‘Self-Interest and the Distant Vulnerable’, Ethics and International Affairs 30, no. 3 (2016), 335-53. (original) (raw)
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This Article explores three theories of humanitarian intervention that appear in, or are inspired by, the writings of Hugo Grotius. One theory asserts that natural law authorizes all states to punish violations of the law of nations, irrespective of where or against whom the violations occur, to preserve the integrity of international law. A second theory, which also appears in Grotius’s writings, proposes that states may intervene as temporary legal guardians for peoples who have suffered intolerable cruelties at the hands of their own state. Each of these theories has fallen out of fashion today based on skepticism about their natural law underpinnings and concerns about how they have facilitated Western colonialism. As an alternative, this Article outlines a third theory that builds upon Grotius’s account of humanitarian intervention as a fiduciary relationship, while updating Grotius’s account for the twenty-first century. According to this new fiduciary theory, when states inte...
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In this piece, we take issue with several recent state-defined migration crises in Latin America. As in other colonized areas of the world, discussions about humanitarianism in Latin America are necessarily linked to the legacy of conquest, colonialism and imperialism. By revisiting the sixteenth-century Valladolid Debate regarding the humanity of indigenous peoples in the Americas, we seek to establish historical links to contem- porary humanitarian discourses and practices aimed at excluding, controlling and managing mobile populations. Taking our point of departure in changes in migration legislation in Ecuador and three particular groups of incoming populations – Cubans and Haitians, Venezuelans and Ecuadoran nationals deported from the United States – we compare the various relationships between state power and humanitarian claims in these cases. Special emphasis is given to situations that generate rationales for different kinds of humanitarian intervention and claims regarding the regulation of movement and borders. Our comparison of different ‘migration crises’ exposes some of the inherent contradictions between migration control on the one hand and claims in respect of humanitarian action and the protection of migrants on the other. These contradictions both challenge and reinforce deep-seated ideas about sovereignty, security and prosperity, as well as what kinds of lives are deemed worthy of intervention.