Prohairesis in Epictetus' Stoic Moral Theory (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Phenomenology of Proairesis in the Stoic Philosophy of Epictetus: ‘Desire’ and ‘Aversion’
2021
If we agree that Proairesis, and not simply Reason, is the fundamental and sovereign faculty the man is naturally endowed with, it appears appropriate to identify the actions that this reality sets in motion. With regard to them, Epictetus calls ‘deeds of proairesis’ our desires and aversions, our impulses and repulsions, our assents and dissents. The present paper is devoted to a discussion of the phenomenology of desire and aversion only. It shows how the only four basic possible attitudes of human proairesis towards both proairetic and aproairetic things generate the corresponding kinds of desires and aversions.
Prohairesis in Aristotle and Epictetus: A Comparative Study
Kaygı. Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi, 2014
The concept of prohairesis in Aristotelian ethics, usually translated as deliberate choice or policy decision, is later revived by Epictetus, a major figure among the Stoics. In this paper I critically examine how the concept of prohairesis is employed by Aristotle and by Epictetus and the differences involved. Aristotle's concept of prohairesis acquires its meaning in a framework according to which we live in a world where at least some things are up to us whereas Epictetus's concept of prohairesis acquires its meaning in a framework where nothing is up to us. As such, Aristotle's concept of prohairesis is essentially about choice and assumes freedom and thereby more ethical in character, whereas Epictetus's concept of prohairesis is used to provide a metaphysical basis for freedom and as such less ethical in character.
In the last decades, the concepts of προαίρεσις (proairesis), προαιρετικὸν (proairetic) and ἀπροαίρετον (aproairetic) in the Stoic philosophy of Epictetus have aroused the interest, among others, of researchers like C. Cassanmagnago [1]; R. Dobbin [2-3], J. B. Gourinat [4], R. Kamtekar [5], R. Sorabji [6-7], R. S. Braicovich [8], K. Seddon [9] and A. A. Long [10]. The scope of this paper is to present a complete and as far as possible unequivocal picture of the subject. To this end I have produced a new translation and made a careful analysis of all the occurrences of the three terms in the works of Epictetus. The results I have reached show that the three concepts are perfectly clear in their meaning, without the need of translating them and with a simple transliteration from ancient Greek, as modern languages do not have an exact equivalent of such words.
2018
The comparative analysis of the frequency of use of the term "proairesis" with respect to the term "hegemonic" in the "Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta," the "Meditations" of Marcus Aurelius and the "Discourses and Manual" of Epictetus, shows a striking discrepancy between the choice of Epictetus and that of the other Stoics. The results of the present research favor the conclusion that such dramatic difference has an exquisitely philosophical root. This root can be traced back to the highly original and convincing arguments provided by Epictetus and that allow us to define the human being as a creature equipped by nature not only with a "hegemonic," as all other living creatures are; but equipped by nature with the "proairesis," that is with the special faculty of the hegemonic that characterizes human nature thanks to its ability to recognize the nature of things.
Innovation and development in the psychology and epistemology of Epictetus
University of Oxford DPhil thesis, 1998
The subject of this thesis is the relationship of the psychology and epistemology of the philosopher Epictetus (c.55-135 A.D.) to the Stoic tradition to which he belonged. Epictetus' psychology is characterised by the subsuming of psychological functions and development under the single term prohairesis, and his epistemology under a corresponding term 'use of impressions' (chresis phantasion); the two terms being used largely interchangeably. The status of the prohairesis as a faculty is investigated and it is concluded that it is the principal over-arching faculty of the governing-principle of the soul (hegemonikon), and thus occupies a similar position to that occupied by Reason (logos) in the Stoic tradition. Prohairesis is used to define the 'end' and 'good' for man in Epictetus' teaching, displacing 'wisdom' and 'virtue' with 'prohairesis as it ought to be'. Epictetus thus seeks to reflect the concerns of the 'person m...
The question of the Freedom of Will in Epictetus
2009
Stoic philosophers had to face the accusation of incoherence, self-contradiction and Paradoxes since ancient times. Plutarch in his Moralia writes against them; Cicero devotes a separate work on stoic paradoxes (Paradoxa stoicorum). Even in contemporary Literature there are still discussions on the possibility of such an incoherence and existence of paradoxes in the stoic theory. At first glance, stoic Cosmology gives the impression to both (paradoxically) accept a kind of Determinism, and at the same time it undoubtedly argues for the moral agent’s freedom of the Will. In pre-stoic or even other contemporary to Stoicism Philosophical Traditions, the definitions that these two terms/concepts are given, fairly accuse as incoherent any Theory that does not set them as “contraries”. Under these types of accusations, the stoic Cosmology and Theory of the Freedom of the Will is often to be included. This phenomenal self-contradiction inside the Principles of Stoicism becomes even more ob...
Digestion and Moral Progress in Epictetus
Journal of Ancient Philosophy , 2019
The Stoic Epictetus famously criticizes his students for studying Stoicism as ‘mere theory’ and encouraged them to add training to their educational program. This is made all the more interesting by the fact that Epictetus, as a Stoic, was committed to notion that wisdom is sufficient to be virtuous, so theory should be all that’s required to achieve virtue. How are we then to make sense of Epictetus criticism of an overreliance on theory, and his insistence on adding training? This paper argues that this tension can be resolved through an appeal to the metaphor of ‘digesting theory’. Epictetus discusses the digestion of theory in three parts of his existent work. While the use of digestion as a metaphor for moral progress in Epictetus has been noted, an explanation as to exactly what this process consists of has yet to be provided. This paper attempts to provide such an account. I argue that digestion consists of assimilating what we have learnt conceptually, at the level of general principles, into specific beliefs concerning existent objects. I argue further that this process of digestion can only be achieved through what Epictetus calls training (askesis).
The Piety of the Determined Will: A Critique of Stoic Freedom
The Stoic's were aware of the problem of reconciling a deterministic view of the universe with a preservation of the responsibility and freedom of an individual's will. Stoic philosophy does not adopt a traditional conception of libertarian freedom, where individuals can act freely with respect to multiple different actions in the world1. Instead, the individual is fated to act in a specific way, but is free to assent, or not assent, to the validity of impressions which are presented to the mind2. The Stoic doctrine of determinism states that the universe as a whole is God, and that the will of God determines the entirety of this universe. Reconciling the doctrine of a determined universe with the idea of free assent is imperative to the Stoic philosophy, but brings about significant problems. In this paper, I examine the concept of assent in Stoic philosophy. Assent is intended to help the Stoic reconcile determinism with individual freedom and responsibility. Specifically, I aim to critique Chrysippus' distinction between principal and auxiliary causes, and its implications on the relationship between the individual and God. I conclude that Chrysippus' notion of assent as an auxiliary cause does not avoid the problem of reconciling determinism and individual responsibility. Furthermore, the conception of the individual as free places the individual's volition outside of the will of God. Any attempt to reserve a space for individual freedom from fate, as is the case with the freedom to assent or dissent to given presentations, comes at the cost of the Stoic claim that the universe as a whole is 1 Also known as the principle of alternate possibilities, or PAP for short (O'Keefe, 11). 2 Different Stoics differ on the degree of freedom attributed to the mind. Chrysippus did not think the mind was as free to alter its own beliefs and desires as did the earlier Stoics. Instead, he aimed to reconcile the concepts of assent and causation with the deterministic nature of the world, including the mind (Hellenistic Philosophy, II-90.39).