Explaining Domestic Violence Policy Outcomes in Chile and Argentina (original) (raw)

Explaining Domestic Violence Policy Outcomes in Chile and Argentina

Susan Franceschet

Abstract

This article explains why Chile has outperformed Argentina in policy responses to the problem of domestic violence. It argues that policy variation is due to both macro-level institutional features (state capacity and centralization) and to more contingent political factors that shape the structure, role, and resources of the women’s policy agencies that coordinate and implement domestic violence policies. The initial design of Chile’s National Women’s Service has allowed it to act as a crucial “insider” ally to advocacy groups. In contrast, Argentina’s National Women’s Council has suffered repeated downgrading and loss of resources due to ideological conflicts and changes in government, rendering it unable to coordinate policy responses to domestic violence effectively or to act as an ally to advocates inside and outside the state seeking increased resources and more effective policy responses to violence against women.

Despite the election of a female president in 2006, Chile is commonly perceived as a deeply conservative country and a laggard in terms of women’s rights policies. Abortion is criminalized in all cases, even if the pregnancy threatens a woman’s life; divorce was not legalized until 2004; and Chile is one of just two countries in Latin America that has not ratified the Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the United Nations in 1999. Neighboring Argentina, in contrast, may be considered a pioneer in terms of gender policy. In 1991, Argentina became the first country in the world to legally oblige political parties to nominate a minimum percentage of female candidates; and today, women constitute more than 40 percent of elected officeholders. While debates about reproductive rights are fierce, political figures in all the major parties have openly called for a more liberal abortion law; and in 2006 a major policy reform on sexual health and procreation was passed by the Argentine Congress. Policies on reproductive rights and women’s political representation tell only part of the story, however. Countries may be leaders in some areas of gender equality and laggards in others. As Mala Htun and Laurel Weldon argue, “gender policy is not one issue but many” (2010, 208).

In another crucial area of gender policy, the problem of domestic violence, Chile has outperformed Argentina according to a variety of

measures. Although both countries first adopted domestic violence legislation in 1994 and subsequently reformed their initial laws (Chile in 2005 and Argentina in 2009), Chile has implemented the law better, gathering and reporting data on domestic violence; creating supporting services, such as public awareness campaigns and training for police, judges, and health professionals; and providing services to victims of violence. Chile’s reformed legislation also goes farther than Argentina’s by criminalizing domestic violence and creating responsibilities for the state to protect victims. The goal of this article is to explain this variation in domestic violence policy outcomes in the two countries. 1{ }^{1}

The article argues that the difference in domestic violence policy outcomes in Chile and Argentina owes something both to macro-level institutional factors, such as variation in state capacity and degree of centralization, and to more mid-range political factors; namely, variation in the resources and power of women’s policy agencies (WPAs). While a state’s overall administrative capacity and degree of centralization are relatively stable features of the institutional context, the role of WPAs is a more contingent political factor, responding to influences like changes in government, party competition, and specific political events. Yet there is also a certain degree of path dependency involved: the power and resources conferred to WPAs at the time of their creation produce their own dynamics, which, in turn, play a role in future policy processes. More specifically, women’s policy agencies may empower women as a group-or at least the advocacy groups that organize and lobby on their behalf-by permitting them greater access to the policy process or providing them with allies in the state who can help them to achieve shared policy goals. This kind of “policy feedback loop” is evident in the two countries examined here, and helps to account for domestic violence policy variation.

Argentina and Chile are useful cases for comparison because they show so clearly the impact that women’s policy agencies can have in this policy area. After both countries adopted domestic violence laws in 1994, serious problems and glaring shortcomings soon appeared in the legislation. Only Chile has engaged in far-reaching reforms, including a much-improved domestic violence law in 2005 and substantially increased funds for victim support services, training, and public awareness campaigns. This outcome can be partly explained by macro-level institutional factors: Chile is a relatively strong and centralized state with a capable and effective bureaucracy, while Argentina is a federal state with weak administrative capacity. Effective bureaucracies will implement policies better and thereby provide improved policy outcomes. But a full explanation needs to take into account the role of Chile’s National Women’s Service (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer, SERNAM), a centralized state agency created in 1991 that plays a key role in policy research, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation.

Certain features of SERNAM’s institutional design are important, particularly its well-resourced legal reform department and its ability, as part of the executive branch, to propose legislation. SERNAM’s institutional features have thereby permitted the agency to become a crucial “insider” ally of advocates of policy reform. The situation is very different in Argentina, where reform advocates confront a decentralized federal state and a bureaucracy with very low policy capacity. More important, Argentina’s National Women’s Council (Consejo Nacional de la Mujer, CNM), created in 1992, has few resources, very little influence within the state, and no legislative role at all, leaving advocacy groups without influential insider allies. As a result, although a new law was adopted in 2009, it fails to address the most critical shortcomings of the original law, and there is no evidence that it will be more effectively implemented, given the absence of resources for the CNM to coordinate the implementation.

A comparative analysis of the two countries thus reveals the importance of both macro-level institutional factors and women’s policy agencies. The institutional capacity of WPAs does not flow directly from the broader institutional features of the state, however. Strong states will not necessarily or automatically have strong and effective women’s policy agencies. Instead, the power and resources of WPAs are shaped largely by political factors. Between 1990 and 2010, Chile was governed by a center-left coalition of parties known as the Concertación. 2{ }^{2} Although there is considerable ideological diversity among the parties of the coalition and intense disagreement over specific gender issues, such as reproductive rights, there has been fairly consistent support for a broad women’s rights agenda. This factor, combined with the Concertación’s uninterrupted hold on power for 20 years, helps to explain the institutional stability enjoyed by SERNAM. Argentina’s CNM, in contrast, has suffered institutional downgrading due to ideological conflicts, economic crises, and multiple changes in government.

This article will analyze the comparative variation in domestic violence policies that has resulted from these differences. First it puts the problem of domestic violence in context, with an overview of the adoption of domestic violence laws in Latin America and a brief discussion of their main shortcomings. Then it outlines a framework for analyzing variation in domestic violence policy outcomes, paying particular attention to both institutional and political contexts. The Argentine and Chilean cases are compared, showing that an underresourced and less powerful women’s policy agency in Argentina, embedded in a context of federalism and weak bureaucratic institutions, has not only undermined policy implementation, but also has deprived reform advocates of influential insider allies who would improve their ability to politicize policy failures and build public support for meaningful policy reform.

Domestic Violence Policy in Latin America

Historically, two factors helped to place the issue of violence against women on the political agenda in Latin America. First, women’s movements, many emerging during periods of dictatorship or civil war, highlighted the gendered aspects of political violence and also successfully politicized issues, such as domestic violence, that had previously been considered private matters (Waylen 2007). Second, the demands of local women’s movements were supported and legitimated by transnational developments, particularly the growing global awareness of the problems of gender inequality (Friedman 2003). At the 1993 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, women’s rights were explicitly recognized as human rights, and the conference concluded with the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. The Fourth UN Conference on Women (Beijing) in 1995 also emphasized the problem of violence against women.

More important, a regional treaty emerged shortly after the Vienna conference, translating the global norm against violence against women into practice in Latin America. The 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women declares all forms of gender violence to be human rights violations, and obligates all signatories to take action by implementing legislation that addresses domestic violence. Even more significant, the treaty establishes monitoring mechanisms that permit individuals and groups to bring complaints to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in cases in which states fail to comply with the obligations set out by the treaty (Hawkins and Hume 2002; Friedman 2009). By 1998, all Latin American states had signed and ratified the convention.

Latin American governments soon responded to lobbying by women’s movements and to their treaty obligations, with most states adopting domestic violence legislation in the mid-1990s (although Peru had done so in 1993). Argentina and Chile passed laws in 1994, and most other countries followed suit between 1995 and 1998. Brazil was the regional outlier, waiting until 2004 to adopt domestic violence legislation, despite being a regional (and indeed, world) leader in terms of the creation of women’s police stations for victims of violence (see Santos 2004). But although all states in the region have adopted laws and policies on domestic violence, scholars have identified a range of problems that undermine the laws’ effectiveness, from poor design to arbitrary implementation and insufficient budgets.

One of the most common criticisms of domestic violence laws in Latin America is that most establish family violence as a civil rather than a criminal matter, designating family tribunals or civil courts as the key authority. As a result, penalties for domestic violence are seldom severe

enough to send a strong message that such acts are unacceptable (Rioseco Ortega 2005). Some countries, including Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and more recently Chile, have included domestic violence in their penal codes (Rioseco Ortega 2005, 68-73), while others refer cases to criminal courts only when they are “severe” enough to be classified as assault or homicide (Macaulay 2005). When cases are classified as assault or homicide, however, they are no longer treated or registered as family or domestic violence, thereby hindering data collection and knowledge about the problem. All too frequently, decisions about whether civil or criminal courts acquire authority in domestic violence cases are made in an arbitrary manner, often due to ambiguous legislation and the subjective preferences of police and judicial officials (Guerrero Caviedes 2002; Macaulay 2005).

Another criticism of the region’s domestic violence laws derives from the ideological climate in which they emerged. Despite the success of Latin American feminist movements in challenging the idea that domestic violence is a “private” matter, Latin American societies continue to place a high value on family unity. As a result, many laws place considerable emphasis on keeping families together, rather than punishing abusers with prison sentences or removing them from the family home as a protective measure. At least eight countries require conciliation as an obligatory first step in the legal process (although Chile’s reformed law removes this obligation). Argentina’s original law required that a judge ordering preventive measures, such as removing an aggressor from the family home, must summon family members for compulsory mediation within 48 hours (Bressa and Schuster 2003; Macaulay 2005, 106).

Fiona Macaulay argues that mandatory conciliation is highly problematic because “it re-naturalizes domestic violence by implying that a couple can, or should, be reconciled even when one systematically abuses the other” (205, 110; see also Boesten 2006, 259). Other authors note that the conciliation process fails to take into account the power asymmetries that are so central to the dynamic between abuser and victim (Rioseco Ortega 2005, 22-23). The preference for laws that incorporate counseling and conciliation emerges because the majority of laws are framed in such a way that the primary good to be protected is the family unit rather than the individual at risk of violence (Larraín 1999; Macaulay 2005). In a region dominated by Catholicism, where religious groups often mobilize in opposition to perceived threats to Catholic values, it is not surprising that domestic violence laws have prioritized the protection of the family over individual women’s rights.

The shortcomings of many of the region’s laws on domestic violence complicate the implementation process, largely because ambiguity about whether a case should be addressed by civil or criminal courts ultimately leaves too much room for police and other state officials to

decide-based on their own criteria-where to direct cases (Macaulay 2005, 109; Boesten 2006, 259). But policy implementation is also shaped by a series of other factors that have produced highly undesirable outcomes in much of the region.

InStitutions, Gender, and Policy Outcomes

Analyzing policy outcomes across countries requires attention to macrolevel institutional factors as well as mid-range political factors. To that end, a framework combining the insights of historical institutionalism and feminist political science provides a useful point of departure. Feminist political science has been particularly concerned with how gender relations are expressed in and reinforced through political institutions (Beckwith 2005; Chappell 2006). In their focus on the power asymmetries embedded in political and societal institutions, feminist scholars share many of the concerns of historical institutionalists, one of the three schools of the “new institutionalism” in political science (Hall and Taylor 1996). For historical institutionalists, as well as for gender scholars, institutions are not neutral, but instead, mobilize bias in ways that make certain outcomes more or less likely. As historical creations, institutions embody a set of power relations present at the time of their creation. In this way, institutions “structure politics” and reproduce or reinforce those same power relations (Thelen and Steinmo 1992).

These institutional biases are exemplified by the very organization of modern states. Most of the stand-alone ministries (e.g., labor, finance, commerce, external affairs) represent policy areas that have been defined as universal yet address those activities in which men have been the dominant actors (Weldon 2002, 120-22). Policy issues mainly affecting women, such as child care, domestic violence, and reproduction, were historically considered “private” issues and hence beyond the reach of the state. Although these issues have now been accepted as matters of “public” policy, they have been incorporated into state institutions in ways that complicate their treatment.

Responsibility for these policy issues is spread across multiple departments rather than being contained in a single ministry; and this creates two distinct problems. First, the committee structure of modern legislatures tends to follow the organization of executive ministries, increasing the potential veto points for gender policy issues. In other words, gender policy bills are usually sent to a greater number of committees, increasing the likelihood that such initiatives will stall or even die at the committee stage. Second, once policies are adopted, policy implementation is complicated because there is rarely a single department responsible for implementation. When policy implementation is spread across agencies rather than assigned to a single department,

“agencies will likely give priority to those tasks for which they already have explicit responsibility” (Weldon 2002, 120).

Domestic violence policy is a clear example of this problem because it cannot be contained in a single department or ministry. In addition to addressing domestic violence through the legal process, whether criminal or family courts, government responses to the problem should also include victim services (counseling or shelters), education and training for police and health care workers, and public awareness and prevention programs. Consequently, the policy sectors involved are many, including health, justice, education, social services, and the police. Clearly, effective implementation requires capacity for administrative coordination across many policy sectors (Guerrero Caviedes 2002; Rioseco Ortega 2005). But coordination for gender policies frequently falls to women’s policy agencies. Unfortunately, it is rare for these agencies, especially those in Latin America, to possess the necessary resources and political influence to coordinate and implement public policies effectively.

Throughout Latin America, women’s policy agencies were created in the 1980s and 1990s in response to gender inequality, but also in keeping with states’ obligations as signatories of the CEDAW Convention. The specific features of WPAs and their role within the larger state structure reflect gendered hierarchies and state priorities, however. Gender equality is rarely viewed as a pressing national priority, as the design of the region’s WPAs indicates. Most agencies lack adequate staffing and funding levels; but more important, they are rarely endowed with institutional influence over other departments. Often, they are housed within other departments that themselves lack political influence (Guzmán 2001).

Institutions are not static, however, and an institutionalist framework must be capable of explaining both institutional change and continuity (Waylen 2009). The gendered hierarchies that are generally evident in states do not have the same effect across time and space, and in some cases, these hierarchies are renegotiated and even mitigated. Women’s policy agencies can play a key role in this renegotiation, although in practice the extent to which they do so is shaped by a variety of factors. Existing research on WPAs provides ample evidence of how much their trajectories are shaped by political dynamics. They are more likely to be effective when left parties hold office and when supported by a relatively autonomous women’s movement, which can lobby governments to uphold their commitments to women’s equality (Stetson and Mazur 1995; Valiente 2007). But unlike the powerful ministries, such as finance or foreign affairs, whose status and influence remain untouched by changes in government, WPAs are likely to suffer in terms of resources and influence with the election of governments

less supportive of women’s rights. Even if created by progressive governments, WPAs can be reorganized, relocated, and deprived of funding when conservative governments take office or when governments focus on other issues and lose interest in gender equality (Valiente 2007). Although WPAs are clearly subject to the oscillating priorities that governments place on gender equality, their very creation and the kinds of original powers they are granted can also create a degree of path dependency by empowering women as a constituency and giving rise to certain kinds of alliances.

Chile’s SERNAM exemplifies this possibility. The agency was created by law in 1991 by a center-left government, and remains one of the region’s most successful WPAs in terms of institutional stability, level of resources, and administrative capacity (Ríos Tobar 2009, 27). Its relative success is linked to the electoral fortunes of the center-left governing coalition, and particularly to the effectiveness of gender equality advocates in the coalition who have lobbied behind the scenes to ensure continued government support for SERNAM. But the fact that as part of the executive SERNAM also plays a legislative role has meant that gender equality advocates elsewhere-in civil society and in congresshave been compelled to create working relationships with SERNAM in order to forward their policy goals (see Haas 2006, 2010). As a result, advocacy groups and progressive legislators have a key “insider” ally.

The policymaking environment in Argentina differs markedly. The National Women’s Council was created through presidential decree in 1992, but has repeatedly lost influence and resources, first due to actions by the Argentine president and later following changes in government. More important, the agency does not play a legislative role and does not have the influence or resources to serve as an insider ally of advocacy groups or legislators seeking executive support for their policy initiatives. As a result, although policy failures in domestic violence legislation emerged in both Chile and Argentina, widespread reform occurred only in Chile, where an effective alliance emerged to create pressure for reform.

Domestic Violence Policy in Argentina and Chile

The issue of domestic violence had been on the public agenda in both countries for many years before each adopted its 1994 legislation. In 1988, a senate committee in Argentina convoked a meeting of experts that included both legal authorities and representatives of women’s organizations to discuss legislative initiatives. Much of the debate centered on whether family violence should be considered a crime or a “conflict.” The latter idea won out, and the bill passed by the National

Congress placed domestic violence under the purview of family courts rather than the criminal law (Birgin and Pastorini 2005). Argentina’s initial legislation included physical and psychological violence committed by family members. 3{ }^{3} Because Argentina is a federal state, however, the law applied only to the Federal Capital of Buenos Aires and invited the provinces to create their own legislation. 4{ }^{4}

Women’s rights activists and lawyers report that there is substantial variation among provincial laws, and two provinces still lack their own legislation (Interviews, June 9, 2008, June 17, 2008). The numerous shortcomings of the national law and its application were raised by advocacy groups and also taken up by members of Congress. Despite numerous legislative initiatives at the federal level to reform the law, it was not until March 2009 that an initiative first introduced in 2006 by Senator María Cristina Perceval passed its final legislative hurdle. The new law (Law 26.485; see República Argentina 2009) is far more ambitious in scope than the earlier one: it refers to violence against women in a variety of arenas rather than just the family realm, guarantees free services to victims, and eliminates conciliation as a legal option (Carbajal 2009). That it will be any more effectively implemented than the earlier law, however, is doubtful. 5{ }^{5} In fact, by October 2009, the executive had still not taken any steps toward regulating the law; that is, detailing how its various provisions would be implemented and creating the necessary institutional infrastructure to do so.

Chile’s original domestic violence law (Law 19.325, the Intrafamily Violence Law), was adopted in 1994 following lengthy negotiations within the governing coalition and also between legislators and SERNAM (see Haas 2006). Although an earlier bill introduced by Deputies Sergio Aguiló and Adriana Muñoz focused on the gendered nature of domestic violence and sought tough sanctions for abusers, a much-scaled-down version of the bill was later introduced by SERNAM, prompting protests from the two legislators. Although SERNAM eventually withdrew its bill and agreed to support the bill introduced by Aguiló and Muñoz, its involvement led to a series of amendments to the original bill (Haas 2010). Largely due to the strength of conservative legislators in the Chilean Congress, the bill that was finally approved emphasized protecting the family and ensuring that couples were reconciled through counseling and therapy, rather than punishing abusers with prison terms.

As a result, feminists in Chile actively criticized the law, viewing it as prioritizing family unity over women’s right to be free from violence. After repeated criticism by women’s organizations, feminist legislators, and eventually SERNAM officials, a project for legislative reform emerged, and a number of new policy directions were adopted. A revised domestic violence law (Law 20.066), approved in 2005, incor-

porates domestic violence into the criminal code, increases penalties, and expands the use of protective measures, among other changes. Accounting for these differences requires a closer look at the institutional and political context in each country and how this context creates opportunities and obstacles for policy reform advocates.

Argentina: Advocacy Groups Confront Weak and Decentralized Institutions

Argentina is a relatively decentralized federal state with 23 provinces and an autonomous federal district. Political decentralization in Argentina means that there is substantial variation in provincial policies on domestic violence. Essentially, women living in different provinces enjoy different levels of access to justice, as well as varying levels of victim services. Some provincial laws require complainants to have legal representation in order for a case to proceed. However, in at least eight provinces, the law does not provide for the free provision of legal representation, effectively ensuring that poor women do not have access to justice (Birgin and Pastorini 2005, 301-2).

In addition to variation in the content of legislation, there is also substantial variation in terms of provincial governments’ commitments to domestic violence as a policy area. Only four provinces have passed the legal regulations (reglamentos) that detail how the laws are to be implemented; this is evidence of the low priority that most provincial governments accord to domestic violence policy (Birgin and Pastorini 2005, 298-99). 6{ }^{6} Also, not all provinces provide women with access to victim services, such as crisis hotlines or victim services centers (centros de atención) that provide counseling or legal advice. Women’s police stations (comisarías de la mujer) also vary by province, existing in some form in 13 provinces (Bressa and Schuster 2003). Even where provinces have created services, there are frequent complaints about their ineffectiveness. One activist noted that the crisis hotline established by the provincial government in Buenos Aires takes calls only during the day, and that the crisis center has a budget so small it could purchase only one computer (Interview, September 13, 2006). Public programs for prevention and training of medical, police, and justice officials vary considerably across the provinces, and the federal government has not engaged in ongoing efforts to train public officials in addressing domestic violence. 7{ }^{7} In sum, political decentralization in Argentina means that women who become victims of domestic violence enjoy very different levels of services, protection, and legal support, depending on the province in which they reside.

While federalism creates a vertically fragmented policy domain, Argentina’s state institutions also suffer from low capacity in terms of

horizontal coordination. A recent comparative analysis of public policymaking in Latin America ranked Argentina low on measures of enforcement and implementation, coordination and coherence, and efficiency (Stein et al. 2006, 135). Another team of researchers studying public policy in Argentina observes that “political actors do not have a quality bureaucracy onto which to delegate policy implementation” (Spiller and Tommasi 2007, 156). These weaknesses are evident in the federal government’s approach to policymaking on domestic violence. Until very recently, the federal government lacked an overarching national plan for addressing domestic violence and coordinating policies across departments. 8{ }^{8} Elsewhere in Latin America, multisectoral national action plans have been critical policy tools, setting out details for how the state will respond to domestic violence, including what the role of various agencies and departments will be, how policies will be coordinated, and how policy implementation will be monitored and evaluated.

Argentina adopted such a plan only in 2006, when the CNM developed the National Action Plan to Eradicate Violence Against Women in the Family and set up an Inter-Ministerial Committee with representatives from health, education, and social development. However, the limited number of policy sectors involved indicates that this plan is not very ambitious. Policy sectors that are critical to domestic violence, such as justice and the police, are not involved. Moreover, the effectiveness of this plan is doubtful because it is coordinated by the National Women’s Council, an agency with a small budget and staff and very little political influence.

Argentina’s 2009 antiviolence law also establishes the CNM as the central coordinating body, charged with creating an Observatory on Violence Against Women that is supposed to monitor and collect data on the problem. Seven months after the law was passed in the congress, the observatory still did not exist, signaling a lack of political will and seriousness on the government’s part. Without substantially strengthening the CNM, the new federal law, and any antiviolence measures to be designed and coordinated by the agency, will probably not be effective. 9{ }^{9}

The trajectory of Argentina’s National Women’s Council indicates the importance of both macro-level institutional factors and contingent political factors. As already noted, Argentina’s bureaucratic capacity is relatively weak, making it unlikely that any type of women’s policy agency would be strong and effective in administrative terms. But the CNM has been further weakened by changes in the political environment. The CNM was created almost a decade after the country’s transition to democracy in 1983. President Carlos Menem, the Peronist president who governed from 1989 to 1999, created the CNM in 1992 as an agency that reported directly to the president and had the capacity to interact directly with other ministries (Waigandt 2008). Although the agency was never as well resourced or well staffed as Chile’s SERNAM,

it was initially headed by a well-known feminist, Virginia Franganillo, who established open relations with women’s organizations in the country. Within two years of its creation, however, ideological conflict emerged between Franganillo and Menem, leading ultimately to Franganillo’s resignation.

Although Menem did not downgrade the agency in institutional terms, he did reduce its resources. The conflict emerged when Menem sought to ally himself with conservative Catholics while the CNM, under Franganillo’s leadership, was taking a more progressive stance on gender issues in preparation for the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing (Blofield 2006). 10{ }^{10} Since Franganillo’s departure, none of the subsequent CNM directors has come from the feminist movement, and some have been known for taking fairly conservative positions on gender issues (Carbajal 2008). As a result, the CNM is not viewed as a potential ally of the feminist movement (Kohen 2009; Waigandt 2008).

The CNM, furthermore, is not considered a potential ally for women’s organizations because, in addition to frequent budget cuts, it has also suffered repeated lowering of its institutional rank, depriving it of any real influence in the state. These downgrades do not appear to respond entirely to ideology, however; governments of varying ideological stripes have ordered them. Instead, they indicate the lower priority governments have placed on the goal of gender equality. Following a change in government in 1999, when a moderately leftist coalition led by Fernando de la Rúa defeated Menem, the CNM was relocated to the Ministry of Social Action, and it no longer reported directly to the office of the presidency. In 2002, following one of the country’s most severe economic and political crises and another change in government, in which the presidency reverted to another Peronist leader, Eduardo Duhalde, the agency was downgraded yet again. In addition to even more severe budget cuts prompted by the economic crisis, the CNM was placed under the mandate of the National Council for Social Policy Coordination, an agency that itself is housed in the Ministry of Social Development.

Although movement activists and female legislators in Argentina have been vocal opponents of these changes, with a number of feminist legislators introducing bills to restore the agency’s earlier institutional rank, according to activists and officials, these efforts have been unsuccessful (Interviews, August 15, 2006, September 13, 2006). Despite Argentina’s overall economic recovery since the 2001-2 crisis, the CNM’s budget has yet to be fully restored. According to a CNM official, the agency’s budget was 11 million pesos in 2006-7 and was reduced to just 5 million pesos in 2007-8 (Interview, June 13, 2008; Waignandt 2008). According to an Amnesty International report, the CNM’s budget is currently less than onesixth of the budget for tourism (Valente 2009), once again indicating the low priority the government places on gender equality.

The new domestic violence law requires that the agency’s budget be increased to deal more effectively with domestic violence, but the law has still not been regulated, so it remains unclear whether sufficient funds will be forthcoming. But even with increased funds, there appears to be no support for restoring the agency’s institutional rank. The CNM continues to occupy a lowly position in the government hierarchy, and its last two directors, María Lucila Colombo and Lidia Elizabeth Mondelo, are known neither as strong defenders of women’s rights nor as influential politicians in their own right (Carbajal 2008). The agency is also fairly small, with a staff of fewer than 50 (Interview, June 13, 2008).

The CNM’s institutional weakness and lack of political influence mean that it has not been able to harness resources from other state institutions to develop and monitor domestic violence policy. This produces three main problems. First, the underresourced CNM has not been able to conduct effective dissemination and public awareness campaigns. As a result, women often do not know about the laws and policies that exist with respect to family violence, and therefore do not know how to proceed if they are victims of violence (Interview, August 25, 2006). A survey conducted by the NGO Equipo Latinoamericano de Justicia y Género (Latin American Group for Justice and Gender, ELA) reveals a profound lack of knowledge among Argentine women about domestic violence laws and what kinds of services are available to them. Only 40 percent of respondents knew that domestic violence legislation existed, and of these, only half knew the procedures to report a case or the kinds of protective measures that the laws provided (ELA 2006, 117, 123).

A former CNM official explained in an interview that the agency lacks the budget to carry out large-scale public awareness campaigns involving the print, radio, or television media. The CNM’s only communication strategy involves distributing pamphlets and posters on specific days, such as International Women’s Day (March 8). This official also explained that although the CNM did put together a database of all organizations providing services to victims of family violence, the database is not publicly available. “Argentina is not a country that stands out for having good information,” the official noted wryly (Interview, June 13, 2008).

A second result of the CNM’s lack of political influence and state resources is the absence of government initiatives to raise public awareness about domestic violence. This is problematic because the government fails to send citizens the necessary symbolic message that such violence is a serious social problem that warrants a strong public response. Public concerns about violence against women, in turn, play a critical role in generating political pressure for improved policy responses. Policy implementation is more likely to be effective when citizens perceive a problem as serious, because only then will govern-

ments feel pressure to marshal the appropriate resources. But such a public perception is itself shaped by state action: public awareness campaigns and gathering and releasing data about the extent of the problem are two important factors that influence public perceptions. Citizens are far more likely to consider domestic violence a serious social problem that requires state action when activists and the media have access to data that indicate the scope of the problem and show that state responses have been insufficient.

This is the third problem that reform advocates confront in Argentina. A common complaint from activists and researchers is the absence of a centralized data registry that records domestic violence. A study by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on women’s access to justice in Latin America indicates that Argentina continues to lag behind other states in terms of data gathering. As part of the study, countries were asked to report the number of complaints they had received from women who were victims of discrimination and violence, and Argentina was unable to provide national data, instead reporting statistics from a mix of institutions, such as the national judiciary, the Directorate for Women (City of Buenos Aires), and the Provincial Court of Buenos Aires (CIDH 2007, 82). The 2009 law aims to rectify this situation by creating an observatory, managed by the CNM, that would gather these data; but as noted above, it is difficult to predict whether it will actually be created and whether the CNM will be able to count on sufficient human and technical resources to manage the task.

While the CNM’s lack of resources undermines its ability to conduct the policy research and monitoring that could aid advocacy groups lobbying for more robust policy responses, the agency’s lack of influence and power means that it cannot play the role of effective advocate for women’s rights in the Argentine state. Its low status in the bureaucracy means that its director does not participate in cabinet meetings, thereby reducing its ability to lobby other relevant departments to give greater priority to domestic violence policy. 11{ }^{11} Therefore, women’s organizations working on domestic violence in Argentina lack influential allies inside the state.

In this overall gloomy picture, however, there is one institutional arena in which opportunities for progress have appeared. Partly due to the weakness of Argentina’s executive, legislative, and bureaucratic institutions, citizens and advocacy groups are increasingly turning to the courts to resolve pressing social problems (Smulovitz forthcoming). Observers are calling this the “judicialization of social conflict.” According to Beatriz Kohen, “judges are now called on to solve matters formerly addressed by stronger and more representative political institutions, such as unions, political parties, or social movements” (2009, 97). Although women’s advocacy groups have not made as much use of the

judicial arena as have other collective actors, the judiciary has become open to gender issues. When a federal commission on access to justice was created, a working group in it led to the creation of the Office of Domestic Violence under the National Supreme Court. 12{ }^{12} A federal Office of Domestic Violence was opened in September 2008 in Buenos Aires, providing information as well as preliminary legal, medical, and psychological assessments to victims of violence. 13{ }^{13} It was scheduled to be open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In its first year, the federal office signed agreements with 18 provinces to facilitate women’s access to justice (Centro de Información Judicial 2009).

Although such offices will probably be more effective than those created under the auspices of the federal or provincial women’s policy agencies, given their location in the better-resourced and more influential judicial branch, this strategy is not without limitations. Because they are more specialized institutions, courts are not likely to do the sorts of things that WPAs often do (where they have the funding and human resources), such as coordinating public awareness campaigns, training public officials, and designing broader prevention strategies. Judges and others working in the courts also tend to be more insulated from advocacy groups; and although advocacy groups sometimes use litigation as a strategy for achieving policy change, they rarely consider the courts as allies in the same way as women’s policy agencies.

In sum, the weak and fragmented nature of Argentina’s institutions reduces the likelihood for effective policy implementation. But political dynamics have also created further obstacles in the form of repeated institutional downgrading of the CNM. Argentina’s institutional architecture is particularly disadvantageous for women’s rights issues. The successive downgrading of the CNM and its lack of resources close off possibilities for a more favorable renegotiation of the gendered hierarchies evident in the state’s administrative institutions. The resulting lack of policy monitoring and evaluation deprives reform advocates of concrete indicators of policy failure, thereby undermining their efforts to generate political pressure for a more serious policy response to the problem of violence against women. Recent developments in the judiciary represent an improvement: the office created by the courts may have the capacity to monitor the implementation of the law and publicize any failures that emerge. It remains to be seen what sort of long-term impact this might have.

Chile: Advocacy Groups, A Strong Bureaucracy, and Influential Insiders

Compared to the rest of Latin America, Chile’s institutions are strong, stable, and relatively effective. According to Cristóbal Aninat et al., a key

aspect of the Chilean policy process is “the existence of a well-functioning mechanism for policy implementation, including an independent judiciary and an honest and reasonably efficient bureaucracy” (2006, 7). 14{ }^{14} Chile is a unitary state, and despite recent moves toward decentralization, its political institutions remain relatively centralized (Aninat et al. 2006, 20).

In general, Chile’s strong and stable institutions provide a more favorable environment for the implementation of anti-domestic violence policies. Yet as we have seen, the initial 1994 domestic violence law had serious shortcomings, which led to substantial policy reforms. An explanation focusing on Chile’s stronger institutions alone cannot account for these changes. A complete explanation for the different policy outcomes in Chile must take into account the role of SERNAM. More specifically, SERNAM’s own institutional features created a positive policy feedback loop in which policy failures were detected, reported, and politicized through a mutually cooperative relationship between the agency, sympathetic legislators, and advocacy groups in civil society.

SERNAM was created in response to the demands by organized women that emerged during the country’s transition to democracy. The first set of postdictatorship elections took place in 1989; they were won by a center-left coalition of prodemocracy parties. Feminists in the parties successfully lobbied coalition leaders to adopt some of the key demands of the women’s movement, the most important of which was the creation of an executive-level agency to promote gender equality through public policy. When President Patricio Aylwin introduced a bill to create SERNAM, it sparked considerable congressional debate between the center-left governing coalition and the conservative opposition. As a result, the design of the agency was somewhat more scaled down than some of its advocates in the coalition and the women’s movement would have liked.

Instead of being a ministry in its own right, SERNAM is housed in the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, but its director has ministerial status and therefore participates in cabinet meetings (Franceschet 2005). Although its directors have not had strong links to the feminist movement, they have all been highly capable and, in some cases, influential politicians. The agency’s first director, Soledad Alvear, subsequently served as justice minister and foreign affairs minister before becoming a prominent senator.

SERNAM also negotiates its own budget, and despite some cuts during an economic downturn in the 1990s, it has enjoyed relatively stable funding. It has also maintained a large staff (more than two hundred) and has not suffered any institutional downgrading. On the contrary, SERNAM’s influence and ability to achieve equality goals through public policy have actually expanded. In 1998, Chile launched its Pro-

gram for Improving Public Management (PGM), essentially intended to modernize the public sector and make service delivery more efficient. SERNAM’s director at the time, Adriana Delpiano, recognized an opportunity to incorporate gender-based goals into the program. As a result of her lobbying and her relative influence with President Ricardo Lagos, the Gender Focus System was adopted in 2002 as part of the PGM; it requires all public services “to incorporate a gender focus in their regular services” (SERNAM 2004). More important, there are sanctions for noncompliance: public servants lose their yearly salary bonuses if their department does not submit progress reports that detail their efforts at incorporating a gender focus. Departments must also produce genderdisaggregated indicators for service delivery. SERNAM evaluates these reports, thereby increasing the agency’s influence in the state, at least to the extent that it possesses mechanisms for sanctioning noncompliance with gender-based objectives (Interviews, November 10, 2006, November 20, 2006, November 23, 2006). With respect to domestic violence, moreover, public officials in certain areas of the state bureaucracy are obliged to participate in training programs on dealing with family violence (Interview, May 23, 2008).

Although some observers have criticized SERNAM’s technocratic approach and lamented its lack of openness to grassroots women’s movements (Alvarez 1999; Richards 2004), the agency clearly provides opportunities to women’s advocacy groups. Of course, this is more the case for groups whose policy goals “fit” into the broad government agenda; groups pursuing more controversial policy goals, such as abortion, are not likely to consider SERNAM a potential ally. For policy goals that are less controversial, such as improving women’s representation, women’s equality in the workplace, or addressing violence against women, SERNAM’s resources make it a potentially valuable ally for advocacy groups. This is clear in the case of domestic violence: SERNAM played a prominent role in the achievement of both the 1994 and 2005 domestic violence laws. Its capacity to design and propose legislation, as well as to lobby directly the executive, have led advocacy groups to rely on the agency’s support in seeking policy change.

Women’s organizations criticized Chile’s 1994 domestic violence law for its emphasis on conciliation processes and for incorporating family violence into the civil rather than the criminal code. As a result, abusers were rarely punished with anything more than fines or compulsory therapy. Prison sentences were rare, even if cases went through the criminal courts, because judges often classified injuries as “light,” meaning that the offense was a misdemeanor rather than a felony. 15{ }^{15} But criticisms also emerged about ineffective implementation of the law, largely due to lack of resources. Courts were overwhelmed with complaints, leading to lengthy waiting times for trials; sanctions were insufficiently

monitored; and victims had too few places where they could receive services (legal support and medical and psychological counseling). Despite the existence of victim attention centers, there were no shelters for women fleeing from abusive partners. In addition, partly due to the absence of legal divorce until 2004, Chile lacked family courts, meaning that family violence cases were being addressed by judges with little experience with family conflict (Staats and Caprioli 2009). A human rights lawyer noted that without family courts, judges who were accustomed to dealing with minor things like contracts and commercial disputes were suddenly confronted with very serious matters of family violence (Interview, May 23, 2008).

Like the CNM in Argentina, SERNAM was tasked with monitoring the law, creating victim services, and carrying out training. 16{ }^{16} It also was responsible for public awareness and prevention programs. 17{ }^{17} Most important, however, SERNAM has ensured that the problem of violence against women has remained a relatively high priority on the public agenda. SERNAM’s structure and organization itself have a lot to do with the successful politicization of the problems of domestic violence policy and legislation in Chile, indicating that early decisions to confer power and resources to WPAs can create positive policy feedback loops. Unlike the CNM, SERNAM’s resources have allowed it to conduct substantial research and policy monitoring of domestic violence, and the findings of its studies about the frequency and scope of domestic violence in Chile are reported in newspapers, NGO campaigns, and reports of international organizations.

SERNAM’s website contains national figures on domestic violence complaints, broken down by region. The data show a fairly substantial increase in complaints, from 38,200 in 1995 to 95,829 in 2006 (SERNAM n.d.). These data, in turn, have been crucial for advocacy groups lobbying for policy change and legislative reform. Frequent reports in the media about the high number of women who suffer from violence contributed to growing public concern that the government was not doing enough to protect women from violent partners. A 2001 study by SERNAM found that almost half of all married Chilean women reported suffering some kind of violence, either physical or psychological, in their lifetime. The number of women suffering violence, combined with stories about inadequate penalties for abusers, created growing pressure for legal reform. 18{ }^{18}

Also unlike Argentina’s CNM, SERNAM’s position in the executive branch allows it to play a legislative role. In addition to having a legal reform department staffed by four lawyers to research and write legislation, SERNAM can also lobby the president directly to fast-track legislative initiatives. 19{ }^{19} SERNAM’s legislative role has compelled reform advocates to work with the agency, even though, in some cases, the

relationship has not always been smooth. In 1999, Deputies María Antonieta Saa and Adriana Muñoz introduced a bill to reform the 1994 domestic violence legislation. Because of the executive’s substantial agenda-setting powers, the bill did not move forward until SERNAM became involved. According to Saa, “the [Chilean] regime is very presidentialist, therefore if you’re not on the agenda of the government, it’s very hard for your issues to advance” (Interview, November 28, 2006). Indeed, the legislative process in Chile can be quite slow. Even after SERNAM became involved, the bill did not pass the congress until 2005. Once it was adopted, however, many advocacy groups hailed the law as an important achievement.

The new law (Law 20.066) incorporates the category of “habitual mistreatment,” which includes both physical and psychological violence, into the criminal code, and also establishes more mechanisms for judicial authorities to take precautionary measures. The law increases the severity of penalties; those who fail to comply with the protective measures ordered by the judge can be sentenced to prison rather than simply fined. It creates duties for the state to train public officials and maintain data registries of domestic violence (Interview, May 23, 2008). It also permits SERNAM to sponsor domestic violence cases and provide legal representation to victims (SERNAM 2006; Chile, Senado 2006). The law’s effectiveness has also been enhanced by the creation of family tribunals charged with processing domestic violence complaints. 20{ }^{20} In 2006, SERNAM released a report that found a 151 percent increase in arrests for domestic violence following the adoption of the new law (Santiago Times 2006).

In addition to the new law, other policy changes have occurred, especially since the election of President Michelle Bachelet in 2006. Bachelet’s commitment to gender issues has gone beyond rhetoric; in 2006 she increased SERNAM’s budget by 30 percent to fund the creation of shelters for domestic violence victims (Interview, November 23, 2006). In 2007, 16 shelters opened across the country, 1 in each of Chile’s 13 regions and 3 in the metropolitan region of Santiago. More funding for shelters and victim service centers was announced in early 2008 when SERNAM’s minister revealed plans to build an additional 27 shelters and centers. More important, Bachelet used her executive prerogatives to fast-track some of the legislative initiatives to improve the functioning of the family courts and existing domestic violence legislation.

Despite all these improvements, women’s rights activists continue to press for further reform. They argue that the 2005 law creates a needlessly complicated and lengthy process for having certain instances of family violence labeled “habitual mistreatment” and therefore addressed by criminal law. 21{ }^{21} It is up to the family court judges to decide whether

habitual mistreatment exists, in which case the family judge puts together the documentation and then transfers the case to the criminal court (Interview, May 19, 2008). According to a lawyer working in the human rights NGO Corporación Humanas, “any other crime can be brought directly before the Public Prosecutor in the criminal branch, but for family violence, you have to go to the Family Court so that they classify it as habitual mistreatment in order that it then be transferred to the Public Prosecutor” (Interview, May 23, 2008).

This process is also criticized for the lengthy delays it introduces: it can take up to six months for the family courts to decide whether a case warrants a “habitual mistreatment” classification. 22{ }^{22} This is partly because the family tribunals have been overwhelmed with cases and the number of family court judges is insufficient. One study found that within a week of their creation, Chile’s new family tribunals had received 6,288 complaints, and 20.5 percent of these concerned domestic violence (Staats and Caprioli 2009, 23).

Chile’s media have drawn considerable attention to the problem of violence against women, largely due to a great number of brutal murders of women at the hands of spouses or ex-partners. Most important, the media have drawn a link between ineffective laws and policies on domestic violence and the high number of femicides by noting that up to half of the women murdered had lodged domestic violence complaints. This has produced growing concern that the judiciary, and the family courts in particular, have been ineffective (Andrade 2007). Some members of Chile’s Congress have responded to this situation by introducing legislative initiatives that establish “femicide” as a specific crime in the penal code; expand the existing domestic violence law to cover boyfriends, noncohabitating partners, and ex-partners; and have all domestic violence cases brought to the Public Prosecutor rather than to family tribunals (Meneses 2007).

Media attention and public pressure have also been consistent. The large number of femicides has not only been endlessly reported by the press, it also has produced public demonstrations by women’s organizations and antiviolence groups (Bunting and Malinowski 2007). Numerous legislators from across the party spectrum either have commented publicly that Chile needs to do more to address violence against women, or have introduced or supported legislation themselves. As a result, a special session of Congress was called in October 2007 with the express goal of discussing the increase in femicides and their link to domestic violence. 23{ }^{23} A human rights lawyer with Corporación Humanas insists that the media attention, combined with public demonstrations, has been effective in conveying the scope of the problem to Chile’s political class.

[Ilf something is done [to address the problem of violence] I would say that it was due to the pressure from the citizenry and public opinion. They would not have had a special session of Congress on October 2, 2007 if there hadn’t been ten days of television programs about the number of femicides that we’ve had in Chile. I’m quite sure of that. (Interview, May 23, 2008)

In sum, there is ongoing pressure from civil society, the media, the congress, and SERNAM for reforms to further protect women from violence and to sanction more effectively such violence when it occurs. Given the institutional and political context described here, in particular the mutually cooperative relationship between advocacy groups and SERNAM, and the priority that President Bachelet gave to the issue, these efforts are likely to succeed. As a result, despite a lack of progress on some gender policies, such as gender quotas or reproductive rights, Chile is likely to continue outperforming Argentina in responding to the problem of domestic violence.

CONCLUSIONS

The comparative analysis undertaken here reveals the importance of macro-level institutional factors but also the more contingent political factors that influence whether countries are leaders or laggards on particular gender policies. State capacity and degree of centralization play a role in determining the overall effectiveness of public policy. But state architecture also has gendered dimensions: policy issues that primarily affect women are rarely under the purview of a single department or ministry.

This means that states with poor administrative capacity are even less likely to be capable of effectively implementing gender policies. Yet Chile’s performance as a leader and Argentina’s status as a laggard on domestic violence policy are not simply the results of stronger or weaker state capacity. Instead, Chile’s creation of a women’s policy agency with specific features, namely a high rank and a legislative role, produced an opportunity for successfully renegotiating the place of certain issues in the public sphere. This, in turn, permitted improved policy responses to the problem of domestic violence. As the shortcomings of the original law became apparent, SERNAM’s capacity to monitor and report these problems provided the necessary tools for advocacy groups and sympathetic legislators to build public support for policy reform. SERNAM’s own legislative role allowed it to act as an “insider” advocate of reform as well. Furthermore, President Bachelet’s personal commitment to the issue created even more momentum for policy reform, including increased resources and executive support to fast-track leg-

islative initiatives. The Chilean case indicates a certain degree of path dependency, where the original features of an institution contribute to its stability and even to its strengthening over time.

Of course, the real test of SERNAM’s institutional integrity will be its fate under the conservative government of President Sebastián Piñera, which took office in March 2010, ending 20 years of government continuity. We might hope that SERNAM’s lengthy trajectory, its success in incorporating a gender perspective into the state (through the PMG), and its public role in highlighting problems such as violence against women will render it difficult for a conservative government to marginalize the agency or reverse the gains it has made in championing women’s rights.

In contrast, the weak administrative capacity and decentralization of the Argentine state are obstacles to the effective implementation of domestic violence policy. But the problem is more acute because policy coordination is the responsibility of the poorly resourced National Women’s Council. Unlike Chile’s SERNAM, the role of Argentina’s CNM was more constrained from the outset. More important, contingent political factors, in the form of ideological conflict between the agency’s director and President Menem, meant that the CNM was weakened and marginalized within a few years of its creation, before it could have any broad policy impact. A weak and ineffective women’s policy agency has deprived reform advocates of the resources needed to launch an effective campaign for improved government responses to domestic violence. Despite the achievement of legislative reform, the government does not appear to have the political will to provide the kinds of resources that would make the 2009 law any more effective than the 1994 one. Most important, as long as the CNM remains weak and lacks political influence, it will be unable to coordinate policy implementation and create an effective domestic violence observatory.

The CNM’s weakness is also evidenced by the way gender issues are now being taken up elsewhere in the state, particularly in the judiciary. Although the judiciary has more resources and more influence and therefore seems better placed to address domestic violence, its own mandates are more limited than those of a women’s policy agency would be. Moreover, its greater insulation from civil society and advocacy groups might preclude it from being responsive or representative in the same way that a well-resourced and open WPA might be. The apparent openness of the judicial branch to gender issues is important, however, and warrants future research. Although it is too recent a development to speculate about the longer-term implications, it will be important for researchers in the future to examine the policy impact of these developments.

NOTES

Financial support for the research on which this article is based was provided by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Institute for Advanced Policy Research at the University of Calgary. A number of people provided very useful comments and feedback on previous versions of the article, including Jordi Díez, Antonio Franceschet, Juan Marsiaj, Jennifer Piscopo, Catalina Smulovitz, and four anonymous reviewers for LAPS.

1. This article uses the term policy outcome fairly broadly, encompassing the adoption of specific legislation and the subsequent creation and implementation of programs and policies to support the general legislation.

2. This coalition includes (from center to left) the Christian Democratic Party, the Radical Social Democratic Party, the Party for Democracy, and the Socialist Party.

3. Law 24.417 (Ley de protección contra la violencia familiar).

4. A 1994 constitutional reform established Buenos Aires as an autonomous entity, and in 1996 it adopted its own constitution and established its own legislature. The Autonomous City of Buenos Aires passed its own domestic violence legislation in 2003.

5. It is significant that one of the most strident and well-respected feminist members of the Chamber of Deputies, Marcela Rodríguez, abstained during the vote and spoke passionately about the bill’s many shortcomings, noting in particular the vague administrative and judicial procedures in the text (Cámara de Diputados 2009).

6. Whereas in the United States it is the bureaucracy that sets regulations to implement legislation adopted by Congress (although these agencies are themselves monitored by Congress), in most Latin American countries, it falls to the executive to issue regulatory decrees that specify more precisely how the new legislation is to be implemented. Researchers have argued that this stage of the policy process is quite important, because the original aims of the legislation can be thwarted or undermined by the regulations, and the congress tends not to have any oversight powers (see Díez 2006, 77).

7. According to an official in the National Women’s Council, the CNM did, however, prepare a training module for the Interior Ministry to use in its training of security personnel (Interview, June 13, 2008).

8. The only federal plan in existence was the National Plan for Prevention and Attention to Family Violence, located in a subsector of the Ministry of Health (Guerrero Caviedes 2002, appendix 5). However, this plan did not involve other departments or ministries.

9. This criticism is also found in the report of the Equipo Latinoamericano de Justicia y Género (ELA) to the UN Human Rights Committee (ELA 2009, 11).

10. Further indication of Menem’s wish to move Argentina in a more conservative direction is his attempt to have an anti-abortion clause written into the constitution, which was in the process of being reformed at this time. The feminist movement responded actively, however, framing this attempt as undemocratic, given that it had not been raised as part of the Peronist Party’s platform in the previous election. Menem’s attempt ultimately failed (Gutiérrez 2000).

11. There have been a number of legislative initiatives to create a new women’s policy machinery with a higher rank. Most recently, in August 2009, a group of female senators introduced a bill to create a Women’s Institute that would have ministerial rank and report directly to the president. An earlier initiative had been approved in the senate but died in the committee stage in the lower house (Diario Judicial 2009).

12. It is likely that the Supreme Court’s openness to a gender agenda owes something to the appointment in 2005 of Carmen Arbigay, the first woman to serve on the court. She is known as a strong supporter of women’s rights and has even been a vocal advocate for women’s reproductive rights. In fact, her appointment to the court was controversial due to her overt support for decriminalizing abortion.

13. A report by a group of lawyers working for a gender and justice NGO notes that the newly created Office for Domestic Violence will not entirely solve the problem of poor women’s lack of access to justice, given that the office will not have lawyers on staff who can sponsor cases on behalf of victims seeking legal services (ELA 2009, 10).

14. In a similar vein, a study by the Inter-American Development Bank ranked public policies in Chile “high” in terms of enforcement and implementation, coordination and coherence, and efficiency (Stein et al. 2006, 135). Argentina ranked “low” on all of these measures.

15. Common judicial practice in Chile considers all injuries “light” unless there is evidence of loss of work or need for medical treatment lasting at least two weeks (Culliton 1994).

16. Between 1991 and 1999, approximately 24,000 public officials received training in dealing with domestic violence (CEDAW 2004). According to one researcher, police training has been effective in Chile because of “the hierarchical structure and obedience to authority among Chilean police” (Culliton 1994).

17. In 1999, SERNAM launched a mass public awareness campaign with the theme “Mujeres con Derechos, Mujeres Ciudadanas” (Women with Rights, Women Citizens). The campaign included information about domestic violence and the 1994 law and details on where victims could seek help and register complaints. Later, another mass anti-domestic violence campaign was launched, specifically targeting young couples. This campaign included posters, radio and television spots, and educational videos (CEDAW 2004).

18. A document on SERNAM’s website outlining the reasons for a new domestic violence law notes that of the 78,900 domestic violence complaints received in 2004, only 780 of them resulted in sentencing the offender (SERNAM n.d.).

19. Chile’s constitution gives the president extensive agenda-setting powers, including the right to declare certain bills “urgent.” An “urgency” designation is a fast-tracking mechanism that can force committee or chamber discussions of legislative initiatives. See Haas 2010 and Siavelis 2000 for discussions of Chile’s presidential system and the greater policymaking powers enjoyed by the executive branch.

20. The family tribunals were created through a separate law (19.968) and began operating in October 2005.

21. One of the legislative initiatives that appears to be gaining momentum involves improving the capacity of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to investigate “habitual mistreatment.” See Public Prosecutor’s Office 2007.

22. Noted by Deputy Isabel Allende during a special session of Congress called to discuss the problem of femicide and domestic violence (Cámara de Diputados 2007, 11).

23. The session was called by a petition signed by 47 members of the Chamber of Deputies, and it took place on October 2, 2007.

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INTERVIEWS

2006
Official, Women’s Directorate of the City of Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires, August 15. Women’s rights lawyer. Buenos Aires, August 15.
Women’s rights activist. La Plata, Argentina, August 25.
Women’s rights activist. San Fernando, Argentina, September 13.
Saa, María Antonieta. Member, Chamber of Deputies, Chile. Santiago, November 28.

SERNAM official. Santiago, November 10.
SERNAM official. Santiago, November 20.
SERNAM official. Santiago, November 23.

2008

Human rights activist. Santiago, May 19.
Human rights lawyer. Santiago, May 23.
Women’s rights lawyer. Buenos Aires, June 9.
Women’s rights activist. Buenos Aires, June 17.
Former official, CNM. Buenos Aires, June 13.