Throughput and QoS pricing in wireless communication (original) (raw)

Access selection and joint pricing in multi-operator wireless networks: A Stackelberg game

2015 Fifth International Conference on Digital Information and Communication Technology and its Applications (DICTAP), 2015

We investigate in this paper the access selection and joint pricing problem in multi-operator wireless networks. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game, where cooperating service operators first set the service price to maximize their revenue. Then, the home operator of the mobile user performs the access selection process among the service operators, in order to maximize its own profits and its client satisfaction, in terms of perceived QoS. Competing operators decide the service price following a number of defined pricing schemes, and the home operator uses a hybrid utility function for the selection decision. We consider the Nash equilibrium as a solution of the service price setting game, where the best response is presented in function of the adopted pricing scheme. Simulation results show the efficiency of this multi-leader follower game for the access selection in a multi-operator environment, and illustrate how operators' cooperation enhances network performance and improves operators' revenue.

Technology Choices and Pricing Policies in Wireless Networks

2011

This paper studies the provision of a wireless network by a monopolistic service provider who may be either benevolent (seeking to maximize social welfare) or selfish (seeking to maximize provider profit). The paper addresses questions that do not seem to have been studied in the engineering literature on wireless networks: Under what circumstances is it feasible for a provider, either benevolent or selfish, to operate a network in such a way as to cover costs? How is the optimal behavior of a benevolent provider different from the optimal behavior of a selfish provider, and how does this difference affect social welfare? And, most importantly, how does the medium access control (MAC) technology influence the answers to these questions? To address these questions, we build a general model, and provide analysis and simulations for simplified but typical scenarios; the focus in these scenarios is on the contrast between the outcomes obtained under carrier-sensing multiple access (CSMA) and outcomes obtained under time-division multiple access (TDMA). Simulation results demonstrate that differences in MAC technology can have a significant effect on social welfare, on provider profit, and even on the (financial) feasibility of a wireless network.

Multilevel Pricing Schemes in a Deregulated Wireless Network Market

Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools, 2014

Typically the cost of a product, a good or a service has many components. Those components come from different complex steps in the supply chain of the product from sourcing to distribution. This economic point of view also takes place in the determination of goods and services in wireless networks. Indeed, before transmitting customer data, a network operator has to lease some frequency range from a spectrum owner and also has to establish agreements with electricity suppliers. The goal of this paper is to compare two pricing schemes, namely a powerbased and a flat rate, and give a possible explanation why flat rate pricing schemes are more common than power based pricing ones in a deregulated wireless market. We suggest a hierarchical gametheoretical model of a three level supply chain: the end users, the service provider and the spectrum owner. The end users intend to transmit data on a wireless network. The amount of traffic sent by the end users depends on the available frequency bandwidth as well as the price they have to pay for their transmission. A natural question arises for the service provider: how to design an efficient pricing scheme in order to maximize his profit. Moreover he has to take into account the lease charge he has to pay to the spectrum owner and how many frequency bandwidth to rent. The spectrum owner itself also looks for maximizing its profit and has to determine the lease price to the service provider. The equilibrium at each level of our supply chain model are established and several properties are investigated. In particular, in the case of a power-based pricing scheme, the service provider and the spectrum owner tend to share the gross provider profit. Whereas, considering the flat rate pricing scheme, if the end users are going to exploit the network intensively, then the tariffs of the suppliers (spectrum owner and service provider) explode. 1

Pricing strategies in multi-operator heterogeneous wireless networks

2015 7th International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS), 2015

In this paper, three pricing scenarios are proposed to set the transaction cost of the inter-operators agreement in a multi-operator cooperative environment. An analysis, of the operators' profits, is performed for these cooperation scenarios and different price sharing models are investigated for comparison. First, we present a hybrid decision algorithm for the selection of the access in a multi-operator wireless networks environment. Then, we describe the proposed pricing scenarios, the motivation behind and the points of evaluation for each scenario. Next, we present two business models made for the evaluation and highlight how network conditions and operator's strategy for service price may affect the profitability of the cooperation. Simulation results show that proposed pricing models are suitable in a cooperative environment depending on the operator situation in terms of capacity and service price.

Competition between wireless service providers sharing a radio resource

irisa.fr

We present a model of competition on prices between two telecommunication service providers sharing an access resource, which can for example be the same WiFi spectrum. We obtain a two-level game corresponding to two time scales of decisions: at the smallest time scale, users play an association game by choosing their provider (or none) depending on price, provider reputation and congestion level, and at the largest time scale, providers compete on prices. We show that the association game always has an equilibrium, but that several can exist. The pricing game is then solved by assuming that providers are riskaverse and try to maximize the minimal revenue they can get at a user equilibrium. We illustrate what can be the outcome of this game and that there are situations for which providers can co-exist.

A Pricing Model to Optimize Transmission Strategies for Mobile Devices

Advances in Wireless Technologies and Telecommunication, 2020

The simultaneous multiple data transmission can improve the use of the network. Unlike existing solutions in the literature, in this chapter, the authors propose a solution to the network resource allocation problem under the selfish behavior of mobile device with multiple connections to several available network interfaces simultaneously, to resolve the conflict of interest in network. They analyze the impact of interactions between users based on two conflicting factors (i.e., throughput and monetary cost). Also, a diverse set of user service types is taken into consideration, which makes the proposed approach suitable for an integrated service network. Analytical and numerical results demonstrate the validity of the proposed approach, which show that the non-cooperative game has an equilibrium point that depends on all parameters of the system, and they show that this situation between mobile devices is much more beneficial in terms of the performance of mobiles, cost, and the da...

Pricing Wireless Access Services: The Effect of Offloading and Users ’ Bounded Rationality

2016

Abstract—Offloading through WiFi access networks has been recently proposed as a cost-effective solution for coming up against the unprecedented increase in the mobile data traffic volume. However, apart from reducing the operational costs of a network operator, WiFi access can be also promoted as an alternative low-cost service for users with low willingness-to-pay. In this paper, we consider a monopolistic scenario of a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) offering LTE and WiFi access services and make the optimal pricing decisions. We further show that the presence of reluctant users to switch to the WiFi service could increase the profits of the MVNO. I.

Optimal hierarchical pricing schemes for wireless network usage and resource allocation

2010

Abstract—Typically the cost of a product has many components. Various components correspond to the production chain steps through which the product goes before meeting a customer. This also takes place in the price formation in wireless networks. For instance, before transmitting customer data, a network operator has to buy some frequency range and also establish contracts with electricity providers. In this paper we try to establish the tariff formation scheme in wireless networks. We consider an hierarchical game with three ...