New Work for a Theory of Ground (original) (raw)
Related papers
Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation
Attempts to elucidate grounding are often made by connecting grounding to metaphysical explanation, but the notion of metaphysical explanation is itself opaque, and has received little attention in the literature. We can appeal to theories of explanation in the philosophy of science to give us a characterisation of metaphysical explanation, but this reveals a tension between three theses: that grounding relations are objective and mind-independent; that there are pragmatic elements to metaphysical explanation; and that grounding and metaphysical explanation share a close connection. Holding fixed the mind-independence of grounding, I show that neither horn of the resultant dilemma can be blunted. Consequently, we should reject the assumption that grounding relations are mind-independent. This paper is about the grounding relation and the connection between grounding and explanation. Grounding is a relation of non-causal ontological dependence; a metaphysical determination relation which obtains between entities of various ontological categories including facts, properties, states of affairs, and actual concrete objects. Though discussion of grounding has become widespread, much of the literature about grounding is devoted to arriving at a proper characterisation of the notion. Difficulties arise because grounding is taken to be a metaphysical primitive – it resists reductive analysis. This leaves grounding vulnerable to the charge that it has no distinctive content, or no useful role to play. In response (as well as pre-emptively) grounding has been defended by appeal to intuitive examples of grounding; by highlighting the usefulness of a grounding relation; and by connecting grounding to other more familiar metaphysical notions. In particular, grounding has been connected to the notion of explanation (e.
The ground of ground, essence, and explanation
Synthese, 2018
This paper is about the so-called meta-grounding question, i.e. the question of what grounds grounding facts of the sort 'φ is grounded in Γ '. An answer to this question is pressing since some plausible assumptions about grounding and fundamentality entail that grounding facts must be grounded. There are three different accounts on the market which each answer the meta-grounding question differently: Bennett's and deRosset's " Straight Forward Account " (SFA), Litland's " Zero-Grounding Account " (ZGA), and " Grounding Essentialism " (GE). I argue that if grounding is to be regarded as metaphysical explanation (i.e. if unionism is true), (GE) is to be preferred over (ZGA) and (SFA) as only (GE) is compatible with a crucial consequence of the thought that grounding is metaphysical explanation. In this manner the paper contributes not only to discussions about the ground of ground but also to the ongoing debate concerning the relationship between ground, essence, and explanation.
Where are You Going, Metaphysics, and How are You Getting There? - Grounding Theory as a Case Study
Quo Vadis, Metaphysics, ed. M. Szatkowski, De Gruyter, 2018
The viability of metaphysics as a field of knowledge has been challenged time and again. But in spite of the continuing tendency to dismiss metaphysics, there has been considerable progress in this field in the 20th- and 21st- centuries. One of the newest − though, in a sense, also oldest − frontiers of metaphysics is the grounding project. In this paper I raise a methodological challenge to the new grounding project and propose a constructive solution. Both the challenge and its solution apply to metaphysics in general, but grounding theory puts the challenge in an especially sharp focus. The solution consists of a new methodology, holistic grounding or holistic metaphysics. This methodology is modeled after a recent epistemic methodology, foundational holism, that enables us to pursue the foundational project of epistemology without being hampered by the problems associated with foundationalism.
This essay focuses on a recently prominent notion of (metaphysical) ground which is distinctive for how it links metaphysics to explanation. Ground is supposed to serve both as the common factor in diverse in virtue of questions as well as the structuring relation in the project of explaining how some phenomena are “built” from more fundamental phenomena. My aim is to provide an opinionated synopsis of this notion of ground without engaging with others. Ground, so understood, generally resists illumination by appeal to more familiar models of explanation. Nevertheless, its distinctive explanatory and metaphysical aspects guide us on characterizing its explanatory logic and its metaphysical features. Some issues concerning the meta-question of what (if anything) grounds ground are explored, as well as some recent skeptical challenges to ground.
Synthese, 2018
I develop a reduction of grounding to essence. My approach is to think about the relation between grounding and essence on the model of a certain concept of existential dependence. I extend this concept of existential dependence in a couple of ways and argue that these extensions provide a reduction of grounding to essence if we use sorted variables that range over facts and take it that for a fact to obtain is for it to exist. I then use the account to resolve various issues surrounding the concept of grounding and its connection with essence; apply the account to paradigm cases and to the impure logic of grounding; and respond to objections.
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2019
I explore the logic of ground. I first develop a logic of weak ground. This logic strengthens the logic of weak ground presented by Fine in his ‘Guide to Ground.’ This logic, I argue, generates many plausible principles which Fine’s system leaves out. I then derive from this a logic of strict ground. I argue that there is a strong abductive case for adopting this logic. It’s elegant, parsimonious and explanatorily powerful. Yet, so I suggest, adopting it has important consequences. First, it means we should think of ground as a type of identity. Second, it means we should reject much of Fine’s logic of strict ground. I also show how the logic I develop connects to other systems in the literature. It is definitionally equivalent both to Angell’s logic of analytic containment and to Correia’s system G.
Grounding, Physicalism, and the Explanatory Gap
Recently, it has been suggested that the notion of (metaphysical) ground has an important role to play in developing physicalism about mentality. For there are reasons to think that Grounding Physicalism About Mentality (GPM) has advantages over traditional reductive and non-reductive versions of physicalism about mentality. In this paper, I argue that a new spin on an old objection to physicalism--that it leaves an "explanatory gap"—undermines the enthusiasm for GPM. I start by arguing that truths about the essences of things have an important role to play in explaining certain grounding phenomena. I then argue that this ultimately creates a dilemma for GPM: either GPM leaves a distinctive explanatory gap, or it collapses into a version of reductive physicalism.
Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground
2016
Wilson's "No Work for a Theory of Grounding" (2014) offers an insightful critique of grounding-based approaches to metaphysical inquiry. She argues that the notion of grounding is uninformative, disunified, and in the end unhelpful. She then sketches a rival approach, which eschews the notion of grounding, in favor of a plurality of "small-'g'" grounding-type notions alongside a primitive notion of absolute fundamentality. I think that Wilson is right to criticize many extant grounding-based approaches for not being sufficiently informative. I just think that it is possible for the grounding theorist to do better, and that my own (forthcoming) treatment in terms of structural equations (which are formal models developed for understanding causal structure) does better in the needed ways. I also think that her rival approach deserves serious consideration in its own right. But I argue that her approach is open to serious criticisms, including every one of the criticisms she levels at the grounding theorist.
Philosophical Studies, 2019
I outline and provide a solution to some paradoxes of ground.