The phenomenological connection: an account of perception and knowledge (original) (raw)

At the Heart of Reason : Review in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

A tectonic shift is taking place in French philosophy in the 21 st century. While French philosophers of the past largely ignored work in Analytic philosophy, it has now become an essential part of the academic training of young scholars in France, thus giving rise to a new style of French thinker who is equally versed in the so-called Continental and Analytic traditions. Claude Romano, a professor at the University of Paris-Sorbonne, is a prime example of this new breed of scholar and also a leading voice in French philosophy today. This book, Romano's sixth, marks his most ambitious project to date and is essential reading for anyone who is interested in pursuing a substantive dialogue between Continental and Analytic traditions of thought.

Davidson and the Demise of Representationalism

Acting, Interpreting, Understanding, 2011

The master concept of modern and contemporary epistemology, namely, the idea that thoughts, statements, and beliefs have content in virtue of their capacity to represent reality accurately, 1 has attracted the admiration and attention of many philosophers throughout the ages. Typifi ed historically by Descartes, Locke, Kant, Frege, Russell, Tarski, Carnap, and the early Wittgenstein, this line of thought is so profoundly rooted in the tradition that it is hard to conceive of any alternative to it. Yet one prominent countertradition common to Hegel, 2 Husserl, Dewey, the later Wittgenstein, the later Heidegger, 3 Quine, Rorty, Dennett, and Davidson has shown us how to avoid representationalism, suggesting a new way of describing knowledge and inquiry. Davidson, in particular, has given a renewed impulse to antirepresentationalism through his critique, in "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 4 of the foundations of the scheme-content dichotomy. This dualism, which Davidson reconnects to the Cartesian dualism of the objective and the subjective, is grounded in the conception of the "mind with its private states and objects," and in the idea that truth consists in the correct mirroring of facts. 5 In the wake of Davidson's critique, and without recourse to the schemecontent dichotomy, it is diffi cult to conceive of knowledge in terms of representational relations between language and world. The abandonment of representationalism, namely, the demolition of what Davidson calls the "myth of subjective," brings with it a refusal of the notion of correspondence between language and world, between sentences and facts-a refusal of the idea that statements and beliefs correspond or are " made true by facts ." 6 Davidson's refutation of the representational model begins with both Tarski's semantic conception, and Frege's argument, called by Barwise and Perry the "slingshot argument," 7 which gives us reason for rejecting facts as such. 8

What Davidson said to the sceptic

Davidson believes that "it is good to be rid of representations"-good, we may presume, for the purposes of giving a philosophical account of the relations between thinking, language--using creatures-agents-and the world they think and talk about. 2 He also thinks that we have good reason to reject the hypothesis that our beliefs about the world are largely mistaken. The second contention has received a great deal more attention than the first. 4 Nevertheless, these two claims are so closely related that they may be seen as manifestations of a single line of thought, which we might call Davidson=s anti--representationalism. In this paper I try to understand that line of thought. To that end, I will address the following questions. Firstly, what does Davidson mean to reject when he rejects representations? Secondly, exactly how are the considerations Davidson musters against the idea that thoughts are representations related to his arguments against scepticism? Finally, what is the force of Davidson=s anti--sceptical considerations?

In the Light of Experience: Essays on Reasons and Perception

2018

Empirical thought is made true or false by how the world is. Through experience subjects are brought into contact with the empirical world. Hence, the following premise seems as solid a starting point for philosophical enquiry as any: Perceptual experience provides reasons for empirical thought. Though not uncontested 1 most philosophers agree that this premise must be true, understood some way or another. Experiences provide reasons for empirical thought by making our surroundings accessible to us in some epistemically salient way. The compelling nature of this premise allows one to ask questions on the form: what must experience/thought/reasons/the world be like if perceptual experience is to provide reasons for empirical thought? If anything unites the papers in this anthology it is their outset in a question of roughly this form. However, the seeming unity in outset is shattered once we look closer at how the individual authors understand the notions of 'experience' , 'reason' , 'the world' , and 'accessible'. With different understandings of the key notions, the shared agreement that perceptual experience must provide reasons disintegrates to a plethora of different philosophical theories and opinions. Our goal with this introduction is to provide what can at best be a minimal roadmap, which traces the various agreements and differences in views. A fruitful starting point is McDowell's interpretation of the shared premise, as many of the papers in this anthology situate themselves as responses to, or elaborations of, McDowell's views. The first notion to look at is 'perceptual experience'. To McDowell experience is an essentially passive mental occurrence. 2 It is thus not simply a species of belief that is especially tied to perceptual phenomenology or held in some peculiar way. Experience is a non-doxastic passive mental state attributable to the subject. 3 Next in line is the notion of 'provides'. One way of being the provider of something is by being the very thing provided. Milk provides nutrition because milk is nutritious. Another way of being a provider, which we may call mere providing, is by making that 1 Davidson (1986) famously rejects this. 2 McDowell (1996) p. 10. 3 On this point McDowell's view is in contrast with the view expounded by Ginsborg in Paper 4 of this anthology.

Donald Davidson as an Analytic Phenomenologist: Husserl and Davidson on Anomalous Monism and Action

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2023

This paper puts the theories of Donald Davidson into conversation with those of Edmund Husserl, arguing that their work can be read as representing different species of a singular kind, with both defending: (1) versions of anomalous monism, and (2) the legitimacy of event explanation by way of intentionality, rationality, and talk of agentive action. Through these they provide an account of the mental that aligns with the physical while also avoiding the mental's nomological capture, or its reduction to physicalist causality. A demonstration will be provided in closing as to why this Husserlian-Davidson position is worth exploring, as we will utilize their conjunction as a platform for responding to problems raised against anomalous monism and the intentional rationalization of action by behaviorists, eliminativists, pragmatists, and conceptualists. In this manner their paired reading will be shown to enlighten us about the nature of their individual theories, while simultaneously deepening our understanding of the nature of the (1-2) problematic that their theories shared in common.