Procreative Beneficence, Diversity, Intersubjectivity and Imprecision (original) (raw)

The Moral Obligation to Create Children with the Best Chance of the Best Life

Bioethics, 2009

According to what we call the Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB), couples who decide to have a child have a significant moral reason to select the child who, given his or her genetic endowment, can be expected to enjoy most well-being. In the first part of this paper, we introduce PB, explain its content, grounds, and implications, and defend it against various objections. In the second part, we argue that PB is superior to competing principles of procreative selection such as that of procreative autonomy. In the third part of the paper, we consider the relation between PB and disability. We develop a revisionary account of disability, in which disability is a species of instrumental badness that is context-and person-relative. Although PB instructs us to aim to reduce disability in future children whenever possible, it does not privilege the normal. What matters is not whether future children meet certain biological or statistical norms, but what level of well-being they can be expected to have.

PROCREATIVE BENEFICENCE: WHY WE SHOULD SELECT THE BEST CHILDREN

Eugenic selection of embryos is now possible by employing in vitro fertilization (IVF) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). While PGD is currently being employed for the purposes of detecting chromosomal abnormalities or inherited genetic abnormalities, it could in principle be used to test any genetic trait such as hair colour or eye colour. Genetic research is rapidly progressing into the genetic basis of complex traits like intelligence and a gene has been identified for criminal behaviour in one family. Once the decision to have IVF is made, PGD has few`costs' to couples, and people would be more inclined to use it to select less serious medical traits, such as a lower risk of developing Alzheimer Disease, or even for non-medical traits. PGD has already been used to select embryos of a desired gender in the absence of any history of sex-linked genetic disease. I will argue that: (1) some non-disease genes affect the likelihood of us leading the best life; (2) we have a reason to use information which is available about such genes in our reproductive decision-making; (3) couples should select embryos or fetuses which are most likely to have the best life, based on available genetic information, including information about non-disease genes. I will also argue that we should allow selection for non-disease genes even if this maintains or increases social inequality. I will focus on genes for intelligence and sex selection. I will defend a principle which I call Procreative Beneficence: couples (or single reproducers) should select the child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information.

In defence of procreative beneficence

Journal of Medical Ethics, 2007

The Principle of Procreative Beneficence is the Principle that we should select the best child, of the possible children we could have. I elaborate this principle and defend it against a range of objections. In particular, I focus on four objections which Michael Parker raises: that is it underdetermining, that it is insensitive to the complex nature of the good, that is self-defeating and it is overly individualistic. Procreative Beneficence is a useful principle in reproductive decision making. We should be more active in making selection decisions about what kind of child to have.

On the partiality of procreative beneficence: a critical note

Journal of Mecical Ethics

Abstract The aim of this paper is to criticise the well-discussed Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB) lately refined by Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane. First, it is argued that advocates of PB leave us with an implausible justification for the moral partiality towards the child (or children) reproducers decide to bring into existence as compared with all other individuals. This is implausible because the reasons given in favour of the partiality of PB, which are based on practical reason and common-sense morality, can just as well be used to guide reproducers to make choices that do not support partiality towards one’s possible children. This seems to be true as least in some situations. Secondly, it is argued that Jakob Elster’s recent critique of PB is problematic, and specifically that a counterexample designed by Elster to criticise PB because of its partiality towards one’s own children misses the target. Finally, a genuine counterexample to PB is developed in order to show that the partiality of PB means it gives the wrong answer in a specific case.

Procreative Beneficence and Genetic Enhancement

Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy, 2018

Imagine a world where everyone is healthy, intelligent, long living and happy. Intuitively this seems wonderful albeit unrealistic. However, recent scientific breakthroughs in genetic engineering, namely CRISPR/Cas bring the question into public discourse, how the genetic enhancement of humans should be evaluated morally. In 2001, when preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and in vitro fertilisation (IVF), enabled parents to select between multiple embryos, Julian Savulescu introduced the principle of procreative beneficence (PPB), stating that parents have the obligations to choose the child that is expected to have the best life. In this paper I argue that accepting the PPB and the consequentialist principle (CP) that two acts with the same consequences are morally on par, commits one to accepting the parental obligation of genetically enhancing one's children.

Equality and the Duties of Procreators

The Moral and Political Status of Children, 2002

I formulate and defend a theory of special procreative duties in the context of a liberal egalitarian theory of justice. I argue that (1) the only special duty that procreators owe their offspring is that of ensuring that their life prospects are non-negative (worth living), and (2) the only special duty that procreators owe others is that of ensuring that they are not disadvantaged by the procreators' offspring (a) violating their rights or (b) adversely affecting their equality rights and duties.