Richard Ratcliff, "The Inner Circle and Bank Lending Policy," in Michael Schwartz (ed), Structure of Power in America (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), 154-162, (original) (raw)
Michael Useem and others have demonstrated that the inner circle of the corporate elite is institutionally capable of apprehending and promoting the general interests of the business community. This article examines the inner group of directors among St. Louis, Missouri, corporations, documents their centrality in the center of networks of economic power, and documents how the inner circle influence the lending policy of the dominant banks in the region, and the consequences of these policies for residential and commercial development in the region.
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