“Essence and existence”, in Encyclopaedia of Islam – Three, ed. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas and Everett Rowson (section editor: Ayman Shihadeh), Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2015, IV, pp. 118b-124b. (original) (raw)
Oriens, 2017
The essence-existence distinction was a central issue in metaphysical disputes among post-Avicennian thinkers in the Islamic world. One group argued that what a thing is is different from that it is only conceptually. A rival view would have it that the distinction between essence and existence is real. The purpose of this article is to analyze the philosophical core of the dispute, by isolating the main arguments and their metaphysical foundations. I will study four central issues of the essence-existence debate: (1) the argument that existence is distinct from essence because one can conceive of an essence without knowing whether it exists; (2) the argument that if existence were really distinct from essence, existence would itself have to exist, leading to an infinite regress; (3) the question of whether God is responsible for the existence of essences only or also for their essential content (this relates to the problem of the ontological status of the non-existent); (4) the problem of whether essences are prior to existence.
Wuğūd-Mawğūd/Existence-Existent in Avicenna. A key ontological notion of Arabic philosophy
Quaestio, 2003
In order to analyze the notion of existence in the Arabic-Islamic context, with any sort of thoroughness, one would have to investigate many often mutually contradictory elements. An exploration of the meaning of the terms implicit in this notion would need to take into account the difference between the existential and the predicative function of the verb "to be" as well as the theory first found in Arabic philosophy (falsafa) concerning the distinction between essence and existence. At the same time one could not afford to ignore the contribution of theology, in the form of the Qur'an itself 1 and the discussions about the meaning of the term "thing" in the Mu'tazilite and the Aš'arite schools; one would also have to include Sufism and the mystical branch of Islamic philosophy, particularly the concept of "unity of existence" (waÌdat al-wuǧºd) 2. In this brief article we shall, without pretending to be exhaustive, examine only the basic elements, starting with terminological questions (and perhaps exposing problems rather than of-* I would like to thank Karen Christenfeld for her help in preparing the English version of this article.
"Wujud-Mawjud/Existence-Existent in Avicenna. A Key Ontological Notion of Arabic Philosophy"
Quaestio (éd. Brepols/Pagina, Bari), 3 (2003), pp. 111-138
In order to analyze the notion of existence in the Arabic-Islamic context, with any sort of thoroughness, one would have to investigate many often mutually contradictory elements. An exploration of the meaning of the terms implicit in this notion would need to take into account the difference between the existential and the predicative function of the verb "to be" as well as the theory first found in Arabic philosophy (falsafa) concerning the distinction between essence and existence. At the same time one could not afford to ignore the contribution of theology, in the form of the Qur'an itself 1 and the discussions about the meaning of the term "thing" in the Mu'tazilite and the Aš'arite schools; one would also have to include Sufism and the mystical branch of Islamic philosophy, particularly the concept of "unity of existence" (waÌdat al-wuǧºd) 2 . In this brief article we shall, without pretending to be exhaustive, examine only the basic elements, starting with terminological questions (and perhaps exposing problems rather than of-* I would like to thank Karen Christenfeld for her help in preparing the English version of this article.
2020
Avicenna is an influential philosopher whose contributions in ontology led to the transformation of Greek philosophy into philosophical theology in the Middle Ages. He distinguished between existence and essence, divided beings into necessary and contingent beings, and believed in the objectivity of existence. This article discusses Avicenna’s innovations in philosophical ontology and its influence on Christian ontology and theology, especially on Aquinas’ thought. The article focuses on the distinction between existence and essence and its implications in Avicenna’s philosophy and studies its influence on Aquinas’ theology. It will show that although Aquinas, especially in his De Ente et Essentia, is influenced by Avicenna’s ontology, his understanding of Avicenna’s views are sometimes inaccurate, and this has led him to disagree with Avicenna in some cases.
Aristotle and Essentialism about Existence
As Stephen Menn (2021: 200) has recently reminded us, there was a time when philosophers used to be split into essentialists and existentialists, with Aristotle being regarded as a champion of essentialism. For essentialists existence should be somehow analysed in terms of essence, while existentialists take existence to be primitive and irreducible. This way of looking at things, which originated in a neo-Thomist environment, found its way into the analytic philosophy tradition as well. We often read that, on Aristotle's view, for a thing to exist is for it to be essentially something or other or, equivalently, that for a thing to exist is for it to be a member of some kind or other. My view is that Aristotle is an essentialist about existence. But essentialism about existence comes in different varieties and it is important to determine which one can be attributed to him. This is what I will do in this paper. I will show that there are several things that Aristotle's particular version of essentialism does not imply. Two in particular will be at the centre of this study. For one thing, Aristotle's strategy about existence is not eliminativist. Existence claims, statements etc. are perfectly understandable on their own, and should in no way be replaced by claims and statements about essences. Essentialism about existence is a metaphysical analysis of existence and not an attempt to eliminate altogether all discourse about existence. Another thing that Aristotle's essentialism does not imply is that only essential properties entail existence. Essential properties define in some sense a thing's existence and entail its existence, but standard accidental properties entail existence, too. Those that do not are in many ways non-standard properties. Thus, the distinction between existence-entailing properties and those that do not entail existence cannot be drawn along the lines of the essential-accidental divide. This paper breaks into three parts. In Sections 2-3, I deal with Aristotle's treatment of existence sentences. In Section 2, I argue that, for Aristotle, existence and predicative sentences are distinct types of sentences, which differ syntactically and to some extent semantically. In Section 3, I show, in line with other interpreters, that Aristotle's distinction between existence and predicative sentences cannot be accounted for by the modern, Frege-Russell style distinction between different senses of the verb 'to be' (such as the predicative, identity, existential sense etc.), as there is no such distinction in Aristotle. Sections 4-5 deal with essentialism about existence. In Section 4, I argue that Aristotle does defend the essentialist claim that to exist for something is to be a member of a kind, where 'kind' should be understood in terms of both the lowest kinds and the general categories of being things belong to. I also show that the essentialist claim has the important semantic consequence that 'to exist' has different senses when applied to things of different kinds. In Section 5, I contend that Aristotle's essentialism about existence fundamentally remains a metaphysical claim and so argues against the so-called ellipsis claim, i.e. the claim that essentialism about existence implies that existence sentences should be paraphrased into instances of essential predications. In the section, l also caution against Menn (2021)'s conclusion that the failure of the ellipsis claim implies that Aristotle does not hold essentialism about existence. Sections 6-7 address the issue of existence-entailing properties. I show that it is wrong to think that Aristotle's essentialism implies that only essential properties and predicates entail existence. By contrast, his view is that, in standard cases, all accidental properties and predicates entail existence, too, and property possession is a mark of existence for Aristotle. I will make my point by looking at the issue of the existential import of declarative sentences, i.e. whether true declarative sentences require the existence of the objects they are about. My analysis will show that declarative sentences do normally have existential import for Aristotle (Section 6) and those that do not are non-standard in one way or another (Section 7). 2. EXISTENCE AND PREDICATION It may be useful to start by considering how Aristotle would convey ideas of existence in the first place and what form existence sentences would normally take for him. At the time Aristotle was writing, philosophical Greek had no verb corresponding to the English 'to exist'. It is natural for us to think that the complete use of the (Greek equivalent of the) verb 'to be' could be a good substitute for 'to exist'. Thus, on this proposal, a sentence like 'Socrates is' could normally be used to say that Socrates exists. Moreover, the sentence 'Socrates is', where 'is' is used completely and expresses existence, would normally be taken to be different from the sentence 'Socrates is sick'. In the latter, the 'is' is used incompletely or as a copula and expresses predication, the attribution of a property or character to an object. As Kahn's studies have shown 1 , however, one should be cautious here and not assume, right from the start, that Aristotle, or any other Greek philosopher before him, should take sentences of the form 'Socrates is' to have existential force or the incomplete use of 'to be' to bear an existential meaning. The distinction between the complete and the incomplete use of 'to be' is syntactic, and may not be mirrored by a semantic distinction between existential and predicative sense. The complete use of 'to be' is certainly a good candidate for expressing existence, but other options were certainly available to Aristotle, including that of having recourse to the incomplete use of 'to be'. For instance, one could certainly use such expressions as 'is something' or 'is there', where 'is' is used incompletely, to say that a certain thing exists. Against this background, the interesting 1 Cf. Kahn (1966) and (1986).
Meaning and Definition: Scepticism and Semantics in Twelfth-Century Arabic Philosophy
Theoria, 2020
The theory of essential definitions is a fundamental anti-sceptic element of the Aristotelian-Avicennian epistemology. In this theory, when we distinguish the genus and the specific differentia of a given essence we thereby acquire a scientific understanding of it. The aim of this article is to analyse systematically the sceptical reasons, arguments and conclusions against real definitions of three major authorities of twelfth-century Arabic philosophy: Faḫr al-Dīn al-Razī, Šihab al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī and Abu l-Barak at al-Baġdadī. I focus on showing how their refutation of our capacity to provide essential definitions of things is rooted in their semantic theory: we only know things under certain descriptions which are identical to the meanings of the words that we use to refer to them, yet these descriptions do not capture the essences of things in themselves. The best result one can achieve with Aristotelian-Avicennian scientific definitions is a "nominal definition". With this, Razī, Suhrawardī and Abu l-Barakat will put some serious epistemic limitations on our capacity to attain scientific knowledge of things, at least as Aristotle and Avicenna would have it.
A Mereological Construal of the Primary Notions Being and Thing in Avicenna and Aquinas
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2014
This study has two goals: first, to show that Avicenna’s account of being and thing significantly influenced Aquinas’s doctrine of the primary notions; second, to establish the value of adopting a mereological construal of these primary notions in the metaphysics of Avicenna and Aquinas. I begin with an explication of the mereological construal of the primary notions that casts these notions in terms of wholes and parts. Being and thing refer to the same entitative whole and have the same extension, but they are distinct in intension according to the different entitative parts they signify. Existence and essence constitute the two most fundamental entitative parts of every entitative whole. Being is taken to mean that which has existence, and thing signifies that which has essence. I then show how this mereological construal of the primary notions clarifies a number of texts in Avicenna and Aquinas. Finally, I address a few arguments against employing this mereological interpretation of the primary notions. De Haan, “A Mereological Construal of the Primary Notions Being and Thing in Avicenna and Aquinas” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Special Issue: Aquinas and the Arabic Philosophical Tradition, Richard Taylor ed., 88, 2 (2014): 335-360
Platonic and Neoplatonic Terminology for Being in Arabic translation by Cristina D'Ancona
Studia graeco-arabica 1 (2011), 2011
The Arabic version of the Enneads is the earliest datable text in which appears the term "anniyya", that features in Avicenna’s metaphysics and lies in the background of the Latin definition of the Causa prima as esse tantum, typical of the Liber de Causis. This paper examines some examples of the use of "to be" in the Arabic translation of the Enneads. It also discusses the description of the First Cause as ‘pure Being’ or ‘first Being’ in the Arabic Plotinus, and compares it with the Divine Names of the pseudo-Dionysius.