Language without Ontology: Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and the Semantic Tradition (original) (raw)
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Тhe semantic ontology in Wittgenstein’s philosophy
2020
The aim of this article is to sketch the place the theory of meaning has in the overall conception of young Wittgenstein, and to derive from that some of it’s general and central characteristics. The idea of extracting a theory of meaning from the Treatise does take a central stand in this work, since it presupposes an interpretation of the book as a whole.
Essays on the philosophy of Wittgenstein
2010
This is the first of two volumes containing the proceedings of the 32 nd International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg/Lower Austria, August 2009. The overall topic of this conference, "Language and World", can be seen as central to Wittgenstein's philosophy. When he was once asked by Yorick Smythies what he regarded as the greatest problem in philosophy, Wittgenstein's answer was "Subject and predicate". We have decided to dedicate this first volume solely to Wittgenstein's philosophy. The four sections only provide a very basic structure. Several contributions easily fit into more than one section. Some of the contributions even might have needed an altogether different heading. The chapter "Wittgenstein's Nachlass" results from a workshop on new aspects of Wittgenstein's published and unpublished writings. The editors would like to express their gratitude to all the contributors and to those who took part in the many and lively discussions during the conference. Without them this volume would never have happened. We would also like to thank the board of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society and our publisher Dr. Rafael Hüntelmann for supporting us all the way through. This volume and the conference were sponsored by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research as well by the Government of the Province of Lower Austria. We are very grateful for their generous funding.
The Late Wittgenstein and Late Husserl on Language and its Role in the Constitution of Reality , 2021
The Late Wittgenstein and Late Husserl on Language and its Role in the Constitution of Reality This article investigates the role of language in the constitution of reality in E. Husserl’s phenomenology and L. Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. I have discovered some resemblances and differences in their ideas and concepts on language and its role in the constitution of reality, and how their ideas complement each other in a few as- pects. We can find common features in such concepts as ‘languages-games’, ‘forms of life’, ‘picture of the world’, and the ‘community of monads’, ‘life–world’. Both philosophers are in their late periods interested in the same problems (intersubjective world, values, meanings, beliefs, culture) but from different points of view. Husserl suggested we “Return to the things themselves!” while Wittgenstein called us “Back to solid ground!”. These philosophies represent two ways to our living world: from consciousness and from language. Wittgenstein told us that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life. It is what we do and who we are and what gives meaning to our life. The problem of intersubjectivity and understanding of others is central for both Wittgenstein and Husserl. Wittgenstein said: I cannot understand a lion’s language because I do not know what his world is like. I do fail in understanding because I cannot get in its mind. Husserl, in Logical Investigations, considers language as something purely external in relation to meaning. This understanding of language can be called instrumental. In his analysis, Husserl seeks to study the language with a predetermined goal: to completely subordinate it to the idea of ‘pure science’ and to distinguish the language of theory from language natural. It should become a suit- able expression tool without introducing any distortion. The role of language in phenomenological work, Husserl believes, should be minimal and generally be reduced to ‘pure expression’.
The ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A bibliography
2016
Frege's notion of concept-the reference (vs. the sense) of a predicate-is here compared with cognate notions in Husserl's Logical Investigations and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Their common trait is unsaturatedness or existential dependency: the different treatment of this chief notion of formal ontology is in turn examined comparatively, with regard to the conflicts and the alliances taking tacitly place between the three. In Frege's notion of concept, at any rate, an inner tension arises from its twofold nature of property and of truth-function: saturation and function/argument are too heterogeneous models. Hints for a way out suggested." 17.
The Contemporary Significance of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy
2014
In his post-Tractatus work on natural language use, Wittgenstein defended the notion of what he dubbed the autonomy of grammar. According to this thought, grammar – or semantics, in a more recent idiom – is essentially autonomous from metaphysical considerations, and is not answerable to the nature of things. The argument has several related incarnations in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus writings, and has given rise to a number of important insights, both critical and constructive. In this paper I will argue for a potential connection between Wittgenstein’s autonomy argument and some more recent internalist arguments for the autonomy of semantics. My main motivation for establishing this connection comes from the fact that the later Wittgenstein’s comments on grammar and meaning stand in opposition to some of the core assumptions of semantic externalism.
Ontology, semantics and philosophy of mind in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A formal reconstruction
Erkenntnis, 1988
This paper presents a formal explication of Wittgenstein's early views on ontology, the syntax and semantics of an ideal logical language, and the propositional attitudes. It is shown that Wittgenstein gave a "language of thought" analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions, and that his ontological views imply that such ascriptions are truth-functions of (and supervenient upon) elementary sentences. Finally, an axiomatization of a quantified doxastic modal logic corresponding to Tractarian semantics is given. First published in Erkenntnis 29 (1988), 35-75. ISSN 0165-0106.