Healthcare Intermediaries: Competition and Healthcare Policy at Loggerheads (original) (raw)
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We are grateful to editor Janet Currie for support and encouragement and to her and four anonymous referees for helpful comments that substantially improved the paper. All opinions expressed here and any errors are the sole responsibility of the authors. No endorsement or approval by any other individuals or institutions is implied or should be inferred. In particular, the views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Trade Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at
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