Are we in a cyberwar? (original) (raw)
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This chapter starts off with a short overview of the relevant literature available to any scholar delving into the issue of cyberwar. This issue warrants special attention in the context of this research compendium because there are a couple of difficulties involved: The specialist literature is mostly policy-oriented, and only very rarely informed by theory, whether from the IR discipline or any other field. The second section looks at definitional issues in more depth and will trace how meaning of ‘cyberwar’ evolved from the narrow conception referring exclusively to military interaction to its broad meaning, which has become detached from ‘war’ and encompasses almost every activity linked to the aggressive use of computers. The third section investigates four cases between 1999 and 2007 that have been labelled ‘cyberwar’ by a variety of actors. In the fourth section, a reality check based on these cases is performed. We see that while cyber-vandalism is an everyday reality, cyberwar is not. After speculating on possible restraints for the use of cyberwar tools in the future, the chapter concludes with thoughts on the danger inherent in cyberwar ideas due to the realities of a globalised, interdependent, and networked world.
Why the World Needs an International Cyberwar Convention
Philosophy & Technology, 2017
States’ capacity for using modern information and communication technology to inflict grave harm on enemies has been amply demonstrated in recent years, with many countries reporting large-scale cyberattacks against their military defense systems, water supply, and other critical infrastructure. Currently, no agreed-upon international rules or norms exist to govern international conflict in cyberspace. Many governments prefer to keep it that way. They argue that difficulties of verifiability and challenges posed by rapid technological change rule out agreement on an international cyber convention. Instead, they prefer to rely on informal cooperation and strategic deterrence to limit direct conflict. In this article, I seek to rebut some of themain objections to seeking an international convention on the use of cyber weapons. While there are significant obstacles to achieving effective arms control in the cyber domain, historical experience from other areas of international arms control suggests that none of these obstacles are insurmountable. Furthermore, while most critics of cyberarms control assume that cyberspace favors offensive strategies, closer inspection reveals the dominance of cyber-defensive strategies. This in turn improves prospects for striking an effective international agreement on cyberarms control.