Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the founders’ perspective, and the varieties of capitalism (original) (raw)
Related papers
2010
In the literature the issue of the protection of stakeholder interests (of employees in particular) is usually considered in a static context: how should the institutions of corporate governance be shaped having regard to already existing firms, conforming in particular to some subjective criteria of fairness and fair play. It is remarkable that no attention is usually paid to the basic fact that a company in order to exist must first be established, and that the founders-owners are the original shareholders.
Corporate governance and democracy: The stakeholder debate revisited
Journal of Management and Governance, 2002
Stakeholding' is a term laden with many meanings. In this pape r we attempt to put some order on the discourse by confining attention to the corporation. We assess the origins and the intellectual foundations of the 'shareholder versus stakeholder' debate. We ask whether and how 'stakeholding' might be a more logical or rational system, a fairer or more democratic system, and one that provides better performative outcomes. Each of these claims is assessed in respect to the micro firm perspective and the macro economy wide perspective.
Corporate Governance and Protection of Stakeholders Rights and Interests
Beijing Law Review, 2020
The paper takes a holistic view of corporate governance (CG) and protection of stakeholders' rights and interests. It analyzes whether effective boards of directors in addressing shareholders' interests prove to be effective in guaranteeing the interests of the rest of the firm's stakeholders. It discusses how corporate governance should be shaped in relation to existing firms, according in particular to some subjective criteria of fairness and fair play. It defines CG and explains the concept by stating its principles and codes as contained in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It states that countries such as Nigeria, the United States and the United Kingdom have developed their CG principles with corporate social responsibility (CSR) intent by using as a guideline the OECD principles and other sources of rules and principles of CG which includes the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Investment and Securities Act and a host of others. It states that the concept of CG applies to corporate businesses across the globe by highlighting the importance and specifying the distribution of rights and responsibilities among various corporate stakeholders such as board members, managers, shareholders and outlining the rules and procedures for making decisions. In doing so, it also provides the mechanism by which the company's objectives are set, ways to achieve these and monitoring performance. The paper acknowledges that CG is a vital issue where a corporate organization is concerned but asserts that it is impossible for an organization to satisfy all stakeholders hence it is best to create a balance between meeting organizational objectives and that of its stakeholders.
Stakeholder Protection, Varieties of Capitalism, and Long-Term Unemployment
2012
Abstract: In the literature the issue of the protection of stakeholder interests (of employees in particular) is usually considered in a static context: how should the institutions of corporate governance be shaped having regard to already existing firms, conforming, in particular, to some subjective criteria of fairness and fair play. It is remarkable that no attention is paid to the basic fact that a company in order to exist must first be established, and that the founders-owners are the original shareholders.
The Case for Introducing Stakeholder Corporations
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The objective of this paper is describe how the nature of corporations can and should be reformed to make them an explicit instrument for building an efficient, equitable and sustainable society that is locally controlled. The paper traces how the current concerns over the role of the modern corporation arose from their origin as an explicit instrument of political and economic colonisation. While rights of perpetual succession were consistent with the political origins of corporations, this allows investors to get overpaid with "surplus profits" that exacerbates global inequality in income and wealth. Another problem arises from democracy being undermined by family ownership and/or through what Peter Drucker describes as "pension fund socialism". Tax incentives are proposed to provide shareholders a bigger, quicker less risky short term profit in return for changing corporate constitutions to transfer their property rights to stakeholders over 20 years. The competing interests arising from stakeholder governance introduces self-governance, sustainable competitive advantages and enriches democracy. A Global Community Investment Code to promote the adoption of incentives to create stakeholder corporations is suggested in multi-national forums to counter concerns over globalisation.
Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance
2007
Abstract: The paper is divided in two coordinate parts. The first considers in general the issue of stockholders vs. stakeholders oriented governance systems and their relative merits and demerits. The second part deals specifically with the issue of the principal-agent problem in a stakeholder context.