in terms of its impact on democratic change in Russia. Putin’s evolution is treated as a response and not a solution to the legacy of the Yeltsin era reforms that created a politico-economic system lacking widespread legitimacy. It is argued that Putin’s consolidation of power through his centralization measures seriously undermines Russia’s prospects for democratization. The paper analyzes his efforts to wrest authority away from regional leaders, oligarchs, parliament and civil society. The analysis contends that concentration of state power in the absence of horizontal accountability and an effective state bureaucracy will only consolidate a non-democratic regime incapable of implementing its proclaimed public policy goals.
Putin's Leadership: Character and Consequences
VLADIMIR PUTIN'S LEADERSHIP WAS RIVEN WITH CONTRADICTIONS, and on the basis of these contradictions very different evaluations of his presidency are possible. The contradictions themselves became a source of Putin's power. They allowed him to act in several different political and discursive spheres at the same time, with a degree of credibility in each, although their genuine authenticity was questioned. Arriving into the presidency in 2000 Putin declared his goal as the 'dictatorship of law', and indeed this principle was exercised in the attempt to overcome the legal fragmentation of the country in the federal system; but when it came to pursuing regime goals, it appeared more often than not that the system ruled by law rather than ensuring the rule of law. This is just one example, and there are many more—the revival of the party system, the development of civil society, international integration—where the declared principle was vitiated by contrary practices. The most interesting debates about Putin's leadership are precisely those that examine whether the tensions were contradictions, and thus amenable to resolution (non-antagonistic), or whether they were antinomies (antagonistic contradictions) that could not be resolved within the framework of the system itself. The first option allowed an evolutionary transcendence of the Putinite order; whereas the second would require some sort of revolutionary rupture. Challenges and contradictions Putin's presidency did not operate in a vacuum, and too often easy judgements are made on the basis of a decontextualised absolutism of principles which fails to engage with the real challenges faced by the Russian government during Putin's watch at the helm of the Russian state. The challenge from the Chechen insurgency, accompanied by incursions beyond the republic—into Dagestan, and even into Moscow with the Dubrovka theatre siege of October 2002, as well as the terrible siege of the school in Beslan in September 2004 in which 364 died—would test the political order of even the most long-established democracy. In foreign policy, the terms on which Russia would be accepted into the international community reflected certain postulates that alarmed parts of the ruling elite in Moscow (issues discussed by Angela Stent and Fyodor Lukyanov in this collection). Teleological applications of the transition paradigm, which focused on the mechanics of democracy building and consolidation but neglected history and geopolitics, were tested to destruction in Russia. This reinforced
AUTOCRACY IN RUSSIA: A FATE, A NECESSITY, OR THE WILL OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE
This paper argues that there is a trend towards authoritarianism in Russia. Some political analysts view this mass authoritarianism as a product of history, while others argue that Russia's turn to authoritarianism is not a cultural phenomenon but rather a result of the economic collapse and political turmoil that Russians faced in the early post-Soviet period. The paper, in an attempt to conceptualize Russian attitudes towards autocracy, briefly examines the foundations of autocracy in Russian history and tries to find the answer to the question of why autocracy has become an integral part of Russian political culture. The paper especially focuses on the periods of Muscovite Russia, Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Lenin, and Stalin, during which the foundations of absolutism, despotism, and autocracy were laid and further strengthened. The paper then examines the period of Putin and examines the motives behind Putin's authoritarian turn. Trying to identify the political, economic, and social developments that were instrumental in determining the Russian nation's acceptance of authoritarianism, the paper finally attempts to make predictions for the future.
At the Crossroads: Putins's Third Presidential Term and Russia's Institutions
Political Studies Review
In 2013, Russia’s economy entered a phase of stagnation, with a rate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth much lower than that of other emerging economies. This article argues that economic stagnation is linked to the dysfunctional system of informal institutions that permeates every level of political decision making in the country. By discussing four recent books on the topic, the article shows the negative effect of Russia’s informal institutions on economic development, as well as how their emergence and persistence is linked to the political system built by Vladimir Putin. The article then outlines different scenarios of institutional reform to show how Russia stands very much at a crossroads between different paths of political, economic and institutional development.
Europe-Asia Studies, 2020
This article attempts to open up the ‘black box’ of the Russian Presidential Administration (‘the Kremlin’). Borrowing from the literature on institutional presidencies and institutional approaches to authoritarianism, I argue that the administration institutionalised over the years of study, 1994–2012. More stable and predictable procedures enhanced administrative presidential powers but personalism and non-compliance with presidential orders remained. Original data on budget, staff, units, organisational structure and presidential assignments demonstrate that presidential power ought to be conceptualised as a polymorphous phenomenon that varies depending on the level of analysis. Researchers should refrain from over-personalising accounts of authoritarian regimes at the expense of more structural, organisational elements such as ‘institutional presidencies’.