SUICIDAL RIGHTS (original) (raw)
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The right to life in a suicidal state
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 2013
Suicide prevention may be a key national priority in many countries, but the common law of negligence has traditionally been reluctant to oblige the State and its citizens to prevent others from taking their own life. An individualist philosophy dissuades us from being our brother's keeper, preferring us to look after ourselves and to take responsibility for our actions. Whilst legislation promotes good Samaritanism in certain parts of the world, the common law of negligence positively discourages it in others by rendering rescuers liable for bungling an intervention, despite their best of intentions. Recent developments in human rights law are slowly realigning historically divergent legal and moral obligations towards those in a suicidal state of mind. This article will focus on the circumstances in which a suicidist's right to life may trump the law regarding omissions by positively requiring the State to intervene to preserve life. After analysing the concept of an "autonomous suicide" and its ethical boundaries, the civil liability for acts and omissions in the face of suicide shall be outlined and the 'ugly Samaritan' exposed. Attention will then shift to the interlocking human rights which bear upon notions of respect for physical and moral integrity, a 2010) or to jump to their death. 3 Unless Parliament decrees otherwise, to compel us to live for longer than we wish will usually be a criminal and civil assault. 4 This stark legal position mirrors the libertarian ethical principle of non-interference. In legal terms, according to Justice Cardozo, 'every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body'. 5 Whilst in ethical terms, according to John Stuart Mill, '[o]ver himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign' and our 'own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant' for intervention (Mill, 1859, p. 22). These often-cited legal and ethical perspectives sit comfortably side by side and portray the traditional notion of individual autonomy. The consequences of respecting an autonomous decision are clearly gravest when people wish to suicide, whether by refusing life-saving treatment or by some other means. 6 But that gravity does 3 Suicide Act 1961 section 1 (England and Wales) decriminalised the act of suicide: 'The rule of law whereby it is a crime for a person to commit suicide is hereby abrogated.' Whether this thereby created a 'right to die' is considered below.
One of the most frequently used arguments for the legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia is that assisted suicide and euthanasia are rooted in a right to personal autonomy. Thus, in its decision challenging the Criminal Code of Canada’s prohibition of aiding or abetting a person to commit suicide, the Canadian Supreme Court declared that people’s decision to end their own lives when faced with a “grievous and irremediable medical condition is a matter critical to their dignity and autonomy.” In line with the Court’s emphasis on autonomy, the preamble to Bill C-14, the law enacted by Canadian Parliament permitting assisted suicide and euthanasia in Canada, opens with a recognition of the “autonomy of persons who have a grievous and irremediable medical condition that causes enduring and intolerable suffering and who wish to seek medical assistance in dying.” The purpose of this paper is to refute the libertarian notion of autonomy that is enshrined in Carter and C-14 and that underlies their justification for assisted suicide and euthanasia. This notion is a fundamentally libertarian one. It is rooted in a doctrine of liberty which regards each person as free to do what/she wants provided he/she does not interfere with another’s freedom to do what he/she wants. Individual autonomy is therefore an absolute, and a person’s actions are subject to no higher measure than his/her own desires. To refute this erroneous understanding of autonomy, we first point out that it does not correspond to the concrete reality of our existence as social beings. Second, we show that the doctrine of autonomy as including the right to kill oneself logically leads to the erosion of all limits on assisted suicide and euthanasia. Third, we manifest that the exaltation of autonomy to the level of an absolute actually undermines autonomy because true autonomy, rather than being an end in itself, is directed toward the good. Fourth, we show that assisted suicide and euthanasia are not acts of true autonomy because they are opposed to three goods in particular: the good of the patient's own existence, the common good, and the divine good.
Constitutionality of Attempt to Commit Suicide- Unlocking The Controversy
Medico-Legal Update, 2020
A person is born free but he does not have this freedom to choose his death. Suicide is a deliberate act of killing of oneself. Suicide as such is not a crime but when an attempt is taken it can be considered as one under Section 309 of Indian Penal Code. The debate round the corner is whether attempt to commit suicide should be punished or not. A person was aware of the outcome of committing suicide, still knowingly takes an attempt. Suicide as a problem is the mixture of social, psychological, philosophical, moral, ethical and legal reasons behind it. An act of suicide requires grave awareness because there is nothing an ordinary prudent man fears more than his death, and that fear in the huge majority of cases, is as logical as it is inevitable. This paper has drawn the attention towards the ongoing debate of retaining or deleting Section 309 by testing its validity on the ground of Article 21 of the constitution of India which provides right to life as a fundamental right.
Choosing death: the moral status of suicide
Psychiatric Bulletin, 1996
Our moral conception of suicide is examined. It is argued that a neutral definition of suicide is difficult to achieve and that how we treat the question of suicide shows what value we place on the sanctity of life or on life as a means to other ends. The case is made that autonomy, the principle of self-governance, has acquired special importance in the modem world to the detriment of other ethical principles such as beneficence.
Legalization of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: Foundational Issues and Implications
This paper takes a general approach by examining foundational issues, and the primary focus is on a single jurisdiction: Canada. It outlines the current legal criteria for euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canada, identifying differences in criteria for the procedures set by the Supreme Court of Canada, Quebec’s unique provincial euthanasia law, and the Criminal Code. Commentary drawing from anecdotal reports from eight dissenting physicians offers some insight into their experience since legalization of the procedures. Material from the public record provides additional context, and the commentary is informed by difficulties that have arisen in relation to morally contested procedures. The experience of dissenting physicians is affected by a number of variables, including cultural and social dynamics, differing beliefs, differing moral and social sensitivity and individual personalities. Four sources of stress are identified: the demand for collaboration in killing, the prospect of punishment, the continuing need to distinguish between cooperation and collaboration, and concern for their patients. Particular concerns of palliative care physicians are discussed, as well as concerns shared by other dissenting physicians. A detailed review of the moral underpinnings of the trial court decision in Carter v. Canada demonstrates that morality precedes and drives law. From this it is argued that a judge will either assume or construct a moral justification that supports a decision, even if this is not explicitly articulated in legal reasoning. These assertions are tested against the ruling of the Irish High Court in Fleming v. Ireland &Ors, which came to radically different conclusions about the risks presented by legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia. An extensive discussion distinguishes the obligation to kill from the more familiar authorization or justification of killing. An obligation to kill can be based upon a contract model of obligation, a social contract (professional) model, and a fiduciary model, each with increasingly serious consequences. To allow the state to enforce an obligation to kill under any of the three models is subversive of life, liberty and security of the person, even before issues of freedom of conscience and religion are considered. In addition, the implications of an obligation to kill suggest that, in the long term, assisted-suicide only regimes are likely to be unstable. Legislative developments demonstrate that the government of Canada supports totalitarian claims seeking total domination of will and intellect in moral decision-making, even in matters of life and death. The ground for this was prepared by demands that dissenting physicians should be forced to refer for abortion and contraception, which established popular support for the erroneous and incoherent principle that there can be a moral duty to do what one believes to be wrong. The Carter ruling formally ratified a new establishment orthodoxy, according to which refusing to at least collaborate in killing in circumstances defined by Carter is unacceptable. This new orthodoxy can be expected to operate at a foundational level, exerting a significant influence that may not be immediately obvious. A defense of freedom of conscience and religion must take this into account. In particular, the medico-legal establishment sees the exercise of freedom of conscience and religion through the dogmatic lens of the new orthodoxy. Dissenting physicians are viewed as heretics threatening an establishment theory of social contract. This is dogmatic moral imperialism, and not less so because the dogmatists are not ecclesiastical theorists and functionaries. It should be identified as such. Again, foundational moral beliefs shape jurisprudence. Judges should be challenged to candidly acknowledge and precisely articulate the philosophical or moral premises underpinning their positions. Similarly, what lies at the root of current controversies about freedom of conscience and religion is fundamental disagreement about the nature of the human person. Thus, judges should clearly acknowledge the credal concept of the human person that informs the evaluation of evidence and legal reasoning.
Journal of Disability Policy Studies, 2005
The opposition to a public policy of physician-assisted suicide from within the disability-rights community seems to be surprising to academics who are supporters of other civil rights movements. Physicianassisted suicide is seen by them as a part of a progressive political agenda, akin to abortion rights and the civil rights of minorities. Many disability-rights advocates see physician-assisted suicide as quite the opposite-an example of discrimination against people with disabilities and a threat to their individual rights. The great conflict between these two interpretations is not much reduced by listening to one another's arguments. Perhaps it will be better understood by considering how the political beliefs of real individuals have been changed by their own experiences with disability. This article reports how two individuals were led to change their beliefs about physician-assisted suicide as a result of their life experiences with disability. matized groups. We are still committed to self-determination as a basic human right. However, true self-determination must be based on genuine choices, not choices that are forced or coerced. We no longer believe that assisted suicide could be a genuine choice to people with disabilities and other stigmatized groups.